'The National, Regional & Global Phases of Jihadism': The Ideological Evolution & Geopolitical Transformation of Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East & Southeast Asia by Gray, Simon Reece
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
  
‘The National, Regional & Global Phases of Jihadism’ 
 
THE IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION & GEOPOLITICAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIST MILITANT TERRORISM 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree  
of  
Master of Arts in International Relations & Security Studies  
at the  
University of Waikato 
by  
SIMON REECE GRAY 
 
 
University of Waikato 
2012 
ii 
 
Abstract 
Since September 11
th
 2001 (9/11), substantial research has been conducted 
and published on the phenomenon of Islamist motivated militant terrorism; notably 
on the contemporary phenomenon of ‘global Jihadism’ and its growing threat to 
nations and the wider international community. However, little has analysed the 
different phases of ‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ 
manifested within the wider phenomenon itself. As a result, Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations are often lumped together and defined, or identified, as 
belonging to a single ideological and geopolitical homogenous movement. 
This study endeavours to highlight that not only is this notion incorrect, but 
that the phenomenon is threefold consisting of three fundamentally different 
ideological and geopolitical phases of Islamist militant terrorism and thus 
categories of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia. The three phases and categories of Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations are identified in the study as ‘National’, ‘Regional’ and ‘Global’. 
Each comprises and represents different ideological contours and geopolitical 
ambitions.   
Collectively, these three phases and categories of organisations make up 
this study’s hypothesis that there have been three ideological and geopolitical 
sequential shifts in the phenomenon. The study’s sequential shift paradigm tracks 
the trajectory of the phenomenon beginning with the manifestation of National 
Islamist militant terrorist organisations, developing into Regional Islamist militant 
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terrorist organisations and, finally, into Global Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations.  
The hypothesis is tested through an examination of Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Here, the considered 
organisations are measured against the sequential shift paradigm, which provides 
key insight into their ideological and geopolitical contours. In turn, this helps to 
identify and categorise the National, Regional and Global phases and categories of 
Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the two considered regions and, therefore, 
further advances support for the study’s hypothesis. The analysis presented in this 
thesis on the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism finds that the study’s 
hypothesis applies and is analytically accurate in the context of the Middle East. In 
the context of Southeast Asia the analysis supports that there has been a shift from 
National to Regional Islamist militant terrorism but, however, that the third and 
hence Global phase of the phenomenon has thus far, although active in the region, 
failed to fully manifest. Therefore, the analysis presented in this thesis supports that 
the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia has not undergone 
a decisive ideological evolution or geopolitical transformation into Global Islamist 
militant terrorism.         
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This study derives from the contemporary global phenomenon of Islamist 
militant terrorism and its growing capacity to destabilise and threaten national, 
regional and global security. Although representing a clear minority within the 
wider pool of Islam, Islamist militant terrorist organisations and individuals are, 
nevertheless, responsible for some of the most deadly, destructive and prevalent 
attacks in modern times; indiscriminately targeting both Muslim and non-Muslim 
civilian populations and nations alike. The research topic, which focuses on the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, does not, however, suggest that the phenomenon 
of Islamist militant terrorism is exclusively confined to these two regions, nor that 
the phenomenon is exclusively the cause of instability in the contemporary 
international system. Rather, both geographic regions collectively have a long 
history of the direct effects associated with this study’s hypothesised ‘ideological 
evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of the ‘National’, ‘Regional’ 
and ‘Global’ phases of Islamist militant terrorism. The Middle East is identified in 
this study as the geographic region that incorporates the nation states that span 
from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east and from Northern Sudan and Yemen 
in the south to Turkey in the north and all those in between. Southeast Asia is 
identified as the geographic region that comprises the ten member states that make 
up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and include, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.      
2 
 
Moreover, both of the selected geographic regions act as case studies and 
provide important insights into identifying the hypothesised National, Regional 
and Global phases manifested within the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant 
terrorism which spans Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and the 
Americas. The first of these two case studies analyses the geopolitical 
transformation component of the phenomenon in the Middle East. It examines, in 
particular, the rise and transformation of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ - aka: 
Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest) which originated in Egypt as 
a National Islamist militant terrorist group and has evolved and spread throughout 
many regions of the Muslim and non-Muslim world; establishing a Regional 
Islamist militant terrorist network, Tanzim al-Jihad, based in Afghanistan which 
spans the Middle East and beyond. These two Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations then went on to directly influence the ascent of the first worldwide 
network of Islamist militant terrorist organisations and thus had tangible ties with 
the Global Islamist militant terrorist organisation al-Qaeda which they eventually 
merged with.
1
 The second case study analyses the geopolitical transformation 
component of the phenomenon in Southeast Asia and begins with an examination 
of the rise and transformation of Darul Islam (Realm of Islam) and Komando 
Jihad in Indonesia and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Foreign Terrorist Organisations: History Tactics And Connections, Edited by 
Linden, V. Edward,  2004, Nova Science Publications, Inc., New York, NY, United States of 
America, pp. 43-45, 76; Gerges, A. Fawaz, 2009, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, 2
nd
 
Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, United States of America, p. 12; Musallam. A, 
Adnan, 2005, From Secularism To Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism, 
Praeger Publishers, CT, United States of America, pp.185-190.    
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Philippines. These organisations emerged as National Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations and went on to spawn the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG/meaning ‘sword 
bearer’ in Arabic) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI/meaning Islamic communities/cells) 
which are both Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations with tangible ties 
to the Global Islamist militant terrorist network al-Qaeda.
2
 Collectively, the two 
geographic regions and groups of Islamist militant terrorist organisations have 
been selected for analysis as they provide the necessary historical background 
needed to successfully explore this study’s hypothesised paradigm and hence the 
National, Regional and Global phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical 
transformation of Islamist militant terrorism.   
The research will first identify and analyse the major ideological contours 
of Political-Islam and the inception of Islamist political ideology and its 
subsequent evolution and manifestation as a platform employed by Islamist 
militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This section 
of the research seeks to establish that there are three primary groups of Islamist 
ideology that have evolved out of the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam 
including, ‘Missionary’, ‘Activist’ and ‘Jihadist’. This study’s primary focus is on 
                                                 
2
 See for example, Abuza, Zachary, 2007, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, Routledge, 
London, United Kingdom, pp. 15, 38; Barton, Greg, 2004, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah 
Islamiyah And The Soul Of Islam, University of New South Wales Press Ltd, Sydney, Australia, 
pp. 48, 51-52; Lacovou, Christos, 11, 07, 2000, “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf: The Radicalization 
of Islam in the Philippines” in International Institute for Counter-Terrorism: Articles , Retrieved, 
17/10/2011, From, 
www.ict.org.il/Articles/694/currentpage/1/Default.aspx?ArticlesSearch=From+MNLF+to+Abu+S
ayyaf, p.1; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V, op. cit., pp.6, 99.       
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the latter form of Islamist ideology – that is, Jihadist Islamist ideology. This is an 
extremist ideology that justifies the use of violence and, in particular, tactics and 
strategies of militant terrorism. Here the thesis will then examine the hypothesised 
notion that there has been, and exists, three distinct manifestations of Jihadist 
Islamist ideology – ‘National’, ‘Regional’ and ‘Global’ – and thus the ideological 
evolution of the phenomenon. The study seeks to establish that these three phases, 
individually and collectively, directly influenced the manifestation of, and 
underpin and connect, many of the historical and contemporary Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The three phases of 
Islamist ideological evolution collectively represent a spectrum that provides the 
additional sub-set of analysis which is needed to examine the hypothesised 
ideological evolution component of the research. 
The spectrum, moreover, provides a way in which to gauge the geographic 
components of the considered Islamist militant terrorist organisations. This, in 
turn, helps to identify their geopolitical contours and ambitions and hence 
correlates to the hypothesised geopolitical transformation component of the 
research. Here, the spectrum will help gauge key political, social, economic, 
cultural, and religious phenomena and contexts which gave rise to each of the 
three phases of Jihadist Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations in the 
two regions. Collectively, the spectrum identifies key historical and contemporary 
phenomena and contexts that correlate to each of the three phases of ideological 
evolution and geopolitical transformation, helping to provide important insights 
into the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism and organisations. The 
ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation process, therefore, 
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ultimately seeks to identify the historical rise and evolution of Jihadist Islamist 
ideologies and militant terrorist organisations as well as the phenomenon’s 
geopolitical expansion and transformation via the three sub-sets of analysis – 
National, Regional and Global – and forms the cornerstone of the thesis’s  
hypothesis.   
Following an analysis and categorisation of the ideological contours of 
Political-Islam and Islamism, the thesis begins by examining the geopolitical 
transformation process of the National, Regional and Global phases of Islamist 
militant terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia respectively. The Middle 
East component of the thesis begins the analysis during the onset of the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire/Caliphate in the mid-1800s. Attention is given to the impact 
that European dominance and influence had on both Ottoman rule and the 
inception of Islamist ideology during this period. The study will then go on to 
examine key additional geopolitical and socio-cultural phenomena during the 20
th
 
Century that directly affected both regions including World War 1 (WW1) and the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 as well as the abolishment of the Ottoman 
Caliphate system in 1924, colonialism, the creation of nation-states, World War II 
(WWII), post-independence secular rule and the suppression of Political-Islam, 
the creation of Israel, and the 1967 Six Day War and 1973 Yom Yippur War. The 
analysis examines the impact that these events collectively had on the rise and 
spread of Islamist ideologies and, notably, militant terrorist organisations. The 
events during this period correlate to the manifestation of the National phase of 
the hypothesised geopolitical transformation process.  
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The study will then go on to consider the rise of Political-Islam as a 
political alternative in the 1970s; ongoing state suppression of Political-Islam; the 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; the Afghan-Soviet War and the arrival of 
Islamist fighters and militant terrorist organisations from the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia; the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
and the intensification of nationalist separatism in the Russian Caucasus; as well 
as the 1992-1995 Bosnian and 1998-1999 Kosovo Wars between pro-Serbian 
nationalists and non-Serbian peoples whom were mainly Muslim and sought 
independence in the former provinces of Yugoslavia. This period witnessed the 
migration and transfer of Jihadist Islamist ideologies, fighters, tactics and 
strategies, and technologies, and hence the rise of wider regional geopolitical 
grievances and objectives. This period correlates to the manifestation of the 
Regional phase of the hypothesised geopolitical transformation process. 
Finally, analysis is given to the post-Afghan-Jihad period and the effects 
of Western-backed secular and Islamic regimes suppression of Islamism; the end 
of the Cold War and the additional spread and evolution of Jihadist operations and 
ideology; the 1991 Gulf War; al-Qaeda’s Declaration of War on America and 
Americans in 1996; the establishment of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against 
Jews and Crusaders/Christians (World Islamic Front for Jihad) in 1998; the 
evolution and expansion of al-Qaeda in the Middle East and Southeast Asia 
during 1990s; and the post-9/11 War on Terror and the subsequent wars in 
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Afghanistan (2001-2011) and Iraq (2003-2013).
3
 It will conclude with an 
examination of the post-9/11 evolution of al-Qaeda and thus the organisation’s 
‘second generation’ and ‘decentralisation and diversification’ in the wake of the 
War on Terror and the impact that this has had on the phenomenon. This period 
correlates to the manifestation of the Global phase of the studies hypothesised 
geopolitical transformation process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 See for example, Dyer, Geoff, February 2, 2012, “US to end Afghan combat operations” in 
Financial Times, Retrieved, 3/02/2012, From, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b85bb22-4d25-11e1-8741-
00144eabdc0.html#axzz1lGE8kbla, p. 1.   
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Chapter Two 
Methodology & Theoretical Framework  
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter will first discuss the research methodology employed in this 
study, outlining the ‘three-part’ analytical approach adopted which combines 
‘comparative’, ‘historical’ and ‘phenomenological’ analytical methods. It then 
goes on to outline the data collection methods employed by the researcher. 
Secondly, the chapter will provide a detailed account of the theoretical framework 
which consists of two stages of analysis. The chapter will discuss the first stage of 
the theoretical framework which examines the different contours of Political-
Islam and the rise and evolution of Islamist ideology as a platform for militant 
terrorist organisations. This phase of the research correlates to the ‘ideological 
evolution’ paradigm of the hypothesis. The chapter will then outline and discuss 
the theoretical framework’s second stage which examines the study’s 
hypothesised ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations.  
2.2 Research Methodology 
The research methodology of this study has adopted a three-part analytical 
approach which incorporates comparative, historical and phenomenological 
research methods. Although not exclusive, these three approaches collectively 
provide the researcher with the analytical tools needed to examine the matrix of 
historical, political, social, economic, and religious phenomena surrounding the 
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‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of Islamist 
militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This 
approach can be applied to analyse the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant 
terrorism or used to examine a particular organisation or individual. Collectively, 
these three analytical approaches combine to support the study’s hypothesis that 
there has been, and exists, three key phases of ideological evolution and 
geopolitical transformation manifested within the wider phenomenon of Islamist 
militant terrorism.  
The methodology’s three primary analytical methods – comparative, 
historical and phenomenological - combines research methods and background 
knowledge deriving from both the Political Science and Religious Studies 
academic fields as well as from the wider analytical context of the Social Sciences. 
The methodology therefore allows for a diverse range of materials and data to be 
examined from a wide range of historical and contemporary contexts and 
perspectives. In turn, this provides the researcher with an interdisciplinary style 
approach which allows for greater insight and analytical accuracy. The study’s 
methodology entails an extensive review of primary and secondary materials and 
data relevant to the research topic and includes the examination of government 
and/or inter-government agency reports, publications and reports produced by 
research institutions and think-tanks, academic texts and research articles or 
reports, and the global media. Thus, the methodology employed in this study is 
qualitative in nature.       
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2.3. Theoretical Framework 
The overarching three-part analytical framework adopted in this study is 
applied in two stages. This two-stage approach incorporates an additional sub-set 
of three analytical components – National, Regional and Global – which along 
with the three-part analytical framework combine to collectively examine this 
study’s hypothesised ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation 
process of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia.  
The first stage of the theoretical framework’s analysis seeks to identify 
and examine the key ideological contours of Political-Islam and the 
phenomenon’s inception of Islamist ideology and its subsequent evolution as a 
platform for Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia. Key historical and contemporary contexts and phenomena will be 
explored including political, social, intellectual, and religious aspects which have 
influenced both Political-Islam and, in particular, the accent of Islamist ideologies 
and its evolution and manifestation of Islamist militant terrorist organisations and 
individuals. This stage of the research advocates the idea, and seeks to establish, 
that the three ideological phases (National, Regional and Global) underpinning 
Jihadist Islamism emerged out of the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam. These 
three phases collectively represent the ideological foundations manifested within 
the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia. The researcher has developed a typology/spectrum of Political-
Islam in order to explore this notion and provide key insights into the ‘ideological 
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evolution’ process and the nature of the intended geopolitical ambitions that are 
sought by Islamist militant terrorist organisations in both regions.   
The second stage of the theoretical framework’s analysis will examine the 
hypothesised ‘geopolitical transformation’ process and seeks to identify the 
geopolitical contours of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia via the additional three analytical sub-sets: National, Regional, 
and Global. The proposed hypothesis is that there has been a three-stage 
sequential shift in Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia. This begins at the National level; develops into a Regional level; 
and, finally, arrives at the Global phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations. Collectively, these three sub-sets of analysis are employed to 
examine this study’s twofold notion that there has been, and exists, three key 
phases and manifestations of Jihadist Islamist ideology which have subsequently 
manifested and spawned the geopolitical transformation of National, Regional and 
Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations in both regions.   
The theoretical framework also introduces a spectrum to identify, 
categorise and analyse the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam which has three 
key bands: (1) ‘Liberal’, (2) ‘Conservative’ and (3) ‘Islamist’. Collectively, the 
three bands of the spectrum represent the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam 
and Islamist militant terrorist organisations which are a particular Islamist sub-
phenomenon; and have been developed and derived from the adopted scholarly 
terminologies. Moreover, the adopted terms used to describe the bands on the 
spectrum correlate to a particular ideological orientation that represents and 
12 
 
measures sequential increases/levels in the hardening of Islamic political ideology 
as well as the tactics (non-violent or violent) employed by governments, 
organisations or individuals within the wider pool of Political-Islam. The 
spectrum thus acts as a sequential paradigm which is used in this study to identify 
the different levels of Islamic political ideology and the hypothesised National, 
Regional and Global evolution and transformation process of Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations. It is argued that at the moderate end of the spectrum there 
is a Liberal manifestation of Political-Islam, which develops into Conservative 
Political-Islam and, finally, at the extreme end of the spectrum develops into a 
radical Islamist manifestation of Political-Islam which consists of ‘Missionary’ 
and ‘Activist’ levels as well as a ‘Jihadist’ sub-group which, as noted, comprises 
National, Regional and Global levels of militant terrorist ideology and 
organisations.
4
   
All chapters, excluding the introductory, theoretical framework, review of 
literature and concluding one, have been arranged chronologically. This allows for 
greater comparative analytical advantages as each chapter represents a sequential 
time period that builds on the previous one. Organising the ideological evolution 
and geopolitical transformation process into time periods helps to demonstrate a 
transparent sequential shift of the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism, 
helping identify the phase(s) of a particular organisation and its tactics and 
motives as well as the different levels of violence perpetrated. 
 
                                                 
4
 See page 47 for a diagram of Political-Islam.   
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Chapter Three 
Review of Literature 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter will provide an analysis of the scholarly literature that has 
been published on the phenomenon of Islamist ideologies, movements and 
militant terrorist organisations. It will identify and discuss the expanse of different 
scholarly works associated with the topic and examine the different analytical 
approaches and/or methodologies developed and employed within this field of 
literature. This study identifies that there are three major analytical approaches 
used, mainly within the Social Sciences, to analyse the wider phenomenon of 
Political-Islam and Islamist ideologies, movements or organisations and 
individuals. The three analytical approaches identified which will be examined in 
this chapter include: (1) the ‘essentialist’ approach; (2) the ‘contextualised’ 
(contextualist) approach; and (3) the ‘discourse’ analysis approach.5  
The essentialist and contextualist analytical approaches are identified by, 
Hakan Yavuz, in his work Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: A Study in 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, Yavuz, M. Hakan, 2003, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: A Study in 
Vernacular Politics, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, United States of America, pp. 16-
17; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p. 25; Jackson, Richard, June 2007, “Constructing 
Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse” in Government And 
Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, Retrieved, 
12/07/2011, From, www.onlieliberary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/goop.2007.42.issuse-3/issuetoc, pp. 
394-426.    
14 
 
Vernacular Politics.
6
 The contextualist approach is also identified and employed 
in Greg Barton’s Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And The Soul Of 
Islam.
7
 The discourse analysis approach, which focuses on the discussion of 
discourses, is used and examined by such scholars as Richard Jackson in his work 
Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse, 
and by Mansoor Moaddel in his work Islamic Modernism, Nationalism And 
Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse.
8
   
Collectively, these three analytical approaches have contributed 
significantly to the development of scholarly literature and debate on the growth 
of Political-Islam and Islamism as scholarly subjects within mainstream Western 
academia. Both have become increasingly important subjects, notably in the 
Social Sciences, particularly in the wake of the l979 Islamic Revolution of Iran.
9
 
It was during that revolution that the term ‘Political-Islam’ was coined and was 
first used to refer to the rise of ‘revolutionary’ and/or ‘Islamic activism’ that was 
sweeping the Shiite Muslim world and ultimately led to the establishment of the 
                                                 
6
 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 18-20.       
7
 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p. 25.  
8
 See, for example, Jackson, Richard, “Constructing Enemies”, op. cit., pp. 394-426; Moaddel, 
Mansoor, 2005,  Islamic Modernism, Nationalism And Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States of America, p.8.   
9
 Mohammad, Ayoob, 1981, The Politics of Islamic Reassertion: The Myth of the Monolith, St. 
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Islamic Republic of Iran.
 10
 The term has subsequently been used to identify a 
much broader spectrum of Islamic political ideologies and will be discussed in 
chapter five.
11
  
3.2. The Expanse of Scholarly Literature Produced on Islamist Ideologies, 
Movements & Militant Terrorist Organisations  
Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran there have been an increasing number 
of works published on the subject of Political-Islam and, though the term was 
developed later, Islamism, within the field of Social Science, notably Political 
Science, by mainly Western scholars.
12
 Moreover, in the wake of 9/11, there has 
been a flood of literature produced on the topic within the wider field of the Social 
Sciences. However, in some instances these works have misrepresented or 
misunderstood the concepts and complexities underpinning the phenomenon that 
is Political-Islam and Islamism and the subsequent manifestation of Islamist 
militant terrorist organisations and individuals alike.
13
  
The expanse of scholarly literature published, particularly in more recent 
years, within the wider field of the Social Sciences on the phenomenon of radical 
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Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations and individuals is wide and 
diverse. While some prominent scholars take a broad approach to the analysis of 
Islamist ideologies and militant terrorism, focusing on geopolitical, social and 
economic trends within particular historical contexts and across a wide geographic 
region, and in particular the Middle East and wider Muslim world in general; 
other scholars analyse these trends within a particular region/s or state/s which has 
or is experiencing a particular manifestation of radical Islamist ideology and 
militant terrorism. Other scholars have produced works that focus on specific 
Islamist militant terrorist organisations and individuals within these geopolitical, 
social, economic and historical contexts. Moreover, most of these works have 
been arranged chronologically and are generally thematic in content with a 
noticeable reference to both Political-Islam’s and Islamism’s implications for the 
Christian and wider Western world.    
Examples of works that analyse Islamism within a broad geopolitical, 
social, economic, and historical framework across a wide geographic context 
include: John Espostito’s The Future Of Islam; Fawaz Gergers’s The Far Enemy: 
Why Jihad Went Global; Jarret M. Brachman’s Global Jihadism: Theory and 
Practice; and Bernard Lewis’s The Crisis of Islam: Holy War And Unholy 
Terror.
14
 Examples of works that focus on Islamism in a particular region/s within 
the wider Muslim world includes Bernard Lewis’s What Went Wrong? Western 
Impact and Middle Eastern Response; Kumar Ramakrishna’s Delegitimizing 
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Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia and Christopher Deliso’s The Coming 
Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West.
15
 
Examples of works that analyse a particular state/s in the wider Muslim world 
include Greg Barton’s Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And The Soul Of 
Islam; Zachary Abuza’s Political Islam And Violence In Indonesia; Mohammad 
Ayoob’s The Many Faces of Political-Islam: Religion And Politics In The Muslim 
World; Dilip Hiro’s War Without End: The Rise Of Islamist Terrorism And Global 
Response; and the book edited by Said Amir Arjomand; From Nationalism To 
Revolutionary Islam.
16
 Examples of works that analyse a particular organisation/s 
or individual/s include: Khaled Hroub’s HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice; 
Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network Of Terror; the work edited 
by Walter Laqueur; Voices Of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, And Manuals Of Al 
Qaeda, HAMAS, And Other Terrorists From Around The World And Throughout 
The Ages; Adnan Musallam’s From Secularism To Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the 
Foundations of Radical Islamism; and the work edited by Abert Bergesen; The 
Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society.
17
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3.3. The Three Key Scholarly Approaches Applied to the Literature 
Published on the Study of Islamist Ideologies, Movements & Militant 
Terrorist Organisations  
As noted earlier, this study identifies three key analytical approaches or 
methodologies that have been developed and applied in the scholarly literature on 
the wider subject of Islamist ideologies, movements and militant terrorist 
organisations. The first of these approaches is the essentialist, also referred to by 
some as the ‘orientalist’ approach. This approach analyses the characteristics, 
values and ideas manifested in Islamist ideologies, movements and militant 
terrorist organisations and establishes the notion that these phenomena are the 
product of a ‘fixed’ set of principles inherent within the wider tradition of Islam.18  
Although this approach has some useful insights, critics such as 
Mohammad Ayoob argue that the essentialist approach fails to identify and 
examine the diversity of Political-Islam and Islamism and, ultimately, lumps them 
together into a monolithic phenomenon that is simply part of a wider singular 
Islamic ‘civilisation’ and which is inherently at odds with Christian and Jewish 
traditions and wider Western civilisation.
19
 It thus does not analyse Islam, and the 
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phenomenon of Islamism, “…as [a] religion and [a] code of ethics that affects and 
is, in turn, affected by multiple cultural and geographic milieus.”20  
Agreeing with this notion is Barton, who notes that: “Traditionally, the 
study of ideas in the Muslim world has been left to orientalists, or ‘text-oriented’ 
experts, [with no] …consideration of social and political engagement and the real-
world application of the documents they are studying.”21 Barton further notes, 
however, that: “ At the same time, comparatively, few political scientists and 
commentators have a deep knowledge of the religious thought associated with the 
groups they are observing, and frequently all political parties and groups with an 
Islamic connection are lumped together.” 22 Lewis, who employs a combination of 
both the essentialist and contextualist analytical approaches, notes in his work The 
Crisis Of Islam: Holy War And Unholy Terror, that “…Islamism, …is not a single 
homogeneous movement. There are many types of Islamic fundamentalism 
[Islamism] in different countries and even sometimes within a single country.”23 
The second scholarly approach applied to the study of Islamist ideologies, 
movements and militant terrorist organisations is contextualist analysis which 
examines the subject from an objective interdisciplinary approach. It gives equal 
attention to both the characteristics, ideas and values, as well as actions and 
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context.
24
 Barton contends that the contextualist approach consists of three key 
analytical mechanisms and that: “Any sound understanding of the current 
[Islamist] reality must rest evenly on each of these three legs: [1] the seminal 
ideas, [2] the pattern of history; and [3] contemporary context.” 25  M. Hakan 
Yavuz states that the contexualist approach examines key political, social and 
economic factors and conditions in particular geographic and historical contexts.
26
 
Barton also argues that if the contextualist approach is amalgamated with the 
essentialist approach, such as in Lewis’s work, and hence a religious-text (Quran 
and Hadiths) oriented analysis, it collectively provides the required 
multidimensional approach needed to best engage the subject objectively.
 27
 
Therefore, the contextualist analysis approach identifies Islamist ideologies and 
militant terrorist organisations and individuals as a product and collection of 
diverse, political, social, economic, historical, and religious phenomena.  
The third scholarly approach applied to the study of Islamist ideologies, 
movements and militant terrorist organisations is discourse analysis. Developed 
and primarily used by scholars deriving from the ‘Post-Modernist’ field of 
academia, the discourse analysis approach focuses on the examination of the 
different and influential discourses manifested within the wider phenomenon of 
Islamism that derive from and span a wide range of geopolitical contexts. One 
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central theme deriving from the discourse analysis approach to Islamism is the 
examination of how Islamist ideologies have been harnessed for popular culture 
and social symbolism and identity by a wide and diverse range of social, political 
and extremist movements and organisations throughout the wider Muslim world. 
This theme and approach is identified by Jenny B. White in Islamist Mobilization 
in Turkey.
 28
  
The discourse analysis approach has also been employed in such works as 
Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, edited by Ken Booth 
and Tim Dunne. Therein, a number of chapters, such as Bhikhu Parekh’s 
Terrorism or Intellectual Dialogue and Chris Brown’s Narratives of Religion, 
Civilization and Modernity, analyse their respective topics through the discussion 
of discourses.
29
 John Esposito, in Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, 
discusses the influence of classical Islamic thought and jurisprudence regarding 
warfare (al-Jihad), and the implications of contemporary geopolitics on Islamic 
and Islamist movements.
30
 Aspects of this approach are also employed by Gerges 
in his work, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, and by Brachman in Global 
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Jihadism: Theory and Practice. Both of these books present and discuss the 
different influential discourses manifested in different Islamist ideologies, 
organisations and individuals regarding their justification for, or definition of, 
warfare and the use of militant terrorism.
31
         
Collectively, these three analytical approaches represent and form, though 
not exclusively, the primary analytical mechanisms employed by scholars within 
the wider field of Social Sciences to examine the phenomenon of Islamism. A 
number of prominent scholars have argued that in order to gain a deeper and 
clearer understanding of Islamism and its wider manifestations, it is useful to 
employ all three analytical approaches. Therefore, this study has adopted, first and 
foremost, the contextualist approach and, secondly, an essentialist approach. 
Additional consideration will also be given to major social and political 
discourses manifested in Islamist ideologies, organisations and individuals.   
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Chapter Four 
Terminology & Definitions 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter will present and examine relevant scholarly terminologies 
and their analytical value and application to the study of Islamist ideology and 
militant terrorist organisations. This study employs various terminologies which 
have been developed within the Social Sciences and associated academic fields. 
These terms collectively form a key component of this study’s categorisation of 
Islamist ideologies and militant terrorist organisations. Although these terms are 
limited, and not exclusive in definition, they nevertheless provide by far the most 
accurate way of identifying the different concepts and phenomena directly 
associated with Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations as well as the 
wider political Islamic movement. The terms adopted in this study include: 
“Political-Islam”, “Islamist/Islamism”, and “Jihadist/Jihadism”.   
After discussing these terms, this chapter will consider the definitions of 
‘militant’ and ‘terrorism’ which are applied in this study, and which have been 
amalgamated to coin the term “militant terrorism”. Analysis is conducted on each 
of the concepts, individually assessing their legitimacy and the ethics of the tactics 
employed by militants and terrorists as well as their evolution and transformation 
as ‘asymmetric-warfare’ (irregular armed combat/low intensity conflict) groups in 
order to assess each concept’s definitional compatibility with this study’s coined 
term: militant terrorism. The concept is applied and interpreted in this study to 
24 
 
identify illegitimate Islamist organisations, networks or individuals which 
perpetrate various tactics and strategies associated with asymmetric-warfare. 
Following this analysis, the chapter will then outline the definitional 
framework which has been developed and is employed in this study to analyse, 
identify and categorise the different ideological and geopolitical contours and 
phases of National, Regional and Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations.       
4.2. Terminologies 
The terms adopted in this study include “Political-Islam”, “Islamist”, and 
“Jihadist”. As noted, these adopted terms allow this study to identify and 
categorise the various levels and orientations of Islamic political ideology and 
thus their associated geographic ambitions. Collectively, these terms represent a 
spectrum that explores and identifies the different levels of Islamic political 
ideology. Each of these adopted terms correlates with, and represents, a particular 
orientation within the wider context of Islamic political ideology. The term 
“Political-Islam” was coined in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran32 
and, in a general context, means that “Islam as a body of faith has something 
important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the 
contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.”33 However, it is 
more accurately defined as being “… a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by 
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individuals, groups and organisations that purse political objectives.”34 This study 
uses the second definition and further develops the term to represent and 
encompass a range of different ideological orientations manifested within the 
wider spectrum of Islamic political ideology all of which advocate the 
establishment of Islamic political frameworks or governments that are pivoted on 
a particular, and often selective, interpretation of both Sharia Law (Islamic Law) 
and the fundamental scriptural texts of Islam (Quran, Sunna and Hadiths).
35
 As 
noted, this study identifies these different levels of Islamic political ideological 
orientation to include Liberal, Conservative, Islamist and Jihadist manifestations 
of Political-Islam. This study’s focus is centred on the latter form of Political-
Islam – that is, the Islamist sub-phenomenon of Jihadist ideology and militant 
terrorist organisations.  
The term “Islamist”, or “Islamism”, which has emerged in the last decade, 
refers to those ideologies, movements, organisations or individuals which derive 
their interpretation and teachings from the Islam of the 7
th
 Century CE. This 
period is identified by Islamists as representing a time when Muslims adhered to 
‘true/pure’ Islam. Islamists seek to emulate this period and refer to it as ‘salaf al-
saih’ or ‘salafiyya’ (Salafi/Salafist) which literally means ‘righteous 
ancestors/pious forefathers’ during the time of the Islamic Prophet, Mohammad 
ibn Abdulla (571-632) and the first Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abbasid 
Caliphate) and their close companions (the first three generations of the Muslim 
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‘Umma’/community). 36  The term represents a radical shift away from 
‘mainstream/classical’ Islam – a phenomenon identified in this study as primarily 
based on a selection of ‘cultural’, ‘spiritual’, and ‘political’ phenomena and 
identities derived from ‘conservative’ and, to a lesser degree, ‘liberal’ forms of 
Islamic teachings and traditions. These emerged following the codification and 
establishment of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Islamic philosophy and law) 
between the 8
th
 and 11
th
 centuries CE; a process that began some 150 years after 
the death of Mohammad.
37
  
Greg Barton notes that “Islamism is a response to modernity that has 
transformed the religion of Islam into a political ideology. Islamism is therefore, 
pre-eminently concerned with changing society and political institutions in order 
to bring both the state and society into confirming with an understanding of Islam. 
Among other things, this involves formalising the state’s constitutional and 
legislative recognition of Islam and, for radical Islamist, introducing the Shariah 
or Islamic Law.”38 While this definition has value and shows important insights 
into understanding and defining the phenomenon of Islamism, it has been refined 
here into a narrower framework.   
This study adopts the following definitional framework: Islamism as a 
phenomenon is inherently radical – that is, it has broken from the tradition of 
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mainstream Islam, and is fixated with the idea of emulating the traditions of the 
salaf al-saih in an effort to bring all aspects of the state (notably political and legal) 
and society (public and private) into a particular geopolitical framework (national, 
regional or global) which must submit to an Islamist interpretation of Shariah Law. 
It is thus unlike Liberal or Conservative forms of Political-Islam.
39
  
Moreover, Islamists seek to revive and implement the traditions of the 
Islamic pious forefathers in an attempt to bring about the ‘golden age of Islam; a 
period when Islamic civilisation was at its greatest strength and when Muslims 
adhered to a literal interpretation of Mohammad’s teachings and a strictly 
puritanical legal and severe penal code: The period witnessed ‘defensive’ and, 
following Mohammad’s death, ‘offensive’ military campaigns – which were 
fundamentally expansionist, imperialist and colonialist in nature – and internal 
chaos under the leadership of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs which endures to 
today.
40
 Additional analyses of Islamism will be provided in chapter five.  
The term “Jihadist”, or “Jihadism”, which has also become widely used by 
academics over the past decade and was invented by Islamist militant terrorists to 
refer to themselves, in this study refers to those ideologies, movements, 
organisations or individuals that adhere to a sub-category of Islamism which 
justifies and promotes acts of extremism, notably tactics and strategies of militant 
terrorism.
41
 This also includes suicide-attacks as well as other forms of political 
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violence, as their primary means to obtain a particular national, regional or global 
Islamist geopolitical objective.
42
 Unlike mainstream Islam, or mainstream 
Islamism (Missionary and Activist), Jihadist Islamists are committed to a 
campaign of indiscriminate warfare which they consider to be a legitimate act of 
‘holy war/fighting’ against what they perceive to be the ‘enemies/aggressors of 
Islam’.43 They justify this campaign via a distorted interpretation of the Islamic 
concept of ‘al-jihad’ (holy war/fighting in a ‘collective/communal’ armed struggle 
in the ‘defence’ of Islam) which can be refered to as ‘jihad by the sword’ and 
‘leaser jihad’ or ‘external jihad’.44   
The Jihadist Islamist interpretation of ‘al-jihad’ is derived from a number 
of key influential works by Islamist intellectuals. These include, Sayyid Qutb’s 
Ma’alim (Milestones) published in 1966, and the work, Zad al-Ma’ad (Provisions 
of the Hereafter), compiled by the medieval Islamists, Ibn Qayyim Jawziyyah’s 
and his teacher Ibn Tymiyyah (1263-1328). Ibn Tymiyyah is considered to be the 
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historical ideologue of the Jihadist Islamist doctrine.
45
 The Jihadist Islamist 
doctrine and its adherents seek to elevate ‘al-jihad’ alongside the principal ‘five 
pillars of Islam’ and, therefore, to reinvent the concept as not only being 
‘defensive’ (jihad al-dafa‘a) and a ‘collective duty’ (fard kifayah) of the ‘Umma’ 
(Islamic community) which is compulsory for all capable Muslims – the 
traditional understanding of the concept – but, rather, as an ‘offensive’ and 
‘individual obligation’ (fard ‘Ayn) for all Muslims.46 It is thus unlike the classical 
view under which ‘al-jihad’ can only be authorised by a legitimate Islamic ruler 
(Caliph) or leader (Imam/Sheik/Ayatollah) of the entire Umma and must adhere to 
strict ‘rules of engagement’ similar to the Christian doctrine of ‘just war theory’.47 
The term Jihadist will be discussed further in the following Chapter.    
4.3. Defining Militant Terrorism 
In order to define the conjoined term militant terrorism, employed in this 
study, the two terms must first be separated for individual consideration and 
analysis. The term militant derives from the Latin word ‘militare’ and refers to 
any individual or organisation that is engaged in aggressive or vigorous support of 
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a particular cause involving warfare, often to the point of extremism (including 
terrorism).
48
   
The term militant/militancy is often loosely, and incorrectly, used as being 
synonymous with the terms ‘insurgent/insurgency’ or ‘guerrilla/guerrilla warfare’ 
to refer to non-state irregular armed combatants or organisations that employ 
asymmetric-warfare tactics and strategies against a particular state’s regular armed 
forces.
49
 Historically, guerrilla groups were originally employed alongside a 
particular state’s regular armed forces as an irregular sub-group in order to 
perpetrate covert military operations.
50
 This study refers to ‘guerrilla warfare’ as – 
as well as insurgents and militants – as non-state irregular combatant groups 
which may (or may not) be used as a covert proxy by states. Guerrilla, insurgent 
and militant groups alike not only employ various types of asymmetric-warfare 
tactics and strategies, they also represent a major phase in the ‘evolution’ and 
‘transformation’ of the phenomenon of asymmetric-warfare.51 This study suggests 
that these three evolutionary phases of asymmetric-warfare are fundamentally 
rooted in the ethical shift of tactics and the legal and political moral legitimacy of 
guerrilla, insurgent and militant organisations respectively. Each of these three 
asymmetric-warfare groups can be identified and categorised as participating in 
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forms of ‘low intensity conflict’ incorporated within the wider Non-Traditional 
Security framework of Security Studies.
52
  
Each of the above three asymmetric-warfare groups, or phases, can be 
further categorised and identified through a number of key facets based on their 
“…motivation, strength of opposition, environment [urban or rural], leadership, 
organisation, recruitment, tactics and international reach [domestic, regional or 
global].” 53 However, in the last 100 years, and in particular since the end of the 
Cold War, there has been a fundamental shift in targeting – away from combatants 
to civilians – which has influenced the evolution and transformation of 
asymmetric-warfare groups.
54
 Civilian populations have been attacked with 
greater intensity and lethality; some of which derives from an increase in fanatical 
motivation and outlook by these groups.
55
 Some of the common asymmetric-
warfare tactics used by guerrilla, insurgent and militant groups include kidnapping, 
political assassination, murder, sabotage, sustained sporadic armed attacks, 
bombings, and – depending on definition – terrorism.56 Experts in the field are 
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increasingly advocating that the escalation of the intensity and lethality of the 
tactics employed by groups and individuals, and their increasingly premeditated 
targeting of civilians for a range of political ends (ideological, national, social, 
religious etc), is primarily a tactic that militant and, depending on the definition of 
terrorism, insurgent groups employ rather than guerrilla warfare groups.
57
   
There are over 109 cited definitions of terrorism that have been used or are 
currently in use. However, to date, there is no universally accepted legal or 
political definition of the term. A ‘quantitative perspective’ study conducted by 
Terrorism Studies expert Alex Schmid, revealed that a large number of these 
definitions all had three common identifying elements. The first and most 
consistent element, which featured in 80% of the definitions, was that terrorism 
featured some form of violence. The second most common element, which 
featured in 65% of the definitions, was that terrorism was political in nature. 
Thirdly, fear of terror was common in 51% of the definitions examined. Schmid’s 
study further highlighted how contentious the term terrorism is analytically and, 
hence, legally and politically.
58
   
Ehud Sprinzak notes that, contrary to terrorism, “Guerrilla war is a small 
war – subject to the same rules that apply to big wars, and on this it differs to 
terrorism.”59 David Rapaport has also noted that the “… traditional distinguishing 
characteristic of the terrorist was his explicit refusal to accept the conventional 
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moral limits which defined military and guerrilla action”. 60  Paul Wilkinson 
identifies a key ethical difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. He 
argues that Guerrillas “… can and often do fight according to conventions of war, 
taking and exchanging prisoners and respecting the rights of non-combatants. 
[However] Terrorists place no limits on means employed and frequently resort to 
widespread assassination, [and] …‘general terror’ upon the indigenous civilian 
population.”61 James and Brenda Lutz contend that: “Guerrilla groups are more 
likely to target the police or military, setting them apart from their terrorist 
counterparts. Insurgent attacks on military personnel in Iraq [and Afghanistan], 
for example, are not normally considered terrorist attacks.”62  It is only when 
groups begin to deliberately target civilians that it is considered terrorism.
63
 
Having considered the various definitions, this study employs the definition of 
terrorism which was developed by Terrorism Studies expert, Christopher Harmon: 
“Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the 
innocent [civilians
64
] to inspire fear for political ends.” 65 
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Considered to be one of the most influential pioneers of ‘modern’ 
insurgent/militant terrorism was the German Social Democrat, Johannes Most. He 
argued in his 1884 work, Revolutionary War Science, that ‘small groups’ would 
greatly benefit by utilising the systematic use of terror tactics if combined with the 
most modern technology available.
66
 Most identified this as a key aspect in the 
pursuit of what he termed the ‘propaganda of the dead’; and signalled the 
beginnings of a shift away from traditional guerrilla warfare tactics towards the 
somewhat more modern development of insurgent and militant terrorist 
organisations.
67
 Hence, prior to the twentieth century, guerrilla warfare was 
almost exclusively understood as a defensive ‘hit and run’ tactic which was 
primarily employed by a militarily weaker indigenous population under siege 
from foreign powers and was used to target a foreign power’s military forces 
through covert and/or irregular armed combat tactics (asymmetric-warfare).
68
  
Guerrilla warfare tactics were extensively employed by regular military 
forces during the American War of Independence in 1775-1783.
69
 However, and 
particularly from the post-1945 period onwards, guerrilla warfare tactics become 
employed by groups as a strategic means to political or ideological ends, unlike 
their predecessors which employed and understood guerrilla tactics primarily as a 
military means within itself. Guerrilla warfare groups historically operated in rural 
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environments, unlike modern-day urban insurgent and militant terrorist 
organisations and individuals.
70
  
The first sign of this evolved form of guerrilla warfare tactic/strategy, best 
described as ‘revolutionary guerrilla warfare’, was employed by the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) in the 1880s and early 1890s. 
The IMRO attempted to build an integrated political and military organisation that 
employed guerrilla warfare tactics against the Ottoman Turks, and sought to 
undermine their dominance in the Balkans. Although the IMRO was 
fundamentally a Macedonian organisation, it was also based in Bulgaria where it 
would operate and carry out attacks against the Ottoman Turks. It ultimately 
failed following an attempted uprising in 1903.
71
  
By the 1930’s and 1940’s, it has been argued, “…guerrilla warfare had 
become revolutionary in both intent and practice, with social, economic, 
psychological and, especially, political elements grafted on to traditional irregular 
military tactics in order to radically alter the structure of a state by force.”72 
Following WWII, particularly from the late-1960s onwards, the evolution of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare had evolved into urban ‘insurgent/militant’ groups 
which were primarily motivated by political ideologies and would often employ 
the tactic/strategy of terrorism.
73
 It was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 
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mid-20
th
 Century that first effectively harnessed this new revolutionary style of 
guerrilla warfare as a strategy to overtly political ends.
74
 However, the use of 
terrorism by many of these groups was often limited, targeting government and 
domestic law enforcement personal and/or police rather than the civilian 
population and, therefore, equated to insurgent or militant tactics instead and the 
use of terrorism during the 1960s and 1970s was often state sponsored.
75
 By the 
1980s though, those insurgent/militant groups increasingly motivated by radical 
Islamic ideology had begun to deliberately target civilians and thus terrorism. 
Therefore, the next point in the evolutionary phase of asymmetric-warfare can 
best be identified and termed as ‘terrorism’ and has manifested both groups and 
individuals that purely employ the tactic/strategy of terrorism as a means to 
political ends.
76
     
Insurgent/militant groups that employ terror tactics/strategies have the 
common denominator of intentionally engaging in a prolonged, violent, and cold-
blooded political struggle, employing terrorism directly alongside other forms of 
asymmetric-warfare. This type of combined tactic, which mainly targets civilians, 
is often employed by contemporary insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
77
 These 
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groups ultimately seek to create a ‘psychological’ state of terror within both the 
immediate targeted audience (the public) and, especially, the primary target (the 
government) in an attempt to destabilise society and force political change that 
would otherwise not happen.
78
 These insurgent/militant terrorist groups are 
ethically outside the legal conventions of regular warfare due to their intentional 
targeting of civilians. In this regard, they are unlike guerrilla groups which do not 
resort to terrorism and have legitimate nationalist grievances.
79
  
Insurgent/militant terrorist groups and individuals, therefore, fall outside 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s resolutions and legal framework 
that legitimises the ‘right to self-determination’. The adoption of the 1994 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (UN Doc 
A/Res/49/60) makes clear that the ‘right to self-determination’ does not in any 
way legitimise the use of terrorism.
80
 The use and justification of acts that 
fundamentally resemble terrorism, and the limited and often absent nationalist 
identity and hence legitimacy, along with the general lack of popular political 
support from within their own population which they claim to represent morally, 
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legally and politically, discredit insurgent/militant terrorist groups and their 
motivations and goals.
81
  
Guerrilla groups, or ‘national liberation’ movements, are dependent on 
considerable public support for operational cover, logistics and ultimately political 
legitimacy; often representing a struggle for greater political autonomy/freedom 
or equality and hence a moral greater good.
82
 Insurgent/militant terrorist groups 
which have evolved out of, and are modelled on, early-to-mid 20
th
 Century 
guerrilla warfare revolutionary style organisations, however, are primarily 
rejected and viewed by the vast majority of a population which is being subjected 
to their campaign as representing an illegitimate political struggle.
83
 Based 
primarily on the ethical and legal framework laid out by the UN, guerrilla warfare 
groups which manifest and represent legitimate claims of self-determination, and 
which do not engage in terrorist attacks, can be identified as a distinct form of 
asymmetric-warfare group from that of insurgent and militant groups.
84
 
Unlike guerrilla groups, insurgent groups and, in particular, militant 
groups, engage in the tactic and strategy of terrorism and ultimately fall outside 
the ethical framework of what is considered legitimate armed combat.
85
 However, 
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this is not to say that all insurgent groups do not have legitimate grievances, rather, 
it is the ethics of the tactics employed by a particular insurgent group that also 
determines their legitimacy. An important distinction which needs to be made 
here between insurgent and militant groups is that insurgent groups fundamentally 
derive from a situation that involves a foreign military’s occupation and political 
take over of a particular country or territory indigenous to the insurgent forces.
86
 
Historical examples in the last 100 years include insurgencies by indigenous 
forces or populations against Imperialism, Colonialism, Fascism/Nazism, and 
Communism. The current Islamist insurgent and militant groups operating in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq are explicit users of the tactic of terrorism. Hence, insurgent 
and militant groups have targeted not only the military and indigenous 
government officials, but also reconstruction teams as well as civilians following 
the invasions of both countries in 2001 and 2003 respectively.
87
 
Unlike insurgent and guerrilla groups who are typically fighting a foreign 
invading and occupying power, militant groups, are fundamentally at odds with 
the indigenous political status quo which is otherwise viewed by the vast majority 
of the state’s domestic population and international community as both legitimate 
and sovereign.
88
 Hence militant groups often resort to the use of terrorism as it is 
the only real weapon in which they can successfully influence political outcomes 
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due to their often extremist ambitions.
89
 Militant groups may also derive from 
indigenous geopolitical grievances such as occupation, civil war, the creation of 
nation states or separatist factions from within a particular population or 
demographic.
90
 Moreover, religion can also act as a motivating factor for some 
militant groups, notably in the context of Islamism. Hence, Islamist militant 
organisations and individuals, the majority of which are Sunni, have increasingly 
targeted Jews worldwide and Christians in countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, 
Pakistan, and Nigeria as well as non-Islamist Muslims and minority Shiite and 
Sufi Muslim sects in Iraq, Pakistan and Malaysia.
91
 Examples of Islamist militant 
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groups which use terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia alone include 
the Jihad Group and EIJ in Egypt; Fatah al Islam in Lebanon; Gerakan 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP – Pattani Islamic Mujahidin Movement) in 
southern Thailand;
92
 the ASG in the southern Philippines, and the Laskar Jhad 
(considered to have disbanded in 2002) and Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar 
Jundullah organisations in Indonesia among others.
93
  
By identifying key ethical differences in the tactics employed by guerrilla, 
insurgent and militant groups such as targeting (civilians or combatants) as well as 
legitimate grievances and political credibility, a limited, but neutral and objective, 
definitional framework begins to emerge. This can then be used to categorise and 
identify militant terrorism groups which intrinsically manifest terrorist tactics and 
strategies.
 94
 This study employs the term ‘militant terrorism’ which refers to 
militant asymmetric-warfare organisations or individuals illegitimately operating 
outside the UN’s resolution on the right to self-determination and which 
perpetrate the tactic/strategy of terrorism as a means to political ends, irrespective 
of whether the situation is one of conflict or peace. 
Figure 1 represents a spectrum of the different levels of political-violence 
that collectively form the wider phenomenon of asymmetric-warfare. As noted, 
this study focuses on the final level (militant) and its sub-level (terrorism) and 
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thus on militant terrorism. Each band on the spectrum represents an escalation of 
the ethics manifested in the tactics or strategies and thus an increase in the 
intensity of political-violence employed and justified by practitioners of 
asymmetric-warfare.                               
Figure 1: Spectrum of Asymmetric Warfare 
  
4.4. Defining a Framework for the Geopolitical Categorisation of National, 
Regional and Global Islamist Militant Terrorist Organisations    
Before discussing the National, Regional and Global manifestations of 
Jihadist ideology and organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, it is 
important to note that there are two primary contexts in which these three 
phenomena are viewed and defined; both of which are centred on the geographic 
contours and contexts of a particular militant terrorist organisation. The first key 
geographic component that needs to be considered is whether or not the 
organisation exclusively perpetrates attacks against targets within the geographic 
sphere that it seeks to control and, secondly, does the organisation also perpetrate 
attacks outside this geographic sphere and thus transcend these geopolitical 
boundaries.  
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A particular organisation that is motivated exclusively by a National 
Jihadist ideology might only attack domestic targets inside the pre-existing nation-
state it seeks to control or territories considered to be under occupation and hence 
part of the existing or perceived future nation-state. An example of this would be 
the Islamic Resentence Movement (HAMAS) which is based in the Gaza Strip 
Palestinian territory and ultimately seeks to destroy the state of Israel and annex 
the West Bank territories into an Islamist-run Palestinian state and the MILF that 
seeks to annex most of the southern Philippians into an Islamist state.
95
 Another 
organisation motivated by National Jihadist ideology may attack both domestic as 
well as ‘out-of-state’ targets in one or more bordering states or in states further 
afield. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic Group (al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya) and the 
EIJ in Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) in Algeria, the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan), are examples 
of organisations which have done so.
96
  
Nevertheless, the latter example does not change the fact that the 
organisation’s goal is based on, and hence motivated by, National Jihadist 
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ideology. The same can also be said in regard to Regional and Global militant 
terrorist organisations which leads to a debate over how an organisation’s 
geopolitical ‘component’ can or should be categorised. Should it be either by its 
geopolitical ambitions, or its operational area and targeting capacity. For 
analytical proposes, this study will adopt the former concept which is based on the 
geopolitical motivations and thus ideology, rather than solely the operational area 
of a particular organisation. Therefore, National, Regional and Global Jihadist 
motivated organisations represent three distinct ideological and geopolitical 
phases and manifestations of Islamist militant terrorism.   
Hence, National Jihadist ideology and organisations are identified in this 
study as exclusively pursuing the establishment of Islamist governments and 
polices and thus laws within the framework of a pre-existing or future nation-state. 
Regional Jihadist ideology and organisations are identified as pursuing the re-
establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and thus governments, polices and laws 
across the entirety of those regions once historically part of, or controlled by, the 
Islamic Caliphate. Global Jihadist ideology and organisations are identified as 
pursuing the implementation of Islamic Law and thus political dominance in the 
wider Islamic world and, ultimately, entire world via the creation of a ‘global 
Caliphate’.97  
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Chapter Five 
Political-Islam, Islamism & the National, Regional & Global 
Evolution of Jihadist Ideologies  
5.1. Introduction 
  As has been noted, the concept of Political-Islam in this study represents a 
collection of different orientations of political ideology motivated by, and 
premised on, a wide and diverse range of Islamic teachings and interpretations. 
The different interpretations of Islamic teachings are widespread within both the 
political and non-political manifestations of Islam, including both democratic and 
non-democratic principles and values. Political-Islam, like other political systems 
such as Democracy or Communism etc, manifests a wide and competitive range 
of ideological viewpoints that are collectively represented within an overarching 
political framework (i.e, Political-Islam). Each viewpoint offers its own insight 
into how Islamic, and in some cases non-Islamic, societies should be structured or 
reformed: Political-Islam is thus not monolithic in nature.
98
   
This chapter will outline and examine the different contours of Islamic 
political ideology, a phenomenon identified in this study as encompassing three 
primary levels/orientations: (1) Liberal, (2) Conservative, and (3) Islamist – which 
is made up from three additional sub-categories that includes ‘Missionary’, 
‘Activist’ and ‘Jihadist’ Islamist ideologies. Collectively, these orientations of 
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Islamic political ideology are interpreted in this study as the primary 
manifestations associated with the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam. Each of 
these ideological levels builds on the previous one and represents a hardening of 
political and legal Islamic codes. Here analysis will focus on the degree to which 
a puritanical emphasis is adhered to or enforced within the different levels of 
Islamic political and legal codes, and each of these level’s justifications for the 
application of violence as well as the intensity of the levels of violence that are 
justified and employed.  
This chapter also examines the ascent of Islamist ideology articulating that 
Islamism as a political phenomenon emerged out of the wider sphere of Political-
Islam. Analysis will also focus on the hypothesis that the phenomenon has 
undergone a series of sequential ideological evolutions. Here, an examination of 
the wider ideological levels of Islamism will take place followed by an 
examination of the three Jihadist Islamist ideological phases (National, Regional 
and Global), analysing historical and contemporary contexts and phenomena 
which gave rise to the wider pool of Islamist ideologies and phases. The three 
evolutionary phases of Jihadist ideology collectively form the basis underpinning 
this study’s hypothesised ‘ideological evolution’ process of Islamist militant 
terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.   
In order to gain a deeper understanding of Jihadist ideology and militant 
terrorist organisations, as well as the phenomenon’s manifestation, it is important 
that all levels of Islamic political ideology associated with this study’s spectrum 
of Political-Islam be given some consideration. Figure 2 depicts a spectrum 
47 
 
developed with the adopted terminologies that represents what this study contends 
are the three primary levels of Political-Islamic ideology – Liberal, Conservative, 
and Islamist – and provides it with a workable analytical framework. The 
spectrum helps to identify and categorise the different levels of Political-Islam 
and also acts as a mechanism to gauge the different intensity of the levels of 
violence justified by different Islamist ideologies and organisations. Moreover, 
the spectrum provides a key insight into this study’s ability to analyse the 
ideological and geopolitical contours and ambitions of a particular Jihadist 
organisation. By identifying a particular organisation’s ideological contours, an 
insight into their geopolitical ambitions is gained thus helping to categorise them 
into National, Regional or Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations.
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Figure 2: Spectrum of Political-Islam 
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5.2. Liberal Political-Islamic Ideology  
Although not the focus of this study, Liberal Political-Islam, also referred 
to as ‘moderate-Islam’ or ‘leftist-Islam’ or ‘secular-Islam’, is interpreted as 
representing those Islamic governments, organisations and individuals that adhere 
to and advocate a liberal and moderate interpretation of Islam. Liberal Political-
Islam is primarily concerned with, on the one hand, preserving Islamic cultural 
identity and, on the other, revitalising Islam in a purely modernist context.
100
 
Advocating and adopting many concepts and norms practiced in Western societies 
such as pluralism, emancipation, tolerance, social-justice and equality, and other 
human rights issues.
101
 It advocates Islamic piety to be an ‘individual/private’ 
obligation for all Muslims, rather than being a ‘social/public’ mandatory 
obligation for all members of society – both Muslim and non-Muslims – to submit 
to Islamic political and legal requirements.
102
 Liberal Political-Islam, therefore, 
coexists with both secular and pluralistic values within Islamic majority or 
minority societies and nations alike and is primarily democratic in nature, 
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promoting free elections and a macro liberal market economy.
103
 Moreover, and 
akin to some Western democratic nations, Liberal Political-Islam seeks to 
establish ‘social-welfare’ systems based on the central Islamic concept of ‘sadaqa’ 
(bearing one another’s burdens) and is derived from both the Quran and ‘Hadiths’ 
(reports/biography containing the life teachings of what Prophet Mohammad did, 
said and approved of).
104
 It also emphasises that socio-economic equality is a 
mandatory obligation and a fundamental component of the Islamic Umma and 
thus any ‘Islamic state’ (dawla islamiyya).105 
It is important to note here that as well as promoting a modern, moderate 
and, in some ways, secular interpretation of Islam, Liberal Political-Islam is 
fundamentally based on socio-economic development and thus the concept of 
sadaqa rather than on Conservative fundamentalism or, in the context of Islamism, 
extreme puritanical Islamic Law that is otherwise considered by adherents of non-
Liberal Political-Islam to be a mandatory component of any Islamic society or 
state.
106
 Hence, Liberal Political-Islam fundamentally rejects the harsh Islamic 
penal code of ‘hadd’ which justifies the use of violent punishment, inducing 
extreme violence and death in some cases, across a range of issues which are 
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considered by those Muslims adhering to Conservative or Islamist orientations of 
Political-Islam to be extreme moral and thus legal misconduct (for example, theft, 
adultery, blasphemy etc), opting instead for more humane punishments which are 
similar to the Western world.
107
  
Liberal Political-Islam, therefore, represents not only the modern face of 
Political-Islam and Islamic society, but in many ways is fundamentally akin to 
some Western democratic values and principles and provides an invaluable and 
committed ally in the fight against Islamist militant terrorism.
108
 Contemporary 
examples of governments that adhere to forms of Liberal Political-Islam are best 
represented by the current Turkish government’s ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) and, though facing many challengers, the Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq. 
The AKP and the Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq both support the deeper human-
rights values fundamental to Western style democracy such as, liberty, equality 
and justice.
109
  
 
 
                                                 
107
 See, for example, Hewer, Understanding Islam, op. cit., pp.151-152, 28-29; Barton, 
Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.28.  
108
 Esposito, The Future Of Islam, op. cit., pp. 63-65; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.28; 
Hewer, Understanding Islam, op. cit., pp.28-29.   
109
 See, for example, Anderson, I, James, 2005, Political Islam And Islamism In Turkey: The 
Question Of Turkish Exceptionalism Since The Mid-1990’s, Masters Thesis, University of Waikato, 
New Zealand, pp.25-29; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.28; Hewer, Understanding Islam, 
op. cit., pp.28-29.    
51 
 
5.3. Conservative Political-Islamic Ideology  
The second ideological level on the spectrum, and again not the primary 
focus of this study, is Conservative Political-Islamic ideology. This is interpreted 
here as Islamic governments, organisations and individuals that adhere to or 
advocate a conservative interpretation of Islamic teachings deriving from a 
particular school of Islamic jurisprudence (philosophy and law) and are referred to 
as ‘madhahib/path or way to go’.110 These Islamic schools of jurisprudence were 
established following the death of the Prophet Mohammad. They focus primarily 
on defining and interpreting Islamic Law based on the Qur’an’s 6,616 verses and 
the ‘Sunna’ (a collection of ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of the Prophet) which consisted 
of some 2,700 sayings and doings and were later codified into six canonical 
bibliographic collections known as the Hadiths. 
111
  
The Hadiths were collected and codified over a period of nearly 150 years 
between the early 8
th
 and mid 9
th
 centuries CE, by the founders and students of the 
different schools who were considered to be ‘Islamic scholars’ (alim/ulama) and 
which, alongside the Quran and Sunna, collectively form the cornerstone of 
Islamic jurisprudence.
112
 These schools include ‘Hanifa’, ‘Maliki’, ‘Shafi’i’, and 
‘Hanbali’, as well as an independent school known as ‘Ibadi’; all but the latter are 
classical Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence.
113
 Shiite Islamic schools became 
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legally codified between 932-1055CE, and include ‘Ja’fari’ as well as those 
schools established by the Shiite sub-groups, ‘Zaydi’, ‘Ismali’, ‘Bohras’, and 
‘Nizari (a sub-Ismail sect) and thus collectively form the Shiite traditions basis of 
Islamic jurisprudence.
114
  
The adherents and promoters of Conservative Political-Islam can, in some 
cases, exercise and justify the use of violence, inducing extreme forms of 
exsiccation (hanging/beheading/stoning), for crimes such as theft, blasphemy, 
adultery and murder.
115
 However, this is not to say that all governments, 
organisations or individuals that are adherents of Conservative Political-Islam 
exercise or justify violence regularly, or, as the only means to enforce and 
maintain Islamic Law. Conservative Political-Islam is identified in this study as 
representing the vast majority of the global Muslim population which adheres to 
the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam and advocates an amalgamation of 
political, legal and religious institutional frameworks (Islamic theocracy).
116
 
Conservative Political-Islam, therefore, constitutes what is widely considered, in 
both the Muslim and non-Muslim world, as ‘mainstream’ Islamic ideology and 
hence political and legal Islamic norms. Thus, Islam and the vast majority of 
Muslims throughout history are not apolitical or traditionally politically Liberal, 
                                                 
114
 Ibid.  
115
 See, for example, BBC News, December 7
th
 2010, Guerin, Orla, “Pakistani Christian Asia Bibi 
‘has price on her head’ ”, Retrieved, 30/01/2011, From, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-
11930849, p.1.  
116
 See, for example, Esposito, The Future Of Islam, op. cit., pp.115-116.  
53 
 
Islamist or Jihadist in nature.
117
 Neither is Islam traditionally a religion of ‘peace’ 
but, rather, a religion of ‘law’ which is inherently focused on the governance, and 
thus politics, of private and public and state affairs.
118
  
Conservative Political-Islam has fundamentally amalgamated itself with 
the concept of the nation-state rather than advocating a return to an Islamic 
Caliphate system (Islamic empire). This notion is confirmed by the following 
Islamic governments and judicial systems which this study identifies as currently 
adhering to Conservative Political-Islam; Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, the thirteen 
autonomist provinces in northern Nigeria (though there is increasing concerns 
there over the rise of Islamism and Jihadist organisations such as Boko 
Haram/Western Education is Sacrilegious), Oman, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates (though somewhat more moderate), and, although there is strong support 
for Islamism within some pockets of society and the government, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  
5.4. Islamist Political-Islamic Ideology  
The third level of ideological intensification on the Political-Islamic 
spectrum, and this study’s primary focus, is referred to and interpreted in this 
study as Islamist political ideology. The term correlates to those governments, 
organisations and individuals that adhere to or advocate a particular form of Sunni 
or Shiite Islamist ideology that derives from an ultra-puritanical and literalist 
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model of legal, political and religious Islamic teachings practised by the original 
Islamic community during the 7
th
 Century.
119
 These teachings were established by 
the Prophet Mohammad and his close companions prior to the establishment and 
codifying of the different Islamic schools of jurisprudence.
120
 Islamists seek to 
impose a theocratic framework over all aspects of society, both private and public, 
ultimately endeavouring to install a particular theocratic framework in all existing 
and, in some instances, pre-existing Islamic lands (i.e. those areas formally under 
Islamic control such as Spain and parts of the Balkans), states and societies as 
well as globally in the most extreme cases.
121
   
As noted, the extremely hard-line Islamist interpretation of Islamic 
teachings and traditions is based on Salafist Islam which, in this study is 
synonymous with the term Islamist, attempts to imitate the ‘pious forefathers’ of 
the original Muslim community which included the first three generations of 
Muslims who lived alongside Prophet Mohammad.
122
 These first three 
generations of pious Muslims were the close companions associated with the 
Prophet’s life, teachings and first Islamic community, considered by 
Salafits/Islamists to be the only pure and true manifestation of Islam.
123
 Hence, 
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Islamists are inspired by, and attempt to replicate, the first three generations of 
pious Muslims that lived during, and after, the Prophet Mohammad by invoking 
the Islamic concept of ‘taqleed’ (emulating tradition). 124  At the same time 
Islamists, ironically, considering they advocate a strictly literalist interpretation of 
Islam, are engaged in ‘ijithad’ (the intellectual effort of interpretation of the 
Islamic texts – Quran, Sunna and Hadiths); rejecting the classical schools of 
Islamic teachings (post-Hadith period) and reinterpreting the ideological 
foundations of Islam and thus Islamic law in order to justify their Islamist 
agenda’s.125  
The original Muslim community and the first three pious generations of 
Muslims included, and were led by, the first four Islamic rulers and successors 
(Caliphs) following the death of the Prophet Mohammad.
126
 These Islamic 
Caliphs included Abu Bakr (632-634), Omar ibn Khattab (634-644), Uthman ibn 
Affan (644-656), and Ali ibn Abu Talib (656-661), who are collectively referred 
to as the four Rightly Guided Caliphs of Islam.
127
 According to Islamists, all 
additional teachings and variations of Islam that emerged following the first three 
generations of pious Muslims and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs are 
contaminated and ultimately un-Islamic.  
                                                 
124
 Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., p.1; International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. 
cit., p.7.  
125
 Ibid.  
126
 Horst, “Salafist Jihadism in Germany”, op. cit., p.1.     
127
 Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., pp.10-14. 
56 
 
Although Salafist ideology is rooted in 7
th
 century Islam, the movement 
was not formally established until the 1880s. The original ideological foundations 
of the Salafist movement, however, represented an Islamic ‘reformist’ movement 
that embarked on a journey of modernisation, unlike many of today’s prominent 
Salafist/Islamist movements, in an effort to accommodate aspects of Western 
civilisation such as technology and science.
128
 The reformist project first emerged 
during the decline of the Ottoman Empire/Caliphate in the mid-to-late 1800s, 
following centuries of economic, technological, cultural, military, and geopolitical 
stagnation.
129
 Moreover, the rise of modern European Christian powers had begun 
to significantly weaken and influence the economic, military and political 
‘balance or power’ held by the Ottoman Empire from the 17th Century onwards as 
a result of a series of military defeats at the hands of the post-renaissance 
European Christian powers.
130
  
This period also witnessed the ‘modernisation’ of the Ottoman Empire 
with sweeping reforms known as the ‘Tanzimat’ (reorganisation), implementing 
secular and liberal polices and laws that gave educational, employment, legal, and 
political equality to both Muslims and non-Muslims – primarily Christians and 
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Jews.
131
 However, the reforms met strong resistance from the conservative 
Muslim elite and the wider Muslim population which had long resented Western 
influences, Christianity, Jews, and infidels, and who were seen as inferior and, 
ironically, a threat to Islam’s absolute superiority. Collectively, these events 
sparked widespread hostilities which thus sowed the seeds for the rise of the 
Salafist reformist project.
132
  
By the early 1920s, however, the Salafist reformist movement, following 
an explicit rapprochement with the Arabian (Saudi Arabia) based ultra-orthodox 
‘Wahhabi’ sect of Sunni Islam, founded by and named after the Hanbali 
theologian, Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792CE), began to take on a 
much more political dynamic and was becoming increasingly anti-modernist and 
anti-Western in its outlook.
133
 Following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 
1924, which marked the end of nearly 1300 years of the Islamic Caliphate, the 
Salafist movement, now under the influence of Muhammad Rashid Rida (a native 
of Greater Syria who had become president of the Syrian National Congress in 
1920), began to transform into a ‘revivalist’ movement that sought to re-establish 
the Islamic Caliphate and strict Islamic Law modelled on 7
th
 Century Islam and 
became further politicised.
134
 By the 1960s, the Salafist movement had manifested 
pockets of radical and extremist (Jihadist) variants of Islamist ideology which had 
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both National and Regional agendas and, following the financial and spiritual 
backing from both the Saudi government and radical Wahhabi Imams (spiritual 
leaders) during the 1970s and 1980s, spawned the rise of global extremists 
(Global-Jihadists).
135
  
The Wahhabi-Saudi ‘takeover’ of the reformist/modernist project set out 
to achieve two objectives. First, to establish Wahhabi dominance over the Salafist 
reformist project in order to launch what has become a global Wahhabi-led 
‘revivalist’ project, rather than a reformist/modernist project, that is actively 
exporting and establishing its hard-line puritanical and literalist teachings 
reminiscent to that of 7
th
 Century Islam throughout the wider Sunni and, if 
possible, entire Muslim world. Secondly, from the late 1970s onwards, to counter 
the influence of Shiite Islamist ideology which had gained significant influence in 
both Shiite and Sunni Islamist circles; notably following the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution of Iran.
136
  
It should be noted here that Salafist Islam is best understood in two 
contexts. First, as a methodology (manhaj) that can be used by any Muslim to 
consult the foundational texts – the Quran and Sunna – and to interpret Islam. 
Secondly, “…it is a movement, or a collection of like-minded believers who are 
held together by a common puritanical [or violent] understanding of Islam, all of 
whom apply the Salafist methodology to their religion.” 137  Salafist Islam, 
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therefore, is not exclusively a Sunni based phenomenon.
138
 Hence, this study 
advocates that there are two main forms of Islamist ideology: Sunni and Shiite.           
Sunni and Shiite Muslims and Islamists alike regard Ali, who was the first 
male adult convert to Islam and the founder and first Imam of Shiite Islam, as a 
pious forefather and one of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs.
139
 Therefore, it is 
logical to conclude that because Shiite Islamist ideology, like that of Sunni 
Islamism, is premised on both the Quran and Sunna, and that Ali was a pious 
forefather of the first Muslim community, Ali’s teachings and interpretations of 
Islam are also representative of a true and pure version of Islam and are thus part 
of the wider Salafist tradition.
140
 Based on this logic, Shiite rooted Islamist 
ideology and militant terrorist organisations alike can best be identified as 
deriving from ‘Shiite Salafist’ ideology.  
It is from this early point in Islam, post-Ali Caliphate, that both Sunni and 
Shiite Islamists see as being the period when Muslims and Islamic teachings and 
practices began to deviate from the pure Islamic tradition; claiming that they have 
become corrupted by other pre-existing non-Islamic influences (Greek-Hellenistic, 
Jewish, Christian, mysticism etc) 
141
 Hence, Islamist political ideology advocates 
a return to Salafist tradition which all Muslims must adhere to based on the true 
                                                 
138
 Gerges, A. Fawaz, 2007, Journey Of The Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy, Harcourt, Inc, 
Orlando, United States of America, p.12.  
139
 Ibid.  
140
 See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., pp.18-23.     
141
 Gerges, A. Fawaz, 2007, Journey Of The Jihadist, op. cit., p.12. 
60 
 
and pure interpretation of Islam revealed to the Prophet Mohammad by 
‘Allah’(God). Thus, Islamists consider themselves to be the only true practitioners 
of Islam and, therefore, the only true Muslims.
 142
   
Islamist political ideology acts as a platform to, on the one hand, 
aggressively oppose secular governments or reforms as well as Islamic 
governments or reforms that are not based on Salafist teachings. On the other 
hand, Islamists use Salafist teachings to promote political, legal and social reform 
throughout the Islamic world in order to replace what they see as un-Islamic and 
corrupt secular regimes and societies; as well as those Islamic regimes that are 
liberal or considered too moderate by Islamist standards. Islamists, in the short to 
mid-term, seek to establish in their place theocracies via what is described as an 
“Islamo-nationalist” (Islamist nationalism) political framework. This nationalist 
approach has been adopted by Islamist groups and militant terrorist organisations 
such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan; most branches of the Muslim 
Brotherhood; HAMAS in the Gaza Strip; the MILF in the Southern Philippines, 
and Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia.
143
  
It is clear, however, that not all Islamists support the idea of nationalism 
and the nation-state. These concepts are rejected by Islamists with regional or 
global ambitions, but not by those Islamists who are focused exclusively on 
establishing Islamist governments at the nation-state level. Advocates of Islamist 
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nationalism derive the concept from their interpretation that the Quran and Sunna 
or Hadiths do not fundamentally define an exclusive concept of what represents 
the ‘Islamic State’.144 Although considered highly utopian, in the long-term some 
Islamists ultimately seek to unify these states under a single regional pan-Islamist 
theocracy.
145
 This study advocates that Islamists seek to establish policies, laws 
and hence theocracies throughout the wider Islamic world, including in those 
nations which were once historically part of the Islamic Caliphate or now have a 
majority or a significant minority Muslim population (including, for example, the 
regions of sub-Saharan and East Africa, Southern Thailand, the Southern 
Philippines, Bosnia and other parts of the Balkans); using national and regional 
geopolitical frameworks, strategies and tactics and, in the context of Global 
Jihadism, ultimately extending to global ones.
146
    
Islamists employ both non-violent and violent tactics to support their 
theocratic ambitions. As noted, this study employs the following three terms: 
Missionary (al-da’wa); Activist (al-harakat al-islamiyya al-siyassiyya); and 
Jihadist (al-jihad/al-mujahid) to represent the three distinctive manifestations of 
Islamist ideology and their associated strategies and tactics which need to be 
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examined.
147
 The first two terms represent those Islamist organisations and 
individuals that refrain from using, propagating or justifying extreme acts of 
political-violence, while the term Jihadist represents those that use and justify 
systematic acts of political-violence and, in particular, militant terrorism.
148
  
Figure 3 represents a sub-spectrum of the Figure 2 and has been developed 
to provide this study with the additional analytical insights needed to further 
explore and gauge the different ideological levels associated with both non-
violent and violent forms of Islamist ideology. This study contends that Islamist 
ideology can be best understood in three distinctive forms and is thus not 
monolithic in nature. This studies primary focus is concerned with the third and 
final manifestation of Islamist ideology – Jihadist ideology.  
Figure 3: Spectrum of Islamist Political Islamic Ideology 
 
5.4.1. Missionary Islamist Ideology  
Missionary Islamist ideology represents the least politically active form of 
Islamist ideology and is primarily focused on ‘al-da’wa’ (preaching and 
proselytising), seeking to ‘convert’, in particular, non-Islamist Muslims (Liberal 
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and Conservative Muslims) and attracting new Islamist converts from outside of 
the Islamic religion as well as from within the wider pool of Islam itself.
149
 
Missionary Islamism fundamentally rejects the concept of the nation-state as an 
alternative to the Islamic Caliphate and advocates that all political systems not 
deriving from Islamic Law are ultimately un-Islamic and that there should be 
strict obedience to the sovereignty of God.
150
 Further, Missionary Islamism 
overtly propagates non-violence at the political level, focusing primarily on the 
“…preservation of Muslim identity and the Islamic faith and moral order against 
the forces of unbelief, [and] …the corruption of Islamic values (al-qiyam al-
islamiyya) and the weakening of [Islamic] faith (al-iman)”151.  
However, Missionary Islamism is a fundamental promoter of Islamist 
ideology and provides a fertile environment for political activism, radicalisation 
and the development of Islamist militant terrorists (Jihadists).
152
 Moreover, 
Missionary Islamist ideology and/or organisations are considered by experts to 
often be exploited or used covertly by Islamist militant terrorist organisations and 
their supporters to prepare or precondition non-Islamist Muslim communities to 
accept and convert to an Islamist interpretation of Islam; a process referred to as 
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the “Islamisation” of mainstream Islam.153 Although there are few governments 
that can be identified as exclusively deriving from Missionary Islamist ideology 
there are, however, some major politically motivated non-government 
organisations (NGO’s) that ‘export’ Missionary Islamist ideology that are funded 
by Islamist states. These include the Saudi funded Muslim World League, the 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Saudi Fund for Development.
154
 
There is also the ‘Jama’at al-Da’wa wa’l-Tabligh’ (Group for Preaching and 
Propagation) in India, the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, and the Society 
for Islamic Reform and Darul Arqam in Malaysia, as well as the forty-five 
branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir – an Islamist organisation that amalgamates both 
Missionary and, to some extent, Activist ideologies in its efforts to establish an 
Islamic Caliphate – which are based throughout the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and 
have been growing steadily in Europe.
 155
  
5.4.2. Activist Islamist Ideology    
Activist Islamist ideology, unlike Missionary Islamism, is highly political 
in nature and often employs non-violent political tactics and strategies as the main 
form of ‘political communication’. Activist Islamists seek power via political 
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means, using a variety of political-systems along with rhetoric deriving from 
different forms of Socialism or Communism, Nationalism, and, more recently, 
Democracy, to sell their puritanical hard-line Islamist agenda.
 156
 Hence, Activist 
Islamism represents a political framework that has amalgamated European 
developed political-systems with Islamist ideology; exposing the extent to which 
Activist Islamist ideology employs Islam for purely political means rather than 
relying exclusively on the ‘religious’ (al-da’wa) component of Islam like that of 
Missionary Islamist ideology.
157
 Activist Islamist ideology fundamentally rejects 
extremism, but supports the use of al-jihad during times of foreign occupation or 
attack, as a means to gain political power and has generally come to accept the 
concept of the nation-state unlike Missionary or some Jihadist based Islamist 
ideologies.
158
  
Examples of Islamist governments and major political organisations that 
currently correlate to Activist Islamist political ideology include Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, the Trans Federal Government in Somalia, the autonomous 
province of Aceh in Indonesia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/Jordan, Jamaat-
i-Islami in Pakistan, the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, the 
Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia, the Islamic Representative Council in 
Malaysia, and branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Malaysia and Indonesia.
 159
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adhering to a more extreme Islamist ideological orientation, and hence pro-
Jihadist in nature, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban 
Pakistan), and the Afghan Taliban, all employ and justify both non-political and 
politically motivated forms of violence such as political assassination, torture, and 
terrorism, and have strong underpinnings to Activist Islamist ideology in the 
context of Islamist nationalism and their acceptance of the nation-state.
160
 Islamist 
nationalism and the nation-state have become the primary frameworks in which 
the majority of Islamist movements and militant terrorist organisations seek to 
gain and control political power through in order to impose their particular 
Islamist ideologies.
161
        
5.5.0. Jihadist Islamist Political-Islamic Ideology 
As noted above, Islamist ideology also represents the ideological level 
associated with the phenomenon of politically motivated violence and hence 
militant terrorist organisations. There are a vast number of Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations throughout the Muslim world which have directly spawned 
from, though doctrinally and grossly misguided, the Islamic concept of ‘al-jihad’ 
which literally refers to an Islamic ‘defensive’ armed struggle/holy fighting/war, 
rather than the non-violent concept of ‘greater-jihad’ (al-jihad al-akbar).162 The 
concept of al-jihad which this third level of Islamist ideology derives from has 
both a ‘licit’ (based on the classical definition of al-jihad which rejects militant 
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terrorist tactics and is adhered to by mainstream Islam) and an ‘illicit’ 
manifestation (it rejects the classical definition in favour of a new extremist 
doctrinal innovation of al-jihad which justifies militant terrorist tactics and is 
adhered to by a minority of Islamists).
163
 This study focuses on the latter, illicit, 
manifestation of al-jihad and is referred to as ‘Jihadist ideology’.164     
Jihadist ideology is best identified as an Islamist sub-set that, like 
Missionary and Activist Islamism, has its ideological roots firmly embedded deep 
within the Salafist Islamic tradition. It can best understood as a tactic or strategy 
that is employed by Islamists who have abandoned the non-violent method of 
‘da’wah’ (preaching/issuing of summons) used by Missionary Islamists and 
political methods used by Activist Islamists, and who justify extreme political-
violence in the name of Islam.
165
 As this study will argue, Jihadist ideology, 
although representing a minority ideology within the wider Islamist movement, 
has witnessed a steady growth of support since its inception and, in particular, 
from the late 1970s onwards.
166
  
The Jihadist movement, although not doctrinally or tactically monolithic, 
seeks to install, a puritanical, absolutist and violent Islamist interpretation of 
Islamic Law over all aspects of Islamic society and, in a particular context (Global 
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Jihadism), non-Islamic societies. Justified via an illicit interpretation, and 
supporting an ‘offensive’ al-jihad which fundamentally constitutes extreme and 
open-ended violence, it is, therefore, distinctive from both mainstream Islamism 
(Missionary/Activist) and the wider Islamic held interpretation that al-jihad is a 
‘defensive’ concept.167 This study advocates that Jihadists are Islamist fanatics 
that have grossly distorted the concept of al-jihad and the wider religion of Islam 
in order to invoke what is an illicit religio-political armed conflict which Jihadists 
claim is in the defence of Islam and thus Allah/God.
168
     
Jihadist Islamist ideology also invokes, like that of Missionary and 
Activist Islamism, additional non-violent tactics including propaganda, 
missionaries, indoctrination, recruitment, and charity and fundraising activities, as 
well as supporting various forms of political-activism.
169
 Jihadists, therefore, often 
employ two strategies simultaneously, using both violent and non-violent tactics 
to promote and sustain their Islamist ideology. It remains the case, however, that 
the justification and use of militant terrorism and other forms of political violence 
represents the primary tactics and strategies adhered to by Jihadists as well as the 
most immediate threat.
170
 Nevertheless, non-violent tactics do play an important 
role within the Jihadist and wider Islamist circles, aiding their abilities to inspire 
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and recruit new members and thus providing a mechanism to amplify their 
Islamist agendas.
171
     
The overwhelming majority of Islamic theologians and academics contend 
that the concept of al-jihad has three distinctive interpretations. These include 
‘internal’ (waging al-jihad against corrupt and impious Muslim 
rulers/governments); ‘irredentist’ (waging al-jihad to redeem Muslim land from 
non-Muslim rulers/forces); and ‘global’ (a new interpretation introduced by al-
Qaeda in 1998 that advocates/justifies a worldwide campaign of open-ended and 
indiscriminate militant terrorism against, in particularly, the West and its allies, 
Jews, Christians and other religions as well as those around the world who oppose 
their Islamist agendas).
172
 They only consider the first two to be legitimate and 
only if the prevailing status quo justifies the use of al-jihad (such as in case of 
foreign or apostate rule and/or military occupation). This must be the last resort 
and there are strict ethical codes such as ‘proportionality’ and ‘discriminate’ 
targeting which must be upheld.
173
  
Figure 4 is a sub-spectrum of Figures 3 and 2 and represents the different 
levels of Jihadist Islamist ideology identified in this study and hence collectively 
form the final and most extreme levels manifested within the wider phenomenon 
of Political-Islam.    
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Figure 4: Spectrum of Jihadist Islamist Ideologies: 
 
5.5.1. National Jihadist Islamist Ideology   
 National Jihadist Islamist Ideology represents the original phase in the 
evolution and transformation phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism. This 
ideology propagates the concept of the Islamic state. Islamists prior to the 1970s 
were opposed to the concept of the nation-state (and it is still rejected by 
Missionary Islamists and Regional and Global Jihadists) which was considered a 
Western replacement of the Islamic Caliphate and thus deemed to be un-
Islamic.
174
 However, as outlined above, the Quran, Sunna and Hadiths do not 
outline an exclusive definition or concept of the Islamic state. National Jihadist 
ideology, therefore, accepts the concept of the nation-state and thus represents an 
amalgamation of nationalism and/or Activist Islamist and Jihadist ideologies.
175
  
The Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928, by Hassan Al-
Banna, had a doctrine that was deeply anti-Western, illiberal and anti-democratic 
and represents the earliest manifestation of Islamist nationalist ideology. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamist political party, primarily sought to 
reform the institutional framework of the Egyptian state, and hence society in 
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general, in accordance with Islamic Law. In its early days it advocated for the re-
establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.
176
 Following the assassination of Al-
Banna by Egyptian government agents in 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
actively seeking to overthrow the highly secular Western backed autocratic 
government led by Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nokrashi Pasha.
177
 By July 
1952, and endorsed by the Muslim Brotherhood which had organised popular 
anti-government and anti-monarchy riots against King Farouq, the Egyptian 
armed forces staged a military coup and in 1953, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser 
was inaugurated Egyptian President.
178
 During this time, the Muslim Brotherhood 
received arms and clandestine military training from sympathisers within the 
Egyptian army and had developed close connections with members of the newly 
empowered Revolutionary Command Council which included the future President, 
Muhammad Anwar Sadat.
179
  
Following the military coup, the Muslim Brotherhood had expected 
Nasser to establish an Islamic government and institute Islamic Law and thus 
transform Egypt into an Islamic state. However, Nasser and his secular pan-Arab 
nationalist regime almost immediately returned to a policy of political suppression 
of the Islamist establishment in Egypt. This led to a failed assassination attempt 
on Nasser in 1954 by an extremist Muslim Brotherhood member, Mahmoud Abd 
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al-Latif. Nasser then adopted a hard line and violent approach towards the 
organisation and wider Islamist movement; executing those directly responsible 
and arresting hundreds more.
180
 It was during this period that pockets of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership had begun to shift towards violent tendencies, 
providing an environment which would help influence and crystallise the 
manifestation and rise of National Jihadist ideology within the organisation and 
beyond.
181
 The adoption of Jihadist doctrine and thus campaigns of political-
violence through strategies and tactics of militant terrorism by some leaders, 
ultimately lead to a major ethical division within the Muslim Brotherhood (and by 
1970, the wider Salaifist movement) between, on the one hand, those Islamists 
who supported the Jihadist doctrine and, on the other, those that opposed it.
182
  
A central figure within the Muslim Brotherhood, one who is considered to 
be the founding ideologue behind the modern National Jihadist doctrine and the 
wider Jihadist movement, was the Egyptian born Islamic theologian and 
intellectual Sayyid Qutb. Ironically, Qutb was once secular and had spent three 
years (1949-1951) of his university study in the United States of America (U.S.) 
had concluded that the U.S. and the wider Western secular system and its 
principles were inherently immoral, corrupt, un-Godly (i.e. un-Islamic), and 
ultimately posed a direct threat to Islamic traditions and civilisation.
183
 On his 
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return to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood and immediately set out to 
institutionalise a more hard line anti-secular and anti-Western, in particular anti-
American, doctrine within the organisation alongside increasing the 
Brotherhood’s efforts to denounce the Egyptian regime.184  
By the late 1960s following Qutb’s imprisonment between 1954-1965, for 
his indirect involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempted assassination of 
Nasser, Qutb wrote the Islamist manifestos In the Shade of the Quran and 
Milestones – both of which provided, and remain, the most influential theological 
and/or intellectual innovation that justifies National Jihadist ideology and would 
later help influence/justify both Regional and Global Jihadist ideologies.
185
  
Subsequently, Nasser and the Egyptian government accused and convicted Qutb 
of conspiracy and he was executed in 1966.
186
 In the wake of Qutb’s execution his 
Islamist doctrine began to resonate within the Muslim Brotherhood coinciding 
with the ongoing socio-economic and geopolitical failures of the Arab regimes 
and, in particular, their inability to militarily defeat Israel. This ultimately 
transformed the Muslim Brotherhood into two ideologically different Islamist 
camps.
187
 On the one hand, an Activist Islamist ideology based on Al-Banna’s 
doctrine that fundamentally rejected politically motivated violence and, on the 
other, a Jihadist Islamist ideology deriving directly from Outb’s manifestos. The 
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doctrine can be seen as a new or reinterpretation of al-jihad which justifies the 
most extreme forms of political-violence including militant terrorism.
188
  
Qutb remains, arguably, the most influential Islamist who nearly 
singlehandedly carved out what has evolved into the central ideological pillar 
underpinning Islamist militant-terrorist organisations and individuals alike.
189
 
Outb’s work was also highly instrumental in the rise of ‘Red Shiism’ 
(Revolutionary/Activist Shiite Islamist Political-Islamic ideology), which went on 
to establish the first modern Islamist orientated government following the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran in 1979. This further crystallised Qutb’s pro-Jihadist doctrine 
as a template within both Sunni and Shiite Jihadist circles.
190
    
There are very few governments or regimes that are manifestations of this 
particular Islamist phenomenon. Saudi Arabia represents the oldest and closest 
example of an Islamist nation-state that has directly derived from the phenomenon 
of National Jihadist ideology.
191
 Emerging following a campaign of ‘internal’ al-
jihad in pursuit of the nation-state (i.e Saudi Arabia) led by the House of Saud, 
and in particular, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman al Saud (aka Ibn Saud). 
However, this was more a campaign of guerrilla warfare and insurgent style 
attacks - although large pockets of Ibn Saud’s Wahhabi Islamist fighters did 
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engage in militant terrorist attacks against Shiite civilians in 1929.
192
 Therefore, it 
is unlike the contemporary adherents of National Jihadist ideology who have 
adopted indiscriminate acts of militant terrorism as their primary means.
193
   
Other than the limited case of Saudi Arabia, there are no other nation-
states that directly derive from National Jihadist Islamist ideology. There are, 
however, a growing number of ‘sub-state actors/organisations’ which are 
adherents of and propagate National Jihadist ideology. The following examples 
can be seen as major political-stakeholders that derive from or represent National 
Jihadist Islamist ideology: HAMAS which governs the Gaza Strip Palestinian 
Territory; Hezbollah which is represented in the Lebanese Government and 
controls the country’s southern districts south of Beirut; and the Afghan-Taliban 
which is the second largest political group in Afghanistan.
194
 Moreover, there are 
a growing number of ‘non-state actors/organisations’ which are or have been 
engaged in militant terrorist campaigns in the pursuit of political autonomy or 
power which are motivated by National Jihadist ideology. Examples of sub-state 
actors/organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia alone include among 
others: the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Palestine, the GIA in Algeria, the Asbat 
al-Ansar (The Partisan’s League) in Lebanon, the EIJ and Islamic Group in Egypt, 
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, 
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Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation in Iran, Palestinian Islamic Jihad which is active 
in the Gaza Strip and West Bank Palestinian Territories, the MILF in the Southern 
Philippines, and the GMIP in Southern Thailand.
195
  
5.5.2. Regional Jihadist Islamist Ideology 
  The second phase in the ideological evolution of Islamist militant 
terrorism is identified in this study as Regional Jihadist Islamist ideology which 
propagates and derives from the concepts of both ‘internal’ and, notably, 
‘irredentist’ al-jihad.196  This particular Islamist manifestation ultimately seeks, 
like National Jihadist ideology, to establish and impose Islamist control and law 
over all contemporary Islamic states and regions. However, contrary to National 
Jihadist ideology, it seeks also to achieve this in all geographic regions that were 
once, but are no longer, part of a former Islamic Caliphate or under Islamic 
control and thus, according to most Muslims, belong to ‘Dar al-Islam’(House of 
Islam).
197
 Examples include Bosnia and the wider Balkans, Southern Spain, the 
Russian Caucasus, Maritime Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa as 
well as large regions of sub-Saharan Africa, and most of South and Central Asia 
as well as regions of western China.
198
 Regional Jihadist ideology can be viewed 
as a form of ‘regional separatism’. Islamist militant terrorist organisations that 
adhere to this particular Jihadist ideology sometimes work together or are 
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sometimes in rivalry and which are driven by the common denominator of 
needing to liberate and recapture what they term to be sacred Islamic lands.
199
 
Attempting to annex states or territory from within a particular state, that were 
once under Islamic control or law in their effort to restore and replicate the 
Islamic Caliphate which Regional Jihadists claim did, and will again, stretch from 
Senegal to the Philippines.
200
 
A key point needing to be added here is the rivalry between National and 
Regional – as well as Global – Jihadists. Although both seek Islamist rule and law, 
Regional Jihadist’s ultimately seek the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate 
based on, and justified by, the concept of both ‘internal’ and ‘irredentist’ forms of 
‘al-jihad’ and reject the modern nation-state.201 They are thus unlike National 
Jihadists who seek to establish this within the framework of the modern nation-
state via an exclusively ‘internal al-jihad’ against states otherwise already 
considered to be Islamic, but not under an Islamist interpretation of Islam.
202
 This 
religo-political and, hence, ideological difference is at the root of rivalry between 
National, Regional and Global Jihadists and is often played out on the ground in 
those nations and geographic regions which have a majority or a minority Muslim 
population that are experiencing socio-political conflict deriving from ‘inter’ or 
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‘intra’ state ethno-religious tensions.203 These types of conflicts are the primary 
context and hence entry-point for Jihadist’s to establish a foothold as has been the 
case, for example, in Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Aceh and 
Maluku as well as Sulawesi in Indonesia, Iraq, Kashmir, Libya, Mauritania, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Mindanao and the Sulu region of the southern Philippines, 
southern Thailand, Sudan, Somalia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to some extent in 
the Xinjiang province in China; as well as a growing number of sub-Saharan 
African states such as Chad, Kenya, Mail, Niger, Nigeria, and Tanzania.
204
  
It’s worth noting that a number of the above states and regions within 
these states sit on the geographic periphery, and in the case of sub-Saharan Africa 
(and some parts of Central, South and Southeast Asia), beyond what is considered 
to be historically lands belonging to Islam.
205
 That is, these regions were never 
part of the Islamic Caliphate but, however, they have large Muslim populations 
and since the 1970’s, and in particular since the mid-1990s, have witnessed the 
rise of Islamist ideology and political movements as well as Jihadist 
organisations.
206
  
The rise of Islamist ideology has witnessed the geographic acquisition and 
subsequent institutional autonomy – most recently in northern Nigeria, Aceh in 
Indonesia, and southern Chad – in local political, legal and judicial matters as 
                                                 
203
 Ibid. 
204
 Ibid.  
205
 McCormack, “An African Vortex”, op. cit., p.2. 
206
 Ibid, pp. 2-5.  
79 
 
well as the implementation by Islamists of harsh Islamic penal-code punishments 
in criminal courts.
207
 Moreover, large amounts of unregulated money and socio-
economic aid is provided by Islamist and Jihadist’s networks alike, often 
originating from Arab (oil) states or sub-or non-state entities that support Islamist 
ideology and who seek to facilitate the Islamisation of mainstream Islamic society 
from the bottom up.
208
 A recent example of this type of activity occurred in Aceh, 
Indonesia following the 2004 Asian Tsunami were Islamists and Jihadists worked 
to successfully distribute money and aid which was supplied by both non-state 
Islamist entities and Indonesia authorities.
209
 Aceh is now effectively an 
autonomous region under the control of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM – the 
Acehnese separatist movement) and Islamists as well as Jihadists forces.
210
 
Collectively, this two-pronged strategy is intended to coerce and condition non-
Islamist Muslim communities for the introduction of Islamist ideology and thus 
progressively towards adopting and implementing an Islamist interpretation of 
both Islamic law and political control over society.
211
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Most of these states and regions which are now experiencing religious 
based conflict originated out of conflicts based on non-religious issues such as 
nationalism and ethnicity but have now become radicalised in the wake of the rise 
of Islamist ideologies since the 1970s.
212
 This highlights the geographic 
expansion of both Islamism and, in particular, Jihadist ideologies in what National 
and Regional – as well as Global – Jihadist organisations now consider to be 
Islamic lands.
213
                
The desire by Regional Jihadist organisations to restore the geographic 
regions which were once under Islamic law or control derives primarily from 
Sayyid Qutb’s pro-Jihadist manifesto. This rejects the concept of the modern 
nation-state, unlike National Jihadist and Activist Islamist ideologies which have 
now come to accept it. Moreover, Qutb’s manifesto promotes the re-establishment 
of an Islamic Caliphate modelled from the first three generations of Islam (i.e. 
Salafist Islam), through a campaign of open-ended and indiscriminate armed 
conflict and thus militant terrorism.
214
 The campaign would first target the ‘near 
enemy’ (Muslim rulers deemed to be ‘kafir’ (unbelievers/apostate/impious)) 
which Qutb, and hence, Regional Jihadist’s derive from the concept of ‘internal’ 
and, to some extent, ‘irredentist’ al-jihad.  
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By the late 1990s, a new targeting strategy was employed, especially by 
Global Jihadists, against what had came to be seen as the ‘far enemy’ 
(governments from the non-Muslim world, notably the U.S. and Western 
governments, that actively support those Islamic rulers and regimes deemed to be 
kafir according to Regional Jihadist ideology).
215
 Regional Jihadists would thus 
seek to incorporate and amalgamate all nation-states and territories that were once 
under Islamic control, as well as those that are not historically part of the Islamic 
Caliphate but now have a significant Muslim population, into what would 
technically represent an Islamic ‘super-state’ which would be controlled and 
united by a network of pan-Islamist organisations and regimes reminiscent of the 
Taliban in pre-9/11 Afghanistan, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the emerging 
Islamist sub-states in Northern Nigeria, and Aceh in Indonesia.
216
 
 This study does not identify that there are any contemporary governments 
or states representative of, or that overtly adhere to, a pan-Islamist super-state 
based on Regional Jihadist Islamist ideology. However, Islamist elements 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the winners of the June 2012 
presidential elections in that country, recently made clear at a Muslim 
Brotherhood rally in Cairo in May 2012, their support for and ultimate goal is a 
pan-Islamist super-state.
217
 At the rally Islamist preacher, Safwat Higazi who is a 
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supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and the idea of a pan-Islamist super-state 
and Regional Jihadist ideology, addressed thousands of Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters. In his speech Higazi stated that “The capital of the caliphate – the 
capital of the United States of the Arabs – will be Jerusalem, God willing,”.218 
Moreover, Higazi went on to state “Come on, you lovers of martyrdom, you are 
all Hamas… Forget about the whole world, forget about conferences. Brandish 
your weapons … Yes, Jerusalem is our goal. We shall pray in Jerusalem, or die as 
martyrs on its threshold.”219 Hence, Higazi and his statements indicate that there 
is still at least some support for the creation of an Islamist supper-state within 
some factions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and, in some pockets, 
Regional Jihadist ideology as well as, in the context of support for HAMAS, 
National Jihadist ideology. In addition to the limited case of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood there are, however, many sub-state variants of this particular Jihadist 
phenomenon. The following is a list of Regional Jihadist organisations that have 
been identified by the U.S. Department of State from 2001-2010 that are or have 
been engaged in the pursuit of a pan-Islamist super-state modelled on the Islamic 
Caliphate in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
220
 These include the ASG in the 
                                                                                                                                     
Oren, “Egypt Islamist vows global caliphate in Jerusalem”, Retrieved, 22/06/2012, From 
www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=269074, p.1.  
218
 The Jerusalem Post, 05, 08, 2012, Kessler, Oren, “Egypt Islamist vows global caliphate in 
Jerusalem”, Retrieved, 22/06/2012, From www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=269074, 
p.1.  
219
 Ibid  
220
 Hellman, Christopher, 2010, “Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department 
Under E.O.13224” United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of 
83 
 
Southern Philippines, JI in Indonesia, Tanzim al-Jihad in Egypt (which evolved 
out of the EIJ, the Jihad Group, Islamic Group, Islamic Jihad, and Vanguards of 
Conquest and was established in Egypt and merged with al-Qaeda in 2001), and 
the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria (which amalgamated 
with other elements in the region to form al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) in 2007).
221
 Moreover, these organisations have evolved to become 
‘affiliated’, often for financial and their desire to obtain new technological 
knowhow and other strategic reasons, with al-Qaeda in their particular state or 
region but, however, organisations such as the ASG and JI retain complete 
operational independence.
222
   
5.5.3. Global Jihadist Islamist Ideology  
The third, and final, phase in the ideological evolution of Islamist militant 
terrorism is that of Global Jihadist Islamist ideology. Unlike Regional and 
National Jihadist ideologies, and contrary to classical or mainstream Islam, this 
propagates a ‘global’ interpretation of ‘al-jihad’ which, as noted, is one that is an 
offensive, individual and perpetual duty for all Muslims throughout the world. 
223
 
As the former leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden put it “…jihad is part of our 
religion and no Muslim may say that he does not want to do jihad in the cause of 
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God…These are the tenets of our religion.”224 Bin Laden further noted that: “No 
other priority, except faith, could be considered before [jihad].”225 Global Jihadist 
ideologists, therefore, elevate their interpretation and status of ‘al-jihad’ to be 
equal with the ‘five pillars’ of Islam’s central teachings, claiming it to be second 
only to the obedience of faith which is contrary to classical and hence mainstream 
Islamic teachings and is thus considered to be an illicit interpretation of ‘al-
Jihad’.226  
Global Jihadist ideology represents the most radial manifestation within 
the wider Jihadist movement and, like Regional – though rejecting the concept of 
the nation-state – and National Jihadist ideologies, is extensively influenced by 
Qutb’s Jihadist doctrine.227 This ideology seeks to establish and implement the 
most radical Islamist interpretation of Islamic law throughout, first and foremost, 
the Islamic world – that is, those nations and regions that belonged to the 
Caliphate –  through a global campaign of militant terrorism that targets both the 
near-enemy and far-enemy simultaneously.
228
 Secondly, and contrary to both 
Regional and National Jihadist ideologies, Global Jihadists ultimately seek to 
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impose their interpretation of Islamic law throughout the entire world in an effort 
to establish a global Islamic Caliphate and thus Allah’s kingdom/rule on earth.229    
Although this study does not consider there to be any current Islamic 
governments or states that overtly propagate or adhere to Global Jihadist ideology, 
there is some evidence that there has been state-actors closely linked to the 
phenomenon. Examples include senior Saudi government officials such as, Prince 
Turki al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz who was the former Saudi intelligence chief,  
Prince Ahmed, Prince Sultan bin Faisal bin Turki al-Saud, and Prince Fahd bin 
Turki bin Saud al-Kabirand, as well as a high-ranking Pakistani Air Force officer, 
Mushaf Ali Mir who was closely connected to Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI). All were identified by high-level al-Qaeda operative, Abu 
Zubaydah as key associates and financers of bin Laden and al-Qaeda as well as 
the Afghan Taliban prior to 9/11.
230
 This information was obtained by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) which had captured Zubaydah in Pakistan in 2002, and 
was confirmed by the CIA to be genuine. Moreover, within weeks of Zubaydah’s 
testimony, a copy of which was passed on to both the Saudi and Pakistani 
governments, the Saudi’s named by Zubaydah excluding Prince Turki al-Faisal 
bin Abdul Aziz, all dead within days of each other under suspicious circumstances 
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followed by Mushaf Ali Mir seven months later in Pakistan.
231
 Further, the Saudi 
government, notably the Saudi Ministry of Education and the Cultural Department 
attached to Saudi Embassies, has been directly involved and cited on numerous 
occasions for providing ‘hate-publications’ and hence a platform for Jihadists. 
The latest example was in 2003 when it was cited for providing and influencing 
Mosques and Muslim communities around the world with radical Wahhabi 
publications and Imams who were promoting intolerant and pro-violent teachings 
towards, in particular, Jews and Christians as well as moderate Muslims and 
‘infidels’ (non-Muslims who are not Christian or Jewish); and why/how Muslims 
should resist integrating into other society’s culture and values.232   
The post-Cold War period has seen an increasing number of organisations 
and individuals that have adopted the Global Jihadist doctrine.
233
 From the 1970s 
onwards there has been a steady increase in the growth of Jihadist based 
ideologies and militant terrorist organisations which from the 1980’s onwards, as 
a direct result of the Afghan-Jihad during the Afghan-Soviet War in 1979-1989, 
began to spawn the contemporary phenomenon of Global Jihadist ideology and 
militant terrorist organisations.
234
 Global Jihadists are attempting to ignite a world 
wide ‘clash of civilisations’ between, on the one hand, Jews, Christians and the 
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wider Western world and ultimately all non-Muslims, against, on the other, the 
entire Islamic world. They employ and propagate both non-violent tactics 
(propaganda, missionaries and activism) and the most extreme forms of political-
violence (militant terrorism – as well as other forms of sadistic violence) available 
to them as a means to implement their radical global Islamist agenda.
235
  
Organisations and individuals that correlate to Global Jihadist ideology 
can be divided into three primary groups. First and foremost, is ‘al-Qaeda Central’ 
(AQC) which is the original and premier organisation at the forefront of today’s 
Global Jihadist movement. AQC is made up of a ‘core’ membership of Jihadists 
loyal to the organisation’s ‘central command’ which is now under the direct 
control of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri following the assassination of Osama bin 
Laden.
236
 AQC’s ranks are estimated to number about three hundred highly 
trained Jihadists who are hiding and operating in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as well as 
increasingly out of Pakistani ‘controlled’ towns and cities.237  
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Although militarily on the defensive in the FATA border region, forcing 
the ‘decentralisation and diversification’ of al-Qaeda at the operational and 
leadership levels and hence dispersed the network across a wider geographic 
sphere, AQC remains, however, the key driving force behind the wider al-Qaeda 
franchise. AQC’s post-2001 role has been to implement the decentralisation and 
diversification strategy in an effort to spread the organisation’s Jihadist ideology 
via its propaganda and media operations in an effort to increase its worldwide 
indoctrination and thus recruitment, notably inside the West. It has also worked 
closer with ‘local’ Jihadist organisations in an effort to infiltrate, regroup and 
strengthen the organisation’s ideological and geographic influence.238  
The second ideological evolution in the Global Jihadist camp, which also 
emerged as a direct result of AQC’s decentralisation and diversification strategy, 
has been the establishment of a global franchise of ‘affiliated’ Jihadist 
organisations that have pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda brand and Global 
Jihadist doctrine and represent al-Qaeda in that particular country or region. These 
franchises have provided AQC with a network of pre-established organisations 
and infrastructure which they now control and first began to establish and 
infiltrate during the 1990s.
239
 The destruction of al-Qaeda’s base in Afghanistan 
following the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001, as well as increased efforts globally 
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to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, has furthered this development.
240
 
Counter-terrorism efforts in the last decade by the international community have 
significantly weakened AQC’s ability to carry out large-scale attacks and have 
created significant operational set-backs thus forcing al-Qaeda’s decentralisation 
and diversification.
241
  
However, in the wake of these developments, al-Qaeda has evolved into a 
multifaceted organisation with branches operating across a wider geographic 
region, independently from AQC, with the ability to conduct low to medium scale 
militant terrorist attacks frequently.
242
 Examples of al-Qaeda affiliated 
organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia alone include al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI/al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers) – which is made up from three 
local Jihadist groups which included Ansar al-Islam, Tawhid wa al-Jihad and 
elements of Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah –, AQIM (formally the GSPC), AQAP, and 
Harakat ul-Mujahedin; as well as JI, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and, to some 
extent, the ASG in Southeast Asia.
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The third and most recent evolution in the Global Jihadist phenomenon to 
emerge in the wake of AQC’s decentralisation and diversification strategy is 
identified by experts as ‘inspired’ Global Jihadists. 244  Since 2005, AQC has 
actively sought to export its Global Jihadist ideology - notably via propaganda on 
the Internet especially via its Inspire magazine/website - beyond the 
organisation’s traditional Islamist sphere. A strategy that seeks to connect with a 
wider Muslim populace, notably in Western countries, as well as seeking to 
resonate with those anti-American and anti-Western audiences around the world; 
thus manifesting and crystallising the phenomenon of inspired Global Jihadists.
245
  
Inspired Global Jihadists can be viewed as a type of ‘do-it-yourself’ group 
or individual. The phenomenon has been steadily on the rise throughout the wider 
Muslim world and, although not the focus of this study, in some Western 
democratic countries and has, particularly in the context of the West, manifested 
into two primary forms; the ‘home-grown’ and ‘lone wolf’ inspired Global 
Jihadists. These two forms collectively represent the latest development to 
manifest within the wider Global Jihadist theatre. The phenomenon has emerged, 
in the context of the West, out of minority Muslim migrant communities such as 
in the U.K, the U.S., most European Union (EU) states, Canada, and Australia.
246
 
It is argued here that home-grown inspired Global Jihadists may or may not be 
directly connected with the al-Qaeda network or any other Jihadist organisation 
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and that the lone-wolf inspired Global Jihadists have no affiliation whatsoever 
with al-Qaeda or any Islamist militant terrorist organisation but, nevertheless, 
have adopted the Global Jihadist doctrine.
247
 Both manifestations of inspired 
Global Jihadists will be discussed further in the following chapter.    
Examples of inspired Global Jihadist in the West include, among others, 
Khalid al-Dawsari, a lone-wolf inspired operative who was an international 
student studying in the U.S. from Saud Arabia who, in March 2011, manufactured 
explosives which he had planed to use in an attack inside the U.S. In 2010, a first 
generation Somali-American citizen – and hence a home-grown Jihadist –, 
Mohamed Osman Mohamud, attempted to explode a device at the Christmas tree 
lighting ceremony in Portland, Organ in the U.S. In November 2010, at Fort Hood 
Army base in Texas, Nidal Malik Hasan, a Palestinian Muslim who immigrated to 
the U.S. and became a Major in the U.S. Army, shot dead thirteen and lamed 
some thirty more. Hasan was not a member of any Jihadist group and was hence a 
lone-wolf.
248
 In Australia three male Somali Muslim migrants were charged for 
their role in a foiled suicide attack on an Army base in Australia and were inspired 
by the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab in Somalia; one of six home-grown and lone-
wolf Jihadist plots uncovered in that country since 9/11.
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In the context of Europe, although Jihadist ideologies and organisations 
were already established and had attacked some countries, notably Britain and 
France (which has the largest Muslim population in Europe and was targeted by  
the Algerian GIA Jihadist organisation from the 1980s onwards), well before 9/11, 
it was not until the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that home-grown and lone-
wolf inspired Global Jihadist attacks began to target and occur in the U.K and 
France and in other European nations.
250
 The threat posed to Britain by inspired 
Global Jihadists was clear following the July 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, 
when four British Muslims – three of Pakistani and one of Jamaican descent – 
detonated suicide bombs on the underground and on a commuter bus killing more 
than fifty and wounding over seven hundred.
251
 Along with the 7/7 attacks there 
have been scores of Global Jihadist plots uncovered and arrests made in the U.K 
such as in December 2011 when four Muslim males who are first and second 
generation immigrants plotted to bomb the Landon Stock Exchange.
252
 Attacks 
and attempted plots by inspired Global Jihadists in Europe in the post-9/11 era 
have also occurred in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, and Russia.
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Collectively, the three evolutions in Global Jihadist ideology can be seen 
as a direct result of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification strategy in 
response to the launch of the U.S.-led global War on Terror following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 strategy, alongside 
the invasions of Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, 
are identified by experts as the key events that gave rise to the three ideological 
evolutionary phases of the Global Jihadist doctrine; which are collectively 
referred to as al-Qaeda’s ‘second generation’ and will be discussed further in the 
following chapter.  
The following diagram indicates the studies findings of the quantified 
support base of Jihadist Islamist ideologies and organisations in the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia since the 1970s.    
Figure 5:   
Source: “Terrorism Today” op. cit., pp. 191-207;“Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by 
Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.12; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by, Linden, V. Edward, 
op. cit., pp.134-135; Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, 2005, Edited by, 
Tore Bjorgo, Routledge, New York, NY, United States of America, p.83.  
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Chapter Six 
The National, Regional & Global Geopolitical Transformation of 
Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East 
6.1. Introduction 
 This chapter will examine the study’s hypothesised ‘geopolitical 
transformation’ process in the context of the Middle East, and seeks to establish 
that there has been three distinctly different phases of Islamist militant terrorism 
and thus categories and manifestations of Islamist militant terrorist organisations. 
The study advocates that the three phases and categories of organisations, which 
have emerged out of the phenomenon of Islamist ideology, can best be identified 
as National, Regional and Global. Collectively they make up the wider 
geopolitical phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East.  
The study articulates the idea that by identifying an organisation’s 
geographic contours and ambitions, first revealed through their ideological 
contours, it can provide a way of illuminating a particular organisation’s, or 
individual’s, geopolitical motivations allowing their categorisation into either 
National, Regional or Global orientated Islamist militant terrorist organisations. 
Here, this chapter will examine the key historical, political, social and economic 
phenomena and contexts directly associated with each of the three hypothesised 
phases, as well as the categories of organisations, in respect of the Middle East 
and represents the first case study of the research.    
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6.2. The Ascent of National Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East  
In order to gain a clear understanding of the ascent of National Islamist 
militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and the phenomenon’s expanse 
since the 1970s, consideration must first be given to a number of key historical 
phenomena and contexts. These include the impact of WWI and the collapse of 
the Ottoman Caliphate; colonial rule and the creation of nation states; the 
expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestine; WWII; the creation of Israel; the 
1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War; and the failure of pan-Arab 
nationalism.  
 With the exception of the guerrilla warfare campaigns against the Ottoman 
and then British forces in Arabia by the Saud tribe, notably by Ibn Saud, and the 
Wahhabi terror camping against the minority Shiite Muslim community in Arabia, 
there have only been a handful of National inspired Islamist militant terrorist 
actors and organisations prior to the 1970s.
254
 Nevertheless, it is during the pre-
1970s period, notably following WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman-led 
Caliphate and during WWII following the transfer of Nazi ideology, that the roots 
of National Islamist militant terrorism can be traced in the Middle East.  
Three examples of National Islamist militant terrorism can be identified in 
the pre-1970’s period. First, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, a Palestinian and former 
Ottoman Army officer who became the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Syrian 
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Islamist cleric, Izz al-Din al-Qassam who was a former student of Rashid Rida 
who was a student of Muhammad Abduh and who were both members of the 
original Islamist movement founded by Sayyid Jamal Din Afghani in the late 19
th
 
Century.
255
 Al-Husseini and, in particular, al-Qassam were instrumental in 
organising and developing the Palestinian “al-Qassam” group which was inspired 
by a mainly National Islamist ideology and perpetrated militant terrorist attacks 
against non-Muslim citizens, notably Jews, and assassinated British and French 
military targets in post-WWI Palestine.
256
 Al-Husseini and al-Qassam thus 
harnessed rising Islamic resentment towards the occupying British forces and 
Jewish immigration, successfully galvanising an Islamist-led anti-colonial and 
anti-Jewish movement that emerged following the Balfour Declaration by Britain 
in 1917, which signalled British support for the creation of a Jewish homeland 
alongside a Palestine one.
257
 Secondly, following the outbreak of WWII al-
Husseini began collaborated with the Nazis in an effort to exterminate the Jewish 
people in Palestine and Europe and, ultimately, throughout the entire world.
258
 In 
turn, al-Husseini established close working relations with the Nazi high-command 
                                                 
255
 See, for example, Mohammed, The Many Faces of Political Islam, op. cit., p. 7; Rahnema, Ali, 
1994, Studies in Islamic Society, Pioneers of Islamic Revival, Zed Books Ltd, London, United 
Kingdom, pp.3.    
256
 See, for example, Hroub, Khaled, 2002, HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice, Institute of 
Palestinian Studies, Washington DC, United States of America, p.13; Milson, Menahem, “Jihad 
Today” in Middle East Media Research Institute: Inquiry and Analysis, No. 411, 2007, Retrieved, 
13/12/08, From, www.memri.org.report/en/0/0/0/0/0/855/2488.htm, p.1 
257
 See, for example, Laqueur, & Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, op. cit., p.16. 
258
 Morse, Chuck, 2003, The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-
Husseini, iUniverse, Inc., Lincoln, NE, United States of America, p.xi.  
97 
 
following a meeting with Adolf Hitler in 1943, and agreed to commission al-
Husseini the task to create and command the Muslim Handzar Division of the 
Nazi Waffen SS (the official armed wing of the Nazi Party which fought 
alongside regular Nazi controlled German Armed Forces) in occupied 
Yugoslavia.
259
 
The third example is provided by the Muslim Brotherhood (which was 
found in Egypt in 1928) and its branches throughout the Middle East which, 
during this period, rejected the concept of the nation-state but, nevertheless, 
sought to implement Islamic policies and laws via the nation-state framework. 
The Muslim Brotherhood became involved in militant terrorist activities aimed at 
establishing national and, ultimately, pan-national Islamist regimes in the wake of 
colonial (Britain and France) rule, the creation of nation-states, Arab nationalism, 
Jewish settlement, and – throughout the 1950s and 1960s – as a response to pan-
Arab nationalism in the Middle East.
 260
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
ideology throughout this period ran counter to the idea of secular rule which had 
emerged as the main political force throughout the Middle East following 
WWI.
261  
Over the next two decades, which witnessed the abolishment of the 
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Ottoman-led Caliphate in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Muslim 
Brotherhood began to send members from Egypt to Palestine to join what was 
considered to be an ‘al-jihad’ against colonial forces and Jews.262 The ‘al-jihad’ 
was led by al-Qassam and his newly established al-Qassam mujahedeen which 
employed an assortment of asymmetric-warfare tactics and strategies including 
insurgency and militant terrorism.
263
 Tensions continued to build climaxing in the 
Great Palestinian Revolt in 1936-1939, trigging the rise of the Palestinian branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood which was officially established in 1946. The 
establishment of this branch turned the Arab Palestinian grievance from one that 
was fundamentally secular (Arab nationalism) in nature into one that has 
progressively become defined – primarily due to Islamist propaganda – as a 
religious one (i.e. Muslims against Jews and their Western Christian allies).
264
      
In the wake of WWII, tensions between Palestinian Muslims and Jews 
escalated in 1947, as the Jewish people fought for independence and in 1948 the 
state of Israel was created along with the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip 
and West Bank. These events became referred to by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its offshoots as the ‘al-Nakba’ (great catastrophe).265 Throughout this period the 
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Muslim Brotherhood increased its collaboration with the al-Qassam mujahedeen 
in Palestine and in Egypt, and actively engaging in insurgent and militant terrorist 
activities against Jewish military and civilian targets as well as Egyptians and 
foreign journalists. This represented one of the most prominent commitments to 
the use of political violence, including militant terrorism, in the history of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
266
  
Following Sayyid Qutb’s reinterpretation of ‘al-jihad’, manifested in his 
‘near enemy’ Jihadist doctrine, from the mid-1950s and during the 1960s as an 
offensive concept (rather than a defensive one) justifying the use of extremism, 
the Muslim Brotherhood gravitated towards Jihadist ideology and the explicit 
justification of militant terrorism.
267
 Qutb’s radicalisation began during the 
Egyptian revolution that swiftly ousted King Faruq in 1952. Qutb’s gravitation 
towards Jihadist ideology was furthered following the failure by the secular 
orientated Free Officers and Revolutionary Command Council to implement 
Islamic Law which, as mentioned, had been promised to the Muslim Brotherhood 
by the pro-revolutionary Egyptian armed forces and was seen by Qutb and 
Islamists alike as a betray.
268
  
In January 1954, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s call for Jihad 
against the British and vocal attacks against the Egyptian government’s 
negotiations with the British over the Sudan and Suez Canal which resulted in 
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violent clashes, the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and its leadership, 
including Qutb, arrested. The Muslim Brotherhood responded with the attempted 
assassination of the Egyptian President, Nasser, and, in its wake, resulted in the 
complete suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism and all forms of 
Political-Islam in Egypt.
269
 It was from this point on that Qutb, who had become a 
central figure in the Muslim Brotherhood following his decision to defect from the 
pro-nationalist revolutionary sphere in 1953, and his supporters within the Muslim 
Brotherhood, thus increasingly sought to use militant terrorism to counter both 
Western influence and the emerging pan-Arab nationalism in their pursuit of 
national and pan-national Islamist objectives.
270
  
Collectively, the above three examples of pre-1970s nationalist inspired 
Islamist movements and their use of insurgency and, to a lesser degree, militant 
terrorism, provide important insights into the historical underpinnings of the 
ascent of this phenomenon in the Middle East. However, there were a number of 
additional key developments and events during the 1950s and 1960s including 
pan-Arab nationalism; the Six Day War in 1967; and the Yom Kippur War in 
1973. Collectively, these events helped to further the growth of Islamism and 
proliferate the explicit rise of the Jihadist doctrine and thus National Islamist 
militant terrorist organisations in the region from the late 1970’s onwards.271         
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Jihadist doctrine continued to gain 
support within extremist pockets of the Muslim Brotherhood and the wider 
Islamist movement. However, the post-WWII geopolitical environment in the 
Middle East also witnessed the rise of pan-Arab nationalism – heavily influenced 
by Nazi fascist ideology – which sought to replace the British and French 
propagated Arab nationalism following WWI, and quickly overshadowed the 
Islamist movement becoming the dominant political force in the Middle East.
272
 
Coinciding with the rise of pan-Arab nationalism was the rise of Marxist inspired 
nationalist revolutionary political movements as well as insurgent and militant 
terrorist organisations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Al 
Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which were 
primarily established to fight Israel.
273
 However, by the late 1960s these groups 
had begun to ‘internationalise’ their targets shifting from what was primarily a 
rural-based and localised insurgency against Israel to perpetrating urban militant 
terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East against Israeli targets. They are 
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influenced and, in some cases, trained by radical left-wing terrorist groups from 
Latin America and Europe.
274
  
During the 1950s and 1960s several attempts to bring about a pan-Arab 
state ultimately ended in failure and humiliation. The first of these failures was the 
‘Arab Federation’ of Iraq and Jordan in 1958 which was implemented by King 
Faisal II of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan. The federation collapsed following a 
coup d’état by the Iraqi Army. The same year witnessed the establishment of the 
‘United Arab Republic’, spearheaded by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
between Egypt and Syria. The Union lasted until 1961 when a coup in Syria led to 
Syria’s withdrawal. The Union can be identified as the highpoint of pan-Arab 
nationalism and was termed as “Nasserism” political ideology.275 Once Nasserism 
and the Ba'th Party had taken hold in Egypt and Syria, the Islamist movement 
considered pan-Arab nationalism to be an enemy of Islam. In response, President 
Nasser and President Hafez al-Assad in Syria, violently suppressed the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the wider Islamist movement whilst taking care to display 
respect for Islam in public.
276
 From the perspective of the wider Islamist 
movement, pan-Arab nationalism fundamentally rejected the ordained rule of 
Islam and its role in society and politics as well as the restoration of the Caliphate, 
while adopting secular pro-Western values and political ideology. Furthermore, 
pan-Arab nationalism was at odds with the Islamic concept of the Umma as it 
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excluded all non-Arab Muslim nations, but included Arab Christians as 
citizens/equals and no longer as ‘dhimmi’ (‘people of the book/protected people’: 
Christians and Jews).
277
 
In addition to pan-Arab nationalism, the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967 
helped to crystallise and underpin the ascent of National Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations from the late 1970’s onwards. The Six-Day War was a cataclysmic 
event for the Arabs. It resulted in the utter defeat of the Arab armies at the hands 
of Israel and, ultimately, had regional geopolitical consequences bringing with it 
the collapse of Nasser’s vision of pan-Arab nationalism. For the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamists, the collapse of the Arab armies was 
understandable and even justified in accordance with their Islamic beliefs; they 
interpreted the defeat of the Arab armies as a punishment for having abandoned 
Islam.
278
 Moreover, the political fallout following the Six-Day War within the 
Arab and Muslim world offered the Islamist movement the opportunity it needed 
to denounce pan-Arab nationalism as a failure because it was un-Islamic and thus 
must be rejected in the name of Allah.
279
  
It is from this point on that the Islamist movement, primarily the Muslim 
Brotherhood, began to increase their efforts to promote the overthrow of secular 
Arab nationalist regimes in their endeavour to restructure the political and social 
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landscape, so it was based on Islamist ideology. For the Islamist movement, the 
1967 military disaster laid bare the worthlessness of secular pan-Arab nationalism 
and its collective failure to defeat Israel (which was now a firm reality following 
independence in 1948) and to unify the Arab Islamic world and generate 
economic growth. Thus the maxim ‘Islam is the solution’ was proclaimed with 
much greater force by Islamists within the Arab and wider Islamic world.
280
 
Moreover, the humiliation and anger that swept the Arab and Muslim world 
following the failure of the Arab states to defeat Israel further intensified when 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat officially declared peace with Israel in 1977. The 
peace treaty led to the follow-up signings of the Camp David Peace Accords 
between Egypt and Israel in 1978 and 1979 and was the direct result of the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973 in which Egypt and Syria again attacked Israel and were 
defeated for a second time. The peace agreement meant Egypt now formally 
recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist and, though reluctantly, became 
the first Arab and majority Islamic nation to make peace and recognise Israel’s 
legitimacy.
281
  
By the late 1970s, in the wake of the failures of pan-Arab nationalism and 
the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars and the subsequent peace treaty with Israel, a 
power vacuum had emerged bringing with it the dawn of a new geopolitical era in 
the Middle East which was now directly challenged by Islamist movements and, 
moreover, National Islamist militant terrorist organisations that were explicitly 
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premised on the “Qutbist” Jihadist doctrine.282 Emerging in Egypt as offshoots 
and/or close affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood was the EIJ and the Islamic 
Group; both of which sought to overthrow the Egyptian government and 
implement strict Islamic Law as well as attack Israeli and American targets or 
interests.
283
 The EIJ and the Islamic Group unleashed a protracted campaign of 
militant terrorism in Egypt which began in the late 1970s, and led to the 
assassination of President Sadat in Cairo, on the 6
th
 of October 1981 for declaring 
peace with Israel.
284
 Both groups would continue their campaigns of militant 
terrorism in Egypt throughout the 1980s and 1990s during the rule of President 
Hosni Mubarak; during this time National Islamist militant terrorist organisations 
had rapidly spread to rival those of Marxist or other non-Islamic inspired militant 
terrorist organisations in the Middle East.
285
 This trend witnessed the rise of major 
National Islamist militant terrorist organisations such as the Armed Islamic Group 
and the GSPC in Algeria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
and HAMAS in the Gaza Strip and, to a lesser extent, West Bank Palestinian 
Territories.
286
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The ascent of National Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the 
Middle East and the widespread, though not monolithic, support for Political-
Islam and, to a lesser degree, Islamist political ideologies from the late 1970s, can 
best be seen as a phenomenon that derives from historical grievances. These 
include the decline of Islamic geopolitical power, law and values from the latter 
decades of the Ottoman Empire onwards; WWI and Colonialism and the creation 
of nation states; Palestine and the creation of Israel; and decades of Arab 
nationalisms that failed to deliver social and economic development as well as the 
Arab states collective failure to defeat Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel 
wars. Collectively, these events galvanised the rise and spread of National 
Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations in the region and thus 
represent the National phase of the geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations in the Middle East. Over time, these organisations have 
become the single largest group within the wider pool of Jihadist organisations.
287
 
6.3. The Ascent of Regional Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East 
In addition to the geopolitical events that unfolded in the Middle East 
between the 1950s and early 1970s, there were two key events that further 
crystallised the support for Islamist ideology and led to the ascent of Regional 
(pan-national and/or transnational) Islamist militant terrorism during the late 
1970s and 1980s. It will be argued here that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran 
and the 1979-1989 Afghan-Soviet War directly influenced the radicalisation of 
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Islamists and, ultimately, galvanised the ascent of Regional Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations in the Middle East and beyond. Moreover, the 1990s 
witnessed the collapse of the USSR in 1991 which brought with it the 
independence of many nations and the intensification of nationalist separatism in 
regions such as the Russian Caucasus. Separatism followed in the Balkans 
triggering the 1992-1995 Bosnian War between pro-Serbian nationalists and the 
non-Serbian populations who were mainly Muslim and sought independence. The 
Bosnian War plunged the region into conflict and set the stage for reprisal attacks 
by both sides throughout the 1990s. In some cases, these attacks escalated into 
ethnic cleansing and other war crimes including the massacre of some 8000 
Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Serbian forces.
288
 In turn, the conflict 
increasingly became defined as a religious one between, on the one hand, Serbian 
Orthodox Christians and, on the other, Bosnian Muslims. Climaxing in the 
Kosovo-Serbian War in 1998-1999 which was also fought between pro-Serbian 
forces and a mainly Muslim force that sought independence in that former 
province of Yugoslavia. These two wars provided Jihadists and, especially, 
Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations with additional arenas to 
Afghanistan, allowing them to establish footholds there and to thus further expand 
their Regional Islamist geopolitical operations which were now established in the 
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Middle East and South Asia.
289
 Collectively, these events are identified in this 
study as being fundamental to the rise and spread of Regional Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations as well as state-backed transnational Wahhabi militant 
groups throughout the wider Middle East and beyond.  
Although the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East from the 1950s to 
the 1980s was dominated by pan-Arab nationalism and various manifestations of 
Ba’ath and Communist political regimes support for regional Islamist ideology 
amongst the Jihadist circles continued to grow and compete with nationalist 
inspired Islamist ideology. The rise of Regional Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations, the ideological roots of which derive from the beginning of the 
Islamist movement (advocated by Al-Afgani in the late 1800s and, notably, 
Rashid Rida following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20
th
 Century 
and, therefore, predates national inspired Islamist ideology which is pivoted on 
the concept of the sovereign nation state created during the mid twentieth-century); 
emerged in the Middle East as a result of an ideological disagreement within the 
National Jihadist movement during the late 1970s.
 290
 This group of Jihadists, as 
noted earlier, seeks to replicate the Islamic Caliphate and redeem Islamic lands 
that once belonged to it: It is identified in this study as representing the second 
largest group within the wider poll of Jihadist organisations today. 
291
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Similar to the rise of Sunni Islamism in Arab states, the ascent of Shiite 
Islamism was trigged by decades of socio-economic and civil unrest throughout 
the late 1960s and during the 1970s, and climaxed in the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
in Iran and the establishment of the first Shiite Islamist government led by 
Ayatollah Khomeini. The revolution, and subsequent establishment of an ‘Islamic 
state’, provided Khomeini with a platform to project pan-Shiite Islamist ideology 
throughout the wider region in his quest to bring about an Iranian-led Shiite 
hegemony and represented the first successful Islamist take-over of a nation state. 
It thus was a watershed moment for the wider Islamist movement.
292
  
The Khomeini instigated revolution was primarily driven by what was 
seen as the lack of ‘Muslim rights’ and the mistreatment of the Shiite clergy in 
Iran (particularly regarding land reform which threatened the clergy’s financial 
autonomy). This, according to Khomeini, was the result of Western influence 
under the rule of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
293
 Khomeini accused 
Reza Pahlavi of ‘Westernising’ Iran and thus rejecting Islamic Law and limiting 
the Shiite clergy’s political involvement which had been established under the 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906.
294
 The revolution can be seen as a 
turning point that provided the inspiration that triggered the expanse of Islamist 
ideologies and movements which had previously received little support from 
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Muslims. The expanding ideology and ascending Islamist movement was now a 
serious contender to secular based political systems throughout the Muslim world 
and became a vehicle for anti-Westernisation and, in most cases, anti-
democratisation.
295
  
In the immediate wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Khomeini began 
to engage in unprecedented collaboration between Shiite and Sunni Islamists and 
directly supported the Sunni National Islamist militant terrorist organisation the 
MILF in the southern Philippines. Khomeini provided direct political support to 
the MILF for the establishment of an independent Islamic state, stating that “…the 
victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran would not be complete until the 
oppressed Bangsamoro Muslims in the southern Philippines won their victory.”296 
In addition to political support, Khomeini provided financial aid, and possibly 
weapons, for their cause and, in November 1979, following accusations that the 
Philippine government had failed to successfully implement the 1976 Tripoli 
Agreement, imposed an oil embargo on the Philippines: Iran thus became the first 
Muslim nation to engage in an Islamic international intervention.
297
 A major 
strategic collaboration between Shiite and Sunni Islamist groups would not be 
seen again until the Iranian regime moved to back HAMAS following the 
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unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) 
in September 2005.
298
  
The Islamic Revolution in Iran sent shockwaves throughout the Sunni 
Muslim states, especially the Arab states which interpreted Khomeini’s revolution 
and the rise of Shiite Islamism as a direct threat to their national security and a 
challenge to their geopolitical spheres of influence throughout the Islamic 
world.
299
 However, between the late 1970s and the early 1980s following the 
global oil price shocks caused by some Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf States, witnessed the emergence of state-backed/funded Sunni Islamist 
militant forces to counter this threat. The new state-backed Wahhabi orientated 
Islamist militants sought to counter the expanse and influence of, on the one hand, 
pan-Arab nationalism and, on the other, the rise of Shiite Islamism throughout the 
region and wider Islamic world: with particular emphasis being given to the 
latter.
300
  
Coinciding with the rise of Shiite Islamism was the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. This quickly turned into a sub-state transnational conflict 
which saw thousands of Islamist fighters, notably Sunni’s from the Arab states, 
mobilised to join the “Afghan Jihad” and/or “Afghan-Mujahedeen” (aka Afghan-
Arabs) to fight what became a protracted decade-long insurgency against the 
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Soviets.
301
 The Wahhabi-led state-backed Islamist insurgent forces in Afghanistan 
soon became known as the “Afghan-Arabs”. It was during the 1979-1989 Afghan-
Soviet War that these state-recruited Islamist insurgents began to interact and 
collaborate with members of independent Jihadist organisations from around the 
world who had also came to fight the Soviets in what they believed was the 
defence of Islam and to escape their domestic homelands where they were being 
hunted down by state security services.
302
 The EIJ, led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri 
who would later became the lieutenant of al-Qaeda, moved its operations to 
Afghanistan in 1986 and began to promote their “Qutbist” inspired Jihadist 
doctrine to many of the Afghan-Arab insurgent forces which they sought to recruit. 
This doctrine was an even more extreme interpretation than the purely Wahhabi 
concept of ‘al-jihad’ which was adhered to by the vast majority of fighters during 
the conflict.
303
                    
The Afghan-Soviet War provided the U.S. with an opportunity to conduct 
a covert war in Afghanistan against the USSR in which they sought to create a 
Vietnam-like situation for the Soviets, establishing a ‘united Islamic front’ against 
the occupying Soviet forces to contain Soviet ideology and to induce 
fragmentation within the wider communist bloc during the Cold War. In order for 
the U.S to achieve this goal, the CIA, with direct support from their Saudi and 
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Arab state allies, recruited and supported Muslim armed volunteers from across 
the wider Middle East and within Afghanistan.
304
 The CIA strategy recruited 
volunteers from Wahhabi Islamist movements as well as, though not intentionally, 
Islamists who adhered to a Qutbist inspired interpretation of Islam (such as the 
EIJ from Egypt) into their insurgent training programs. It was during this period in 
bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the Afghan Service Bureau (Maktab al-
Khadamat/MAK) emerged in 1984. The MAK was an international pan-Islamic 
mujahedeen service recruitment organisation dedicated to fighting the Soviet 
forces in the 1980’s. The MAK was headed by a Palestinian member of the 
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, and a wealthy Saudi 
Islamist, Osama bin Laden, who was recruited by Azzam to Afghanistan in 1979 
to join the state-backed insurgency against the Soviet ‘crusaders’.305  
The strategic role of the MAK was to recruit Muslims to join the Afghan-
Jihad and to channel funds from a variety of sources including donations from 
both government and non-government organisations from across the Middle East 
(notably Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states) and the wider Muslim world – as 
well as to distribute equipment, training and additional funds supplied by the CIA 
and Pakistan – to the Afghan-Mujahedeen insurgent forces.306 Towards the end of 
the Soviet occupation, many of the Afghan-Mujahedeen forces sought to expand 
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their operations to other regions of the Islamic world which was in direct conflict 
with the U.S., and many of its allies, strategic policy and interests.
307
 While the 
state-backed Afghan-Mujahedeen insurgent forces were directed primarily via the 
CIA in conjunction with its Arab state collaborators, the MAK developed an 
‘independent’ but overlapping and interconnected network of organisations. This 
network was built out of Islamist fighters that had originally flocked to 
Afghanistan to fight the Soviets but over time had defected into the orbit of 
Regional Jihadist ideology and thus sought to expand their operations into other 
regions of the Islamic world; which they saw as being ‘under attack’ from both 
‘external’ and ‘internal’ anti-Islamic forces, for example, Chechnya, Palestine, 
Kashmir, and the Philippines.
308
  
The MAK, with its headquarters and operations firmly based in 
Afghanistan, and its newly developed transnational infrastructure of networks that 
spanned the wider Middle East and beyond began to fragment, however, along 
ideological and tactical lines.
309
 Many members of the MAK-led network which 
were loyal to bin Laden had adopted a hybrid of Wahhabi-Qutbist Jihadist 
ideology introduced by Zawahiri and the EIJ, and was increasingly violent and 
apocalyptic in outlook. Justifying terrorism and suicide-terrorism against both 
non-Muslims and Muslims alike in favour of the somewhat less radical Wahhabi 
variant adhered to by Azzam and his pocket of loyalists; thus fundamentally 
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splitting the MAK into two separate ideological and ethical camps.
310
 It was 
during the Afghan-Jihad that Zawahiri met and befriended bin Laden. They were 
united by the same objective: that is, the ‘liberation’ of all Islamic lands, first and 
foremost Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Palestine, from foreign occupation (both 
military and cultural) and secular ruler as well as the ousting of corrupt/fake 
Muslim rulers and regimes in order to re-establish ‘pure’ Islamic governments and 
laws in their stead.
 311
  
In 1988, bin Laden, influenced by Zawahiri, established an offshoot of the 
MAK, which he named “al-Qaeda” (the base), in an effort to achieve their goals. 
They sought to implement their strategy throughout the entire geopolitical region 
that was once part of the Islamic Caliphate as well as in those regions that have 
Muslim majority populations such as Bosnia and parts of Southeast Asia via a 
campaign of Regional Islamist militant terrorism.
312
 Though the Azzam-led 
pocket of the MAK disagreed with al-Qaeda at an ideological level, and over the 
ethics of tactics employed, throughout this period, the two organisations 
nevertheless worked closely together alongside Zawahiri’s EIJ and the Tanzim al-
Jihad network in their efforts to intensify recruitment, funding and asymmetric-
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warfare activities across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. They thus 
operated as Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations.
313
    
Directly following the establishment of al-Qaeda in 1988, Azzam was 
assassinated – some believe at the hands of Zawahiri – in 1989 and the MAK split 
with a significant number of Afghan-Mujahedeen forces joining bin Laden’s 
newly found al-Qaeda organisation which was now allied with Zawahiri’s EIJ and 
his newly established Tanzim al-Jihad network.
 314
 Disagreements between bin 
Laden and Azzam prior to his assassination saw bin Laden become closer to 
Zawahiri and the EIJ and Tanzim al-Jihad militant terrorist organisations. It was 
from this point on that Zawahiri’s Qutbist inspired Jihadist doctrine gained a 
major foothold within al-Qaeda and began to eclipse the Wahhabi inspired 
interpretation of Islam and hence ‘al-jihad’ – which is some what less radical than 
the Qutbist doctrine – and soon became the ideological foundation of al-Qaeda. 
Al-Qaeda was thus cemented as a Jihadist organisation alongside EIJ and the 
Tanzim al-Jihad Regional Islamist militant terrorist network.
315
 Bin Laden’s 
ideological shift and move into the orbit of Zawahiri witnessed al-Qaeda adopt 
what would become the organisation’s trade-mark tactic – large scale militant 
terrorist attacks that sought to inflict maxim damage and casualties against both 
‘hard’ (military and government) and ‘soft’ (civilian) targets through gun-fights, 
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shooting rampages and suicide bombings.
316
 Following the collapse of the USSR, 
these three Jihadist organisations (EIJ, Tanzim al-Jihad and al-Qaeda) worked 
closely together to further expand their infrastructures and operations during the 
late 1980s and 1990s in the Middle East, Africa – notably Sudan –, Chechnya, 
Bosnia, and South, Central, and Southeast Asia.
317
  
The Afghan-Jihad experience therefore represented the second major 
turning-point in the history of Islamist militant terrorism and organisations in the 
Middle East following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. It further galvanised 
the phenomenon throughout the wider Islamic world and is identified in this study 
as the primary catalyst underpinning the geopolitical transformation from 
National to Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations.
318
 By the end of the 
Afghan-Jihad thousands of state-backed Islamist insurgent forces, which had 
descended on Afghanistan from more then forty nations from across the Middle 
East and wider Muslim world, had joined a number of different independent 
Jihadist organisations that had established themselves and/or relocated their 
command structure to Afghanistan. Many of these insurgents and independent 
Jihadist groups – which included Zawahiri’s EIJ and Tanzim al-Jihad 
organisations – merged under the leadership and operational command of the 
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MAK and formed a network of organisations which would ultimately become the 
blueprint of al-Qaeda.
319
  
The Afghan-Jihad provided both state-backed foreign Islamist insurgent 
volunteers, and Islamist militant terrorist organisations with an experience through 
which they came to believe that they had defeated the Soviet forces single handed; 
thus strengthening their resolve to join and expand the Jihadist war against the 
‘near enemy’ – that is, within the wider geopolitical sphere of the Islamic 
world.
320
 The Afghan-Jihad, and those Islamist militant terrorist organisations and 
networks that were developed during the conflict in Afghanistan, represent the 
ascent of Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and 
beyond and thus the Regional geopolitical transformation phase of the 
phenomenon.  
6.4. The Ascent of Global Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East 
 It will be argued here that the third and final phase of the geopolitical 
transformation of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East emerged out of the 
post-Afghan-Jihad era and crystallised throughout the post-Cold War period. 
During this period, the international community witnessed the realignment of 
global powers, shifting from a bipolar international order to a unipolar system 
dominated by a Western power bloc led by the U.S., and saw governments in the 
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Middle East and wider Muslim world begin to crack down on domestic Islamist 
forces and veterans from the Afghan-Jihad campaign.
321
 Alongside the ever 
hardening Jihadist tactics and ideology (which had began to incorporate a 
distorted version of the Islamic concept of  ‘takfeeri’ – the practice of 
excommunicating Muslims – who did not adhere to their Jihadist doctrine), it was 
the geopolitical reshaping of the international system and ultimately the 
strengthening of Western influence, mainly U.S. but also European, in the Islamic 
world and support for secular and Islamic regimes which had set about 
suppressing the wider Islamist movement following the end of the Afghan-Jihad 
that ignited the phenomenon of Global Jihadism.
322
 Moreover, the Gulf War in 
1991, which saw the Saudi Royal family reject bin Laden’s offer to protect the 
Kingdom in favour of U.S. forces which became permanently stationed in Saudi 
Arabia; the U.S. and the West’s support for Israel; the Balkan Wars in the early 
and late-1990s; and the Chechnya conflict, all further influenced bin Laden and 
Zawahiri to defect from an exclusively Regional Islamist militant terrorist 
operation that solely targeted the ‘near enemy’ to an open-ended campaign of 
Global Islamist militant terrorism that primarily targets the ‘far enemy’. 323  
Throughout the 1990s, the EIJ – Tanzim al-Jihad – al Qaeda alliance 
developed into a sophisticated network that spanned the Middle East, Asia, Africa, 
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Europe, and North America. Bin Laden and Zawahiri relocated the core of al-
Qaeda’s operations to Sudan were they developed additional training camps to the 
ones in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1991 and 1996.
324
 They thus expanded 
al-Qaeda’s operations into sub-Saharan and the Horn of Africa where it 
collaborated with, and facilitated the development of, local Islamist groups based 
in Somalia, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Eritrea.
325
 During this 
period the three Jihadist organisations – EIJ, Tanzim al-Jihad and al-Qaeda – 
remained committed primarily to perpetrating militant terrorist attacks against 
‘near enemy’ targets within the wider Islamic world, in Egypt and Algeria as well 
as in the Horn of Africa (primarily in Somalia but also Kenya and Tanzania), 
Bosnia, and Chechnya with operations outside Muslim countries being confined 
primarily to recruitment and fundraising activities.
326
 In 1993, however, an 
independent Egyptian based Jihadist organisation, the Islamic Group, which 
would later merge with al-Qaeda and was closely related to Zawahiri’s EIJ and 
Tanzim al-jihad organisations, perpetrated the first terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Centre in New York City.
327
       
By the late 1990s, following their return to Afghanistan from Sudan the 
two leaders, bin Laden and Zawahiri, of the three organisations began to shift 
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their focus and strategy towards fighting a ‘holy war’ against the West (far 
enemy), notably the U.S., and its allies. This entailed, first and foremost, those 
Arab Islamic regimes allied with the West (near enemy); notably, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Pakistan.
328
 Hence, in 
1996, bin Laden announced al-Qaeda’s Declaration of War on America and 
Americans and thus shifted away from primarily targeting the ‘near enemy’ to a 
strategy that now targeted the ‘far enemy’.329 Moreover, in 1998, bin Laden and 
Zawahiri, along with a number of other Jihadist organisations, further synergised 
their operations closer together following Zawahiri’s decision to commit EIJ and 
the Tanzim al-Jihad militant terrorist organisations to bin Laden’s World Islamic 
Front for Jihad. Other Islamist militant terrorist organisations which joined the al-
Qaeda-led Jihadist network included the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiat ul Ulema 
e Pakistan and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.
330
 Collectively, this network 
of Jihadist organisations was responsible for the synchronised terrorist bombings 
on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in 1998 
which killed more than 230 people and was the largest terrorist attack in Kenya 
and Tanzania to date as well as on the U.S. since the April 1983 Beirut embassy 
bombing in Lebanon which killed 63, and is widely thought to have been carried 
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out by the local Lebanese branch of the EIJ or the Shiite Islamist militant terrorist 
group Hezbollah.
331
  
From 1998 onwards, the newly formed al-Qaeda-led network set about 
infiltrating the wider Jihadist movement throughout the Muslim world in an effort 
to realign and hence amalgamate them together under the one cause and thus the 
World Islamic Front for Jihad.
332
 Moreover, the al-Qaeda network became 
committed to ‘short’, ‘mid’ and ‘long’ term goals which it still actively pursues 
today. The al-Qaeda network’s short-term goal is the immediate withdrawal of all 
U.S. troops and non-Muslim armies from the ‘dar al-islam’ (House of 
Islam/Islamic lands), in particularly from Saudi Arabia – home to Islam’s two 
holiest sites, Mecca and Medina – which has had U.S. military personal 
permanently stationed there in agreement with the Saudi Royal family since the 
1950s and peaked during the 1991 Gulf War until 2003; when they were 
dramatically degreased to a small number of airforce training personnel.
333 
The al-
Qaeda network’s mid-term goal has been to remove all ‘false’ Muslim regimes 
from the wider Islamic world, notably secular and non-Islamist Muslim regimes 
and those which collaborate with the U.S. and its Western allies (identified by 
Jihadists as the ‘near enemy’) as well as the destruction of Israel. In their stead 
                                                 
331
 See, for example, Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p.58; Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., pp. 
267-269.    
332
 See, for example, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., p.221.  
333
 See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.56, 144-145; Otterman, Sharon, May 2
nd 
, 
2003, “Saudi Arabia: Withdraw of U.S. Forces” in Council on Foreign Relations, Retrieved, 
24/01/2012, From, www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia-withdrawl-us-forces/p7739, p.1.     
123 
 
they seek to establish Islamist ones that adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamic 
Law in an effort to revive the Islamic Caliphate, encompassing Islamic states free 
of Western and non-Islamic influences and capable of waging nuclear war 
(Pakistan) on the U.S. and its allies in an effort to bring about a Third World 
War.
334
 The long-term goal of the al-Qaeda network and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist 
organisations and individuals has evolved from solely targeting the ‘near enemy’ 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, into one that primarily targets the ‘far 
enemy’.335  
The past decade, following the U.S.-led War on Terror in response to the 
9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the U.S., has witnessed the al-Qaeda network 
and its followers (along with Activist and Missionary Islamist organisations such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a worldwide movement), time and time 
again reveal that their long-term aspirations are to bring the entire world under the 
control of Islam.
336
 In the context of al-Qaeda, this was first officially made clear 
in June 2002 by Suleiman Abu Gaith, an official spokesman of the Jihadist 
network. He wrote in a manifesto that al-Qaeda and its allies end goal is “…to 
subject the whole earth to the rule of Islam.”337 This is a development, as noted, 
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which has evolved out of what has been identified by experts as al-Qaeda’s 
‘second generation’ and is the direct result of successful propaganda and 
recruitment campaigns spun after the invasions of Afghanistan and, notably, 
Iraq.
338
 The phenomenon has, therefore, further evolved into one which promotes 
and adheres to a doctrine that calls on all Muslims to advance the worldwide 
expansion of Islamist ideology via any means necessary, notably Jihadist 
extremism, in an effort to achieve their ultimate goal of creating a global 
Caliphate system and thus the world’s submission to Islam.339  
As noted earlier, the post-9/11 years, particularly after the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, has seen al-Qaeda’s second generation extremist ideology spawn 
a new twofold phenomenon in the contemporary Jihadist arena.
340
 First, the rise of 
‘home-grown’ Jihadists cells and collaborators which are agents of, or inspired by, 
the al-Qaeda network or a particular Global Jihadist organisation and which the 
members are citizens of Western democratic nations in which they attack; and 
have emerged throughout Europe and North America as well as Australia. The 
home-grown Jihadists phenomenon has emerged out of these countries minority 
Muslim populace/communities which are made up of mainly first, second and, in 
some cases, third generation Muslim migrants.
 341
 Second, and directly related to 
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the first point, the Global Jihadist phenomenon has further manifested self-
indoctrinated individuals referred to as ‘lone-wolves’, who have no ties to al-
Qaeda, or a particular Jihadist organisation or cell, but, nevertheless, have come to 
believe in al-Qaeda’s apocalyptic Islamist ideology and global outlook. Such 
individuals represent what could be the greatest challenge to counter-terrorism 
efforts, particularly in the context of Islamist militant terrorism.
342
 These latest 
two trends in the Global Jihadist phenomenon have led to a steady increase in 
militant terrorist attacks worldwide, notably in the West, and are the direct result 
of the al-Qaeda network’s ability to adapt to the post-9/11 international security 
environment. Al-Qaeda has thus adopted a strategy of ‘decentralisation and 
diversification’ at the operational, leadership and membership (now has a much 
more ethnically diverse membership base) levels of the organisation which, in 
turn, spans across a much wider geopolitical theatre.
343
 Examples of home-grown 
and lone-wolf inspired second generation Global Jihadists are given in the 
previous chapter.  
Al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification strategy has, in effect, 
allowed the organisation to evolve by dissolving and re-manifesting itself into a 
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much more elusive and ‘localised’ organisation that has spawned a collection of 
regional al-Qaeda ‘affiliate’ branches including, as noted, AQAP, AQIM, and 
AQI. It has also gained allegiance from independent, but inspired, groups such as 
al-Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria; JI in Indonesia; and the 
ASG in the Southern Philippines. The new, localised, al-Qaeda network is focused 
on infiltrating and influencing domestic affairs, notably political, via its local 
affiliates and sympathisers throughout the wider Muslim world.
344
 These 
developments have provided the al-Qaeda network with a wider geographic 
operational theatre in which to further spread its Global Jihadist doctrine and has 
increased the networks indoctrination, recruitment and targeting capabilities while, 
nevertheless, ultimately remaining committed to attacking ‘far enemy’ targets – 
civilian, military, government, and economic – via its local affiliated franchises 
while keeping its core leadership and command structure intact and thus ‘acting 
local’ but ‘thinking global’.345   Moreover, the most recent figures identifying 
support for al-Qaeda in the Middle East, produced by Pew Research Center 
surveys in 2010, 2011 and 2012, indicates that in Egypt alone, a country that is a 
major hub for Islamist and Jihadists activities and organisations in the region, an 
average of 20% of the Muslim population had a favourable view of al-Qaeda and 
hence the Global Jihadist doctrine.
346
       
                                                 
344
 Ibid, pp.37-39.  
345
 Ibid, pp.36-43.   
346
 Pew Research Center: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2012, “Key Indicators Database: Al Qaeda 
Favourability” in Extremism/Islam & the Middle East, Retrieved, 17/06/2012, From, 
www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=34&survey=13&response=Favorable&mode=table, p.1.   
127 
 
The al-Qaeda network was identified at the 2011 World Summit on 
Counter-Terrorism by al-Qaeda expert and security analysts Professor Rohan 
Gunaratna of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research (ICPVTR) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore as 
pursuing its ‘infiltration strategy’ in local affairs in the wake of the geopolitical 
unrest and revolutions that have and continue to engulf the Arab world (referred 
to as the Arab Spring). Gunaratna noted that “Al-Qaeda has participated 
extensively in the Libyan uprising”.347 Hence, al-Qaeda actively sought with the 
support of local allies and sympathizers to infiltrate the uprising in Libya in an 
effort to further its support base and, in turn, foothold in that country and 
surrounding region.
348
 This has raised fears that the Arab Spring, which began 
suddenly in Tunisia in late December 2010, and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, 
Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, and Syria throughout 2011; could 
potentially provide the al-Qaeda network and other Jihadist and Islamist 
organisations with an environment of political turmoil and instability which they 
could infiltrate and benefit from.
349
 Gunaratna further noted that: “Before his 
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sudden demise, Osama bin Laden commented on the “Arab Spring” calling for an 
al-Qaeda strategy to infiltrate the rebellions.”350 
In addition to Libya, there is growing fears that al-Qaeda along with a 
handful of independent National and Regional Jihadist organisations, have been 
attempting to establish footholds in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Jihadist organisations 
which have had members arrested in the Sinai since 2010 include al-Qaeda, 
HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Dughmush clan’s Army of Islam, and 
Hezbollah. The Hosni Mubarak regime confirmed prior to the 2011 revolution the 
presence of a number of these organisations but denied, in particularly regarding 
al-Qaeda, that they had established an operational capacity in the Sinai. However, 
in the wake of the Egyptian revolution, which has seen an increase in Islamist 
militant terrorist activities and attacks against Israel from the Sinai, experts such 
as Ehud Yaari from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have noted that: 
“In August 2011, a proclamation announcing the alleged establishment of an al-
Qaeda “Emirate of the Sinai Peninsula” appeared on the [al-Qaeda’s] terrorist 
network’s official websites but was quickly removed.”351  In June 2012, however, 
a Jihadist group calling itself the Lajnat Al-Shura fi Aknaf Beit Al-Mukadess (The 
Shura Council of the Mujahideen in the Environs of Jerusalem) emerged in the 
                                                                                                                                     
International, June 26, 2012, Web Edition, “Al-Qaeda threatens Arab Spring nations: UK spy 
chief”, Retrieved, 08/26/2012, From, www.thenews.com.pk/World.aspx, p.1.   
350
 “Tales From the Front”, op. cit p.71.  
351
 Yaari, Ehud, “Policy Notes: Sinai: A New Front” in The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, No. 9, January 2012, Retrieved, 27/01/2012, From, 
www.washingtoninstitue.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote09.pdf, pp. 2-3.  
129 
 
Sinai and is considered by experts to be linked to al-Qaeda. It carried out its first 
attack in the Negev Desert, Israel on the 18
th
 of June killing one citizen and 
wounding one other. It is a supporter of the implementation of strict Islamic Law 
in Egypt, the distraction of Israel and the establishment of an international 
caliphate and, ultimately, the al-Qaeda-led Global Jihadist doctrine.
352
 This was 
followed by a much more sophisticated attack by Jihadists in the Sinai on the 5
th
 
of August which killed 16 Egyptian border police at an Egyptian check-point into 
Israel. The Jihadists opened fire on them while ramming the border check-point in 
a stolen Egyptian Army armed vehicle before driving into Israel in an attempt to 
carry out a large scale suicide bomb attack in that country but were killed by the 
IDF before reaching their targets. The IDF and experts believe that the Jihadists 
ultimate goal, in addition to killing as many Israelis, and Egyptians in this case, as 
possible, is to ignite an armed conflict between Israel and Egypt.
353
    
There is evidence that al-Qaeda is also attempting to influence 
developments in Syria following confirmation by the Director of the U.S. 
National Intelligence Agency, James R. Clapper who stated that “Al-Qaeda 
extremists “have infiltrated” …[and] …that its operatives may have slipped into 
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groups of fighters opposed to the government of President Bashar al-Assad.”354 
Clapper made these comments in the wake of the deadly suicide bombings in 
Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, on the 18th of March 2012; killing 27.355 Clapper also 
identified that AQI was responsible for the suicide bombings in the city of 
Damascus on 6
th
 January 2012; killing 25 and which came just two weeks after 
two suicide bombers killed 44 people in Damascus. These attacks have been 
confirmed to have been carried out by AQI’s Syrian front organisation and/or 
proxy, Jabhat al-Nusra (Front for the Protection of the Syrian People), however, 
many of the protesters believe that the suicide bombings were organised by the 
Syrian regime.
356
 Moreover, on the 18
th
 of May the UN Secretary General, Ban 
Ki-moon confirmed that al-Qaeda and its Syrian proxy Jabhat al-Nusra were 
responsible for the deadly wave of suicide terrorist attacks on the 27
th
 and 30
th
 of 
April 2012 in Damascus and Idlib respectively; collectively killing 20 people and 
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wounding more than 50.
357
 These attacks came just one day after the arrival of 
Gen. Robert Mood, the head of the UN’s military observer mission in Syria.358 In 
addition twin suicide bomb attacks on the 10
th
 of May in Damascus, the largest 
and most deadly to date, killed 55 and wounded 327 people.
359
 The increase in 
Jihadist tactics and activities in Syria signals a shift in the uprisings turned 
conflict, a phenomenon that suggests Syria may quickly become the next major 
theatre for Jihadists to exploit in the Middle East.
360
  
Moreover, recent al-Qaeda activity of this nature is also evident in the 
periphery Middle Eastern state of Somalia where al-Shabaab has been 
collaborating at an unprecedented level with the Yemen based AQAP branch of 
the al-Qaeda network. This latest collaboration has seen the two organisations 
working much closer together and has included the distribution of aid while 
blocking access to international aid agencies such as the UN in the famine 
stricken country.
361
 Seeking to harness the crisis in an effort to manufacture 
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support from within the domestic Somali population by intensifying the already 
desperate situation in that country thus to create an incubator for the Global 
Jihadist cause. Therefore, the crisis, further compounded by the effects of long 
running political instability, lawlessness and clan conflicts in Somalia, has 
provided al-Qaeda, notably AQAP, with the necessary mix of events and hence 
environment needed to infiltrate and/or develop strategic and operational ties with 
al-Shabaab.
362
 In turn, this has allowed al-Qaeda to proliferate its Global Jihadist 
doctrine into the Somalia theatre while it works towards establishing a long-term 
operational foothold/base in that country via al-Shabaab which pledged allegiance 
to al-Qaeda prior to the assassination of bin Laden.
363
 This allegiance was 
reconfirmed when al-Shabaab’s leader, Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane publicly 
announced that organisations continuing loyalty to al-Qaeda’s new leader, 
Zawahiri on the 9
th
 of February 2012:  declaring al-Shabaab as an official affiliate 
and representative of the al-Qaeda family in the Horn of Africa.
364
 Also in Africa, 
fears are growing over the northern Nigeria Jihadist organisation Boko Haram and 
its links with al-Qaeda, and in particularly AQIM, and the ramifications to Nigeria 
and the wider regions security.
365
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The al-Qaeda network, its affiliates and inspired Global Jihadists, 
therefore, seek through a global campaign of militant terrorism, along with non-
violent tactics and strategies, the geopolitical and religious restoration of the Islam 
that existed during the time of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and first Islamic 
community; in an effort to bring about a world dominated by Islamism. 
Collectively, the events and phenomena identified since the late 1980s, therefore, 
represent the catalysts underpinning the ascent of the Global Jihadist phenomenon 
in the Middle East. Thus corresponding to this study’s hypothesised Global 
geopolitical transformation phase of Islamist militant terrorism and organisations 
which emanate from, and span, the wider Middle East and beyond and endure to 
this day.  
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Chapter Seven 
The National, Regional & Global Geopolitical Transformation of 
Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter will examine the study’s hypothesised ‘geopolitical 
transformation’ process of Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia. It seeks to 
establish that there have been three distinctly different phases of Islamist militant 
terrorism and thus categories and manifestations of Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations in Southeast Asia. These have emerged out of the phenomenon of 
Jihadist Islamist ideology and can best be identified as National, Regional and 
Global.   
This stage of the research will analyse each of the three phases analysing 
key historical, political, and social phenomena and contexts directly associated 
with each of them and thus examining the National, Regional and Global 
geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in Southeast 
Asia. The chapter examines colonial and imperial rule; ideological influences and 
connections with Middle East Islamist organisations; post-independence secular 
rule and state suppression of Political-Islam (in particular, Islamism); extra-
regional geopolitical events (especially the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran and 
the Afghan-Jihad); al-Qaeda’s entry into, and influence in, the region; 
democratisation and the subsequent rise of Political-Islam (especially in 
Indonesia); and al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 strategy. It will be argued here that 
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collectively these events and phenomena are the primary catalysts for the rise and 
proliferation of Islamist militant terrorist ideologies and organisations in 
Southeast Asia.
 366
 Like the Middle East component of the research, this chapter 
argues that the three phases and categories of organisations collectively make up 
the wider geopolitical phenomenon that is Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast 
Asia and it represents the second case study.  
7.2. The Ascent of National Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia  
Armed Islamic groups have been active in Southeast Asia since as early as 
the 17
th
 century, following the Spanish conquest of the Philippines and the arrival 
of additional imperial powers throughout the region who sought to control 
valuable trade routes and local commerce.
367
 These armed groups originally 
emerged as ‘rejectionist’ or ‘separatist’ movements that harnessed what can best 
be defined as asymmetric warfare strategies and tactics and resembled guerrilla 
warfare and insurgency rather than militant terrorism.
368
 Although not monolithic, 
these early armed Islamic groups were fundamentally driven by ‘local/national’ 
geopolitical and religious grievances as a response to the arrival of colonialism 
and Christianity and they continued to operate until independence in the 20th 
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Century, notably in the U.S.-ruled Philippines and the Dutch controlled East 
Indies (Indonesia) and, to a lesser extent, in British Malaya.
369
  
This trend continued and further intensified in the late and immediate post-
colonial period following independence in those regions of Southeast Asia that 
had a majority and/or minority Muslim population, with the newly established 
secular indigenous governments being targeted.
370
 This was particularly the case 
in Indonesia, the southern Philippines (from the 1970s onwards), southern 
Thailand (from the mid-1990s onwards), Malaysia, and, in the post-9/11 era, 
Cambodia.
371
 However, unlike their predecessors throughout the previous 
centuries they did not employ protracted campaigns of militant terrorism as their 
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key tactic or strategy.
372
 While Islamist militant terrorist organisations did not 
emerge until the immediate post-WWII period, Islamist ideologies had been 
active in the region since the 1800s. The first Islamist organisation to emerge in 
the region and to advocate a primitive form of national motivated Jihadist 
ideology in Southeast Asia was the so-called Padri movement in the Dutch East 
Indies in the late 19
th
 Century.
373
  
It was not until the years 1942 to 1945, however, during the Japanese 
occupation of the region, notably in the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, that 
the roots of Islamist militant terrorism can be traced in Southeast Asia. It was 
during the Japanese occupation that National Jihadist ideology in Southeast Asia 
began to emerge.
374
 During this period the Japanese worked to further intensify 
anti-colonial sentiment amongst its occupied Muslim populations, a feeling that 
had existed amongst the local Muslim populace since the arrival of colonialism to 
the region.
375
 This was particularly the case in Indonesia, with the largest Muslim 
population in the region and one of the largest in the world, where the Japanese 
established the Kantor Urusan Agama (Office of Religious Affairs).
376
 In 1943, 
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the Japanese merged this office and forced all Muslim organisations, which 
included Islamist groups, to merge under the pre-existing umbrella organisation 
Majlis Syuro Muslim in Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council, 
or Masyumi).
377
 This umbrella organisation was controlled by the Japanese and 
enabled them to effectively co-opt Muslim leaders and control all major Muslim 
organisations and, in turn, the majority of the Muslim populace in Indonesia.
378
 
The Japanese then used Masyumi as a tool to promote anti-Dutch and anti-
Western propaganda and hate-ideology which was quickly absorbed by both 
nationalist and Islamists alike including Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo who 
formed Hizbullah (not to be confused with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah Jihadist 
organisation in Lebanon) in West Java in 1943.
379
  
Hezbullah represents the earliest manifestation of a modern armed 
National Islamist organisation in Southeast Asia and saw Japanese imperialism as 
just as much of a threat as Dutch colonial rule. Founded by Kartosuwirjo, who had 
defected from the secular orientated nationalist movement in favour of an Islamist 
outlook, Hizbullah was the armed wing of the Masyumi which was primarily an 
Islamist leaning organisation during this period and went on to become a major 
political party at the end of WWII in Indonesia.
380
 Hizbullah was, however, by no 
means a ‘true’ militant terrorist organisation by this study’s definition of the term, 
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but, rather, an insurgency movement committed to resisting Japanese occupation 
and, following WWII, the return of Dutch colonial rule.
381
 Although Japan did not 
win over the Islamist minority in Indonesia or throughout the region it did, 
however, somewhat successfully harness Muslim anti-colonial and anti-Christian 
sentiment in an effort to generate anti-Western sentiment which it hoped would 
soften the local Muslim populaces view towards the occupying Japanese forces.
382
 
Moreover, Japan ultimately sought to promote itself as a ‘liberator’ rather than an 
‘aggressor’, advocating that the West was the true enemy in an effort to win over 
support from the local Muslim populace vis-à-vis the Dutch.
383
  
This trend continued in the immediate post-WWII years following the 
defeat of Japan by the allied forces in 1945 and was furthered by the return of 
some colonial powers which sought to re-govern the territories that they had lost 
to the Japanese during the war; notably the Dutch to Indonesia and the U.S. to the 
Philippines.
384
 In turn, Islamist ideologies and organisations acted as a locus for 
anti-Western sentiment and had become infused with pre-existing nationalist and 
pro-independence elements.
385
 In the immediate post-independence years – which 
began in the mid-to late-1940s – the rise of national inspired Jihadist ideology 
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continued to evolve in some majority Muslim populated states and regions of 
Southeast Asia, notably Indonesia and the southern Philippines. This was 
triggered primarily by the rise of secular leaning nationalist movements and 
governments that emerged during the late 1940s and 1950s throughout the 
region.
386
 This was particularly the case in Indonesia where all forms of Political-
Islam had become suppressed by the secular leaning government. In the 
Philippines too there were increased efforts to continue the centuries long struggle 
for independence which was intensified following the state’s policy of induced 
migration of Filipino Christians into the predominantly Muslim populated south in 
the wake of independence in 1946.
387
  
It was not until 1948, however, that the first National Islamist militant 
terrorist organisation emerged in Southeast Asia following the establishment of 
the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) – aka the Indonesian Islamic Army – which was 
also founded by Kartosuwirjo in West Java as a result of Hizbullah’s and 
Masyumi’s increasingly moderate outlook.388 The TII was the armed wing of the 
Indonesian nationalist Islamist organisation, Darul Islam, which had been 
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established one year earlier in 1947.
389
 The establishment of TII was further 
influenced by the armed conflict between the Dutch and the indigenous nationalist 
forces in Indonesia. The three movements fought each other during this period in 
what became known as the ‘triangular war’.390  
Although often working in strategic partnership with Dural Islam and the 
TII against the Dutch, the nationalists favoured a much more secular outlook to 
the Islamist vision of statehood which had begun to gain rapid support throughout 
the country in the post-WWII period.
391
 On the 7
th
 of August 1949, ten days 
before the end of Dutch rule, Kartosuwirjo declared the establishment of the 
‘Negara Islam Indonesia’ (Islamic State of Indonesia) in West Java with the 
region to be put under the control of the TII and the authority of Darul Islam.
392
 
However, the idea of Indonesia becoming an exclusively Islamic state governed 
by an Islamist interpretation of Islamic Law did not gain the support of the 
nationalist forces which had become increasingly concerned about the TII and 
Darul Islam’s Islamist intentions and lead to a direct armed conflict between the 
two ideological movements which would endure for decades to come.
393
  
Directly following independence, the TII and Darul Islam quickly declared 
the newly appointed Indonesian President, Kusno Sukarno and his nationalist 
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government to be ‘enemies of Islam’ – like the Dutch – following the 
implementation of the secular orientated ‘Pancasila’ doctrine in 1949.394 Pancasila, 
which outlines the five principles of the independent Indonesian state and 
collectively forms the basis of the country’s constitution, fell well short of Darul 
Islam’s and TII’s Islamist outlook and agenda for an Indonesian Islamic State.395 
Pancasila represented a fundamental change, and a betrayal, in the eyes of the 
Islamists, from the 1945 draft constitution known as the ‘Jakarta Charter’. The 
Jakarta Charter was ultimately rejected by Sukarno and the nationalists in favour 
of a more secular orientated constitution and Pancasila, which did not include the 
1945 declaration that in Indonesia it was a legal “obligation to follow Islamic 
Sharia for its adherents [Muslims].” 396  
In the wake of the adoption of Pancasila, Darul Islam and the TII began to 
intensify their attacks against the Indonesian nationalist forces and their civilian 
supporters in the population while expanding their foothold across the Indonesian 
archipelago (in particular in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh) until 
Kartosuwirjo was arrested and executed in 1962.
397
 This was followed by the 
capture and execution of Kahar Muzakkar, the Sulawesi leader of Darul Islam and 
TII in 1965 and Ibnu Hadjar in the same year.
 398
 These proved to be decisive 
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blows by the Indonesian government that had been fighting the National Jihadist 
forces for well over a decade during which an estimated 20,000 people were killed. 
These blows all but signalled the defeat of Darul Islam and its TII militant 
terrorist organisation: it was forced underground and would not reappear until the 
late 1970s.
399
 Although Darul Islam’s armed wing, the TII, is identified in this 
study as representing the ascent of National Islamist militant terrorism in 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia, it is important to note that the choice of asymmetric 
warfare tactics and strategies can best be defined as being a mixture of insurgency 
(in the context of Dutch occupation) and militant terrorism (in the context of 
indigenous nationalist authorities and supporters).
400
 
Nevertheless, following almost twenty years of the state suppression of 
Political-Islam and, in particular, Islamism, the phenomenon of National Jihadist 
ideology remerged and spawned a number of additional Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations in Southeast Asia including, among others, Komando Jihad in 
Indonesia in the late 1970s.
401
 Komando Jihad was modelled on, and made up 
from former members of, the TII and Dural Islam and included Abdllah Sungkar 
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who became members of the organisation’s core 
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leadership.
402
 Moreover, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were also the leaders of Jemaah 
Mujahidin Anshorullah (JMA) – a network of Islamist cells throughout Indonesia 
– which merged with Komando Jihad in 1977.403  JMA, mainly comprised of 
former students recruited from the Islamist orientated Pesantren al-Mukmin 
boarding school (better known as Pondok Ngruki) founded by Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir in Ngruki, Solo in central Java between 1971 and 1973, is identified by 
experts to be the precursor organisation to the JI Regional Jihadist organisation.
404
 
Coinciding with its establishment, and prior to the Indonesian general 
elections in 1977, the Suharto regime arrested 185 Komando Jihad members.
405
 
However, experts are not clear whether Komando Jihad emerged as the result of 
the regime’s effort to flush out any clandestine Darul Islam and TII members and 
supporters prior to the election
406
 or if Komando Jihad was a completely new 
National Jihadist organisation emanating from an explicitly new grassroots 
Islamist revival movement in Indonesia.
407
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 The late 1970s also witnessed the ascent of National Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations in the southern Philippines following the emergence of the 
MILF which had split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 
1978.
408
 This was primarily the result of the former strongly rejecting the MNLF’s 
peace negotiations with the Philippine government regarding the establishment of 
an autonomous Muslim region rather than the independent state which it had 
originally sought in the south. The MILF considered the MNLF’s peace talks with 
the Philippine government and their national integration policy – which supported 
an influx of Filipino Catholics to the southern Island of Mindanao and the Sulu 
region following independence in 1946 – as a direct threat to the Muslim majority 
demographic there and thus any future Islamic state.
409
 Moreover, the signing of 
the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 helped to lay the foundations towards a peace 
agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government which was 
achieved in 1996.
410
 The pace agreement allowed for the creation of the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and ultimately lead to the 
disbandment of the MNLF.
411
 However, the MILF saw this as a betrayal 
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favouring instead an independent Islamic state based on the principles of 
puritanical Islamist ideology.
412
   
Although the MILF had adopted an Islamist nationalist doctrine it was, 
however, not until its members joined the Afghan-Jihad campaign in Afghanistan 
against the Soviets that it truly embraced the National Jihadist doctrine and thus 
the tactics and strategies of militant terrorism. This resulted from the ideological 
cross-fertilisation from Middle Eastern Jihadist organisations that had descended 
on Afghanistan in the early 1980s.
413
 The MNLF, in contrast, was more of a mix 
between ‘quasi-Marxist’ and ‘local’ Conservative Political-Islamic ideologies and 
adhered to methods of guerrilla warfare and insurgency rather than those of 
militant terrorism.
414
  
In addition to Indonesia and the southern Philippines, the phenomenon of 
National Islamist militant terrorism has most recently emerged in Thailand, the 
only state in the region not to have been colonised.
415
 Although predominantly 
Buddhist, Thailand has a large minority Muslim demographic which represents 
the majority of the country’s southern population and is spread across the four 
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provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Sarun, and Patani.
416
 These provinces have been at 
the epicentre of a separatist struggle by Muslim armed groups since the 1970s and 
include, among others, the GMIP, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation 
(PULO), and the National Revolutionary Front (BRN).
417
 The conflict in the south 
between the Muslim separatists and the Thai government has its roots in the 
country’s politics of the early 20th Century. This conflict has intensified over time 
due to ongoing socio-economic underdevelopment and Buddhist-Islamic 
tensions.
418
 It is important to note, however, that prior to the 2000s, the Muslim 
separatist movement and organisations in southern Thailand were driven by 
nationalism rather than Islamist ideology.    
However, since 2001, southern Thailand has witnessed an increase in 
violent unrest and the unprecedented rise of National Islamist ideology and 
militant terrorist attacks by organisations such as, or splinter groups from, the 
GMIP, the PULO, and the BRN.
419
 The violent unrest and attacks climaxed in 
2004 following a raid on an armoury by Islamist separatist forces which left one 
hundred and seven dead.
420
 This trend continued throughout the late-2000s and 
into 2012, during which there have been a number of attacks including a roadside 
bombing and a grenade attack carried out against a former politician by Islamist 
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separatists in the Narathiwat province on the 30 March 2012. Two days later, two 
simultaneous coordinated bomb attacks were carried out by Islamist militant 
terrorists in Yala and Songkhla followed by a third bomb which was detonated 
once rescue personnel had arrived. This type of bombing tactic is often used by 
Jihadist organisations such as JI and al-Qaeda and is intended to kill as many 
people and cause as much damage as possible. Collectively the attacks killed 
sixteen and injured some four hundred and twenty seven people.
421
    
Experts see these attacks, and many since 2001, as directly targeting 
civilians and thus signalling a shift in the modus operandi of Islamic separatists in 
Thailand which had previously primarily targeted security forces via armed 
fighting, towards the explicit use of militant terrorism as their key tactic and 
strategy.
422
 Although there is as yet no conclusive evidence, following the arrest 
of a number of JI members in Thailand for plotting to bomb targets in Bangkok in 
June 2003, experts are concerned that JI is actively seeking to infiltrate separatist 
organisations in southern Thailand.
423
 This is reminiscent of JI’s infiltration of the 
MILF and the ASG in the southern Philippines and can be seen as a strategic 
effort by JI to regenerate and further expand their operational sphere and 
ideological influence throughout the region.
424
 Moreover, there are concerns that 
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the conflict in southern Thailand could ultimately attract, and be exploited by, 
Global Jihadists, particularly al-Qaeda.
425
       
Collectively the above examples represent the ascent of National Jihadist 
ideology and organisations in Southeast Asia: a phenomenon that is identified 
here as being shaped and influenced by historical and contemporary as well as 
local and extra-regional events and ideological forces, and which has proliferated 
throughout the region since its inception in the 1940s and, in particular, since the 
late-1970s and which endures to this day. National Jihadist ideology and 
organisations set the stage for the second phase of the ideological evolution and 
geopolitical transformation process, thus spawning the phenomenon of Regional 
Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia.     
7.3. The Ascent of Regional Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia  
By the early 1980s, in the wake of renewed ties between old members of 
Darul Islam and the TII and extra-regional geopolitics in the Islamic world in the 
late 1970s (particularly the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan), Komando Jihad reignited the National Jihadist phenomenon in 
Indonesia.
426
 However, since its establishment in 1977, Komando Jihad and its 
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leadership had become increasingly influenced by the emerging Regional Jihadist 
doctrine emanating from Middle Eastern Islamist ideologues and organisations.
427
  
By the mid-1980s, following a reduced nine year jail term to three years for 
their roles in numerous Islamist and Jihadist organisations, especially Komando 
Jihad, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, who had become further radicalised during prison, 
returned to their Islamist orientated Pondok Ngruki boarding school as teachers.
428
 
However, to avoid a pending prosecution appeal lodged by the Indonesian 
Supreme Court challenging their early release from jail following their 
involvement in the Tanjong Priok riots in 1985, Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to 
Malaysia from where they continued to build the Komando Jihad network until 
1998.
429
  
During their exile in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir began to send Komando 
Jihad and Pondok Ngruki members, along with volunteers from throughout 
Southeast Asia, to Afghanistan to join the Afghan-Jihad against the Soviets and to 
the Middle East for ideological/spiritual training.
430
 This collection of Jihadists 
became known as Group 272 and referred to the number of Komando Jihad 
facilitated fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia who fought in the Afghan-Jihad. 
It is estimated that more than 1000 Islamists travelled to Afghanistan during this 
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period to receive militant terrorist training and Jihadist indoctrination.
431
 During 
this period the Komando Jihad-led Group 272 became further radicalised and 
forged alliances with Middle Eastern Jihadist organisations and, following 
Sungkar’s trip to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, bin Laden.432 These events and, 
in particular, contact with bin Laden and other Middle Eastern Jihadists and 
organisations inspired Sungkar and Ba’asyir to begin shifting Komando Jihad 
away from an exclusively National Jihadist organisation to a Regional one.
433
 
Thus, unlike their predecessors in Southeast Asia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
advocated the creation of a pan-Islamic super state that would incorporate all the 
regions of Southeast Asia that have a predominantly Muslim population and 
would include Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Thailand, and the southern 
Philippines.
434
                                  
From this point on Sungkar and Ba’asyir were committed to the Regional 
Jihadist doctrine and, following the Afghan-Jihad, began increasing their ties with 
Middle Eastern based Islamist militant terrorist organisations from the mid-1990s 
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onwards, primarily with the Islamic Group, EIJ and al-Qaeda.
435
 This, in turn, 
directly influenced Sungkar and Ba’asyir to further develop Komando Jihad’s 
militant terrorist cells beyond Indonesia and, with the help of an Indonesian senior 
al-Qaeda operative, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali), began to establish 
additional cells in Malaysia and Singapore.
436
 This led to the establishment of JI 
in 1993 and thus the first Regional Jihadist organisation in Southeast Asia.
437
 
Moreover, from the mid- to -late-1990s, Sungak, Ba’asyir and Hambali began 
developing links with Islamist militant terrorist organisations, notably the MILF 
and the ASG, in the southern Philippines.
438
 Their aim was to unite them under 
one wider Regional Jihadist ideological and geopolitical agenda in an effort to 
ultimately create a pan-Islamic super state in Southeast Asia that would form part 
of a wider international Islamic Caliphate.
439
  
Although originally emerging as a National Jihadist organisation, Komando 
Jihad represents a watershed in the history of Jihadist organisations in Indonesia 
and Southeast Asia. Komando Jihad signalled a hardening of Jihadist ideology 
and was the result of years of state suppression of both Political-Islam and, in 
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particular, Islamism, underpinned by the Islamic revolution in Iran and the 
Afghan-Jihad experience. Following the establishment of its cells across 
Indonesia in the mid-1980s it became a more sophisticatedly structured 
organisation.
440
 These two aspects ultimately influenced Komando Jihad to move 
away from being an exclusively National Islamist militant terrorist organisation 
towards a Regional one.
441
 Komando Jihad represented the dawn of a new era in 
the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of the Jihadist 
phenomenon in Indonesia and the ascent of Regional Islamist militant terrorist 
organisations in Southeast Asia.
442
  
By the beginning of the 1990s, following increased collaboration between 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir with al-Qaeda and other Middle East Jihadist organisations, 
the JI network began to directly influence and collaborate with Jihadist forces in 
the southern Philippines, particularly the MILF.
443
 During this period Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir were coordinating JI’s activities from their safe-haven in Malaysia where 
they collaborated extensively with the Malaysian based pro-Regional Jihadist 
organisation Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM).
444
 Collaboration between JI 
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and the MILF was directly influenced, and facilitated, by a number of key 
Southeast Asian al-Qaeda affiliates. These included Hambali, Omar al-Faruq 
(who was the al-Qaeda financial liaison to JI and a future leader of the Indonesian 
based Laskar Mujahidin – a Jihadist organisation established in 1999 committed 
to a campaign of violence against the Christian population on the island of 
Maluku) and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef (who was a member of the Islamic Group –
Tanzim al-jihad – al-Qaeda alliance and the mastermind of the 1993 bomb attack 
on the World Trade Centre and the bombing of a Philippine Airlines flight in 
1994).
445
       
This collaboration and influence ultimately led to internal ideological 
fragmentation within the MILF which saw some members defect and merge with 
other Filipino fighters who had fought in the Afghan-Jihad and, under the 
leadership of Jihadist ideologue, Abubakar Janjalani (who became affiliated with 
bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s), establish 
the ASG in 1990.
446
 Janjalani, who had studied and was radicalised in Saudi 
Arabia and Libya, received funding from both Saudi Arabian and Pakistani 
Islamic charities and/or organisations as well as from Islamic schools and 
Mosques throughout the Middle East in support of the ASG and its National 
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Jihadist objective in the southern Philippines.
447
 The ASG originally emerged as a 
National Islamist militant terrorist organisation with an estimated 600 members 
and sought to regenerate and intensify the struggle against the Philippines 
government in its quest to establish an Islamic state that would encompass the 
southern Islands of Mindanao and Basilan as well as the wider Sulu archipelago in 
the southern Philippines.
448
  
By the mid 1990s, following ongoing ideological cross-fertilisation and 
operational collaboration with JI, the Islamic Group and, in particular, al-Qaeda’s 
Southeast Asian operatives, the ASG, began to shift towards a Regional Jihadist 
doctrine.
449
 For the most part, however, the ASG’s relationship with al-Qaeda and 
JI, and its support of pan-Islamist ideology in Southeast Asia was driven primarily 
by its need to procure sophisticated bomb making techniques to supplement less 
effective methods of kidnapping and sporadic armed attacks which were its 
primary modus operandi.
450
 This development allowed the ASG to undertake 
sophisticated militant terrorist training at a MILF–JI run camp in the southern 
Philippines from 1994 which was funded by al-Qaeda and further facilitated by its 
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operatives in Southeast Asia who provided much of the ‘know-how’.451 Moreover, 
it provided the ASG with a strategic opportunity to increase its legitimacy/status 
amongst the Filipino Islamist and wider Muslim population where it was 
competing with the MILF.
452
 However, following the assassination of Janjalani by 
the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) in 1998, the ASG – which is now under the 
leadership of his younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani – went back to being a 
Nationalist Jihadist organisation that used what can best be described as ‘kidnap-
for-ransom’ tactics.453  
Nevertheless, by 2004, the ASG had redeveloped strategic and operational ties 
with the MILF which was primarily the result of a renewed effort by JI to form a 
strategic alliance with the ASG in an effort to transfer skills and increase training 
activities in order to ultimately create a trilateral Jihadist network that spanned 
Southeast Asia.
454
 During this period the ASG mounted numerous attacks against 
the AFP and increased attacks against the civilian population (for example the 
bombing and sinking of the Superferry off the coast of Manila which killed 118 
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people on February 27
th
, 2004) and on Westerners, in particular Americans, living 
in and visiting the country as well as tourists as far away as Malaysia.
455
  
Since 2004, it has become evident that the ASG has gravitated back into the 
sphere of JI and, in turn, al-Qaeda which has been followed by an escalation in 
both the willingness to intensify the lethality of its attacks and a hardening of 
ideology.
456
 This was confirmed following the arrest of an ASG financier for 
transferring funds from al-Qaeda which was to be used by the ASG to finance a 
number of militant terror attacks throughout the Philippines.
457
 Further evidence 
of this renewed alliance was evident following an AFP military raid on a Jihadist 
stronghold which killed two senior JI leaders and one ASG leader on the island of 
Jolo in the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines on the 2
nd
 of February 
2012 who were responsible for a series of bomb attacks in the region since 
2006.
458
 These events have led many experts to believe that the ASG, while 
remaining committed to the domestic struggle, has once again become an 
organisation directly influenced by Regional Jihadist ideology in the context of JI 
and, therefore, a strategic affiliate of al-Qaeda and its Global Jihadist doctrine in 
the Philippines.
459
 The ASG’s ideological evolution and geopolitical 
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transformation from a National to a Regional Jihadist organisation is identified by 
experts as the direct result of ongoing collaboration with the MILF and, in 
particular, JI and al-Qaeda who have both sought to regenerate themselves by 
infiltrating localised geopolitical and religious grievances or conflicts as part of 
their decentralisation and diversification strategies in the post-9/11 era.
460
   
JI’s post-9/11 effort to regenerate itself resulted in the establishment of 
JAT in 2008 which was founded by Ba’asyir and Malaysian national and JI 
operative, Norodin Mohammed Top.
461
 JAT is an Islamist militant terrorist 
organisation that has evolved out of JI (and hence adheres to and advocates JI’s 
Regional Jihadist doctrine) in the wake of the global War on Terror and increased 
counter-terrorism efforts by ASEAN member states and has confirmed fears about 
JI’s ability to ‘self-regenerate’.462 JAT amalgamates both non-violent Missionary 
and Activist Islamist tactics with Jihadist ones and is considered by experts to be 
the new face of JI and the most dangerous Jihadist organisation in Indonesia and 
possibly Southeast Asia and is seen as an al-Qaeda proxy.
463
 This fear is shared by 
the chief of Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Ansyaad 
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Mbai, who stated on the 29
th
 of March 2012 that “JAT is the new camouflage of JI. 
It has the same leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and most of the key figures of JAT 
are also JI. So I call this the new jacket of JI.” 464 JAT was responsible for the 
simultaneous bombings of the J W Marriott Hotel and the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in 
Jakarta in July 2009, and in February 2010 BNPT officials uncovered a JAT 
training camp in Aceh and foiled a terror plot in Bali in March 2012 which left 
five JAT–JI operatives dead following a shootout with security forces in Bali.465       
Finally, although not considered an epicentre of Jihadist activity, Cambodia is 
the latest region in Southeast Asia to have been infiltrated by Regional Jihadist 
organisations in the post-9/11 years.
466
 With only 1% of the population being 
Muslim from a total population of 14 million who are overwhelmingly Buddhist, 
Cambodia has experienced unprecedented Jihadist activity emanating from 
Southeast Asia, South Asia and Middle Eastern sources.
467
 In 2003, Cambodian 
authorities arrested four people who included one Cambodian citizen and two 
Thai nationals who were JI members and an Egyptian who was an al-Qaeda 
operative thus providing evidence of JI-al-Qaeda collaboration.
468
 Moreover, 
Cambodian authorities have noted that there is an “…increasing influence of 
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Wahhabi doctrines among their [Cambodian Muslim] Cham minority, resulting 
from Middle Eastern financial support and the use of Arab and Pakistani teachers 
in their madrassahs [Islamic schools].” 469  Following hundreds of millions of 
dollars of investment and ‘soft-loans’ from Arab Gulf states to Cambodia in 2008, 
the Cambodian Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen believed it was possible 
“…that the money could open the door to private individuals and foundations who 
seek to influence the Muslim community in the country.”470 Furthermore, in 2008 
the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Joseph Mussomeli, warned that: 
“There are some organisations here [Cambodia] from the Middle East that are 
very radical and are very intolerant, and they are trying very hard to change the 
attitude and atmosphere of the Muslim population here.”471 
Collectively, the above countries and organisations represent the ascent and 
expanse of the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of Regional 
Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia. This phenomenon is identified in 
this study as being shaped and influenced by historical and contemporary as well 
as local and extra-regional events and ideological forces, and has proliferated 
throughout the region since its inception in the late-1970s and, in particular, since 
the mid-to-late-1990s and endures to this day. Regional Jihadist ideology and 
organisations set the stage for the third phase of the ideological evolution and 
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geopolitical transformation process – the emergence of Global Islamist militant 
terrorism in Southeast Asia.   
7.4. The Ascent of Global Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia 
The ascent of Global Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia can be 
traced to the late-1990s. It emerged in Indonesia in the immediate post-Suharto 
era during which the country descended into widespread inter-communal and 
Islamist instigated Muslim-Christian violence between 1999 and 2000.
 472
 It will 
be argued here that events during Suharto’s New Order era, especially in the 
early-1970s, as well as extra-regional ones (mainly the Afghan-Jihad), led to an 
overall increase in Islamist and Jihadist ideologies. These events, along with the 
establishment of JI and the advance of al-Qaeda and its infiltration into the region 
via JI during the 1990s, and the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, as well as an overall 
increase in the support for both Islamist and Jihadist ideologies, acted as major 
catalysts underpinning the ascent of Global Jihadism in both Indonesia and wider 
Southeast Asia.
473
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As was the case in the previous chapter, it is argued here that the 
phenomenon of Global Jihadism in Southeast Asia is supported and/or adhered to 
by only a small minority of the region’s wider pool of Islamist and Jihadist 
elements and has been significantly weakened by the global War on Terror and, in 
particular, by ASEAN member state’s counter-terrorism efforts which have 
successfully reduced both the overall number and scale of militant terrorist 
attacks.
474
 Nevertheless, despite these successes, the phenomenon of Global 
Jihadism in Southeast Asia endures via its ability to strategically readapt to and 
exploit the post-9/11 security and political environments throughout the region.
475
   
The collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998 signalled the end of the New 
Order era and Indonesia’s transition towards decentralisation and democracy.476 
However, these developments also triggered an unprecedented rise in Political-
Islamic organisations in Indonesia.
477
 During this period the state began lifting 
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political constraints on Political-Islamic organisations and parties, allowing them 
new found freedoms such as use of the press and the legitimacy to campaign and 
compete independently in Indonesian politics.
478
 Prior to this, all Political-Islamic 
organisations in Indonesia were incorporated and strictly regulated and controlled 
by Suharto’s state-run and secular-leaning umbrella organisation, the United 
Development Party, established in 1973: the only Political-Islamic organisation to 
exist during the New Order era.
479
 Moreover, the introduction of a policy by 
Suharto in the mid-1980s, forcing all political and large organisations to adopt the 
pro-secular Pancasila manifesto as their sole ideological cornerstone (“asas 
tunggal”), followed by the introduction of the bill on ‘Political Parties and Golkar’ 
in 1985, led to restrictions on opposition political activities and parties themselves; 
especially Political-Islamic ones and Islamist activities and parties.
480
  
As a result of the emasculation of all forms of Political-Islam and the 
overall intensification of Suharto’s political authoritarianism during the New 
Order era, the identity of the different manifestations of Political-Islam in 
Indonesia became increasingly blurred and consequently came to be viewed as a 
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monolithic phenomenon.
481
 The transition to democracy, and hence the 
legitimatisation of Political-Islam, in the wake of the New Order era in Indonesia 
signalled not only the incorporation of Liberal and Conservative Political Islamic 
parties and organisations into the political mainstream, but Missionary and 
Activist Islamist ones as well.
482
 Some of these Islamist organisations, or elements 
within them, had links to the former Indonesian National Jihadist organisation DI 
and its TII militant terrorist wing.
483
 Moreover, members of the DI and TII had 
close links to JI’s leaders, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, who had retuned to Indonesia in 
October 1998 from Malaysia in the wake of Suharto’s resignation in May.484 
The legitimisation and growth of Political-Islam and, as a direct 
consequence, Islamism in Indonesia, was by default partly facilitated by Suharto 
himself as well as by successive Indonesian presidents prior to the country’s first 
free democratic elections in 2004 following the New Order era which saw Susilo 
Bambang Yudhouono elected president.
485
 Realising the increasing support for 
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Political-Islam in Indonesia, throughout the1990s Suharto attempted to court 
support from across the Political-Islamic spectrum in an effort to, on the one hand, 
consolidate his power bases while, on the other, attempting to contain the forces 
of Political-Islam and, in particular, the forces of Islamism.
486
 As a direct result of 
Suharto’s political consolidation and containment strategy the otherwise 
persecuted Islamist elements began to entrench themselves within the apparatus of 
the state, particularly in the military, and set about eroding the secular components 
of the state.
487
 The disintegration of the state was furthered by the cascading 
effects of the Asian Financial Crisis that broke out in 1997, leading to an 
escalation in tensions between the secular and Islamist elements within the 
government.
488
 Collectively, the economic and political crisis along with the 
consolidation of Political-Islam and the inclusion of Islamists into the 
establishment, combined with the breakdown of civil society, ultimately triggered 
widespread inter-communal violence which was largely instigated by Islamists.
489
  
By late-1999, the violence, fanned by Islamists and Jihadists alike, 
escalated into a Muslim-Christian conflict that was widespread throughout 
Indonesia and was particularly apparent on the islands of Maluku and Sulawesi 
                                                 
486
 See, for example, Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., pp.45-46; Houben, “Southeast Asia and 
Islam”, op. cit., p.158.   
487
 See, for example, Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.46.  
488
 Ibid.  
489
 Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.419; Abuza, Political Islam And Violence in 
Indonesia, op. cit., pp.3-5.    
166 
 
where it climaxed in 2000 with an estimated 9,000 people killed.
490
 It was during 
this period of intensified inter-religious violence in Indonesia that JI successfully 
infiltrated and/or collaborated with National Jihadist organisations particularly 
Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah (both of which have JI members in their 
leadership) and, though to a lesser extent, Lasker Jihad. These groups were 
formed to fight Indonesia’s indigenous Christian population.491 The post-Suharto 
political turmoil and intensified Muslim-Christian violence provided Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir with an unprecedented opportunity to exploit the violence and political 
unrest via their newfound civil and political freedoms to further expand their 
influence and hence JI’s Regional Jihadist Ideology in Indonesia.492 Moreover, JI 
and al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asia operative, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambail – who 
is also a member of JI) created Rabitatul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Association) in 
Malaysia between 1999 and 2000; an incorporated alliance of Southeast Asian 
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Jihadist organisations.
493
 Jihadist organisations and representatives that attended 
the series of meetings in Malaysia that resulted in the establishment of the 
Mujahidin Association, in addition to JI and al-Qaeda, included the MILF, Laskar 
Jundullah, Rohingya Muslims of Burma/Myanmar, Jihadists from southern 
Thailand, and GAM in Aceh, Indonesia.
494
   
Although al-Qaeda had already established close operational ties with 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir and their JI network in Malaysia and Singapore in the mid-
1990s as well as with the ASG and the MILF during the same period, it was not 
until Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia in 1998 that the Global Jihadist 
doctrine first began to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia.
495
 Prior to 1998, al-
Qaeda was a Regional Jihadist organisation. The fall of Suharto and the 
subsequent rise of Political-Islam and, in particular, Islamism and the widespread 
communal and inter-religious violence and economic crisis ultimately provided 
the required mix of political, social and economic factors necessary for the 
establishment of JI cells in Indonesia.
496
 In turn, the establishment of JI cells 
provided al-Qaeda with an ally/proxy through which it could gain a foothold to 
expand its Global Jihadist doctrine and operations into Indonesia.
497
 This was 
made clear by Ba’asyir in 1999 when he publicly declared his support for 
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“…Osama bin Laden’s struggle because his is the true struggle to uphold 
Islam”.498 This development directly followed the arrival of Omar al-Faruq in 
Indonesia in 1998 who had been despatched from the southern Philippines and 
was al-Qaeda’s first top operative to be stationed in Indonesia.499  
During this period, in which al-Qaeda began to plan attacks against targets 
in Singapore via JI’s cells there, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were influencing and/or 
infiltrating some Indonesian based Missionary and Activist Islamist organisations 
advocating both JI’s and al-Qaeda’s ideology in an effort to increase recruitment 
and support.
500
 Hence, in 2000, following the death of Sungkar the pervious year, 
Ba’asyir organised a three-day Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta, Java. The 
conference drew delegates from across Indonesia’s Political-Islamic spectrum 
including Jihadists (with Australian members of the Jordanian based international 
Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir also attending) and resulted in the 
establishment of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – Mujahidin Council of 
Indonesia).
501
 The MMI is an Islamist umbrella organisation that seeks, firstly, the 
implementation of Islamic law and hence an Islamist state in Indonesia; secondly, 
a new Regional caliphate encompassing all states with a majority Muslim 
population and/or lands considered to be historically Islamic and, ultimately, to 
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establish a Global caliphate.
502
 The MMI, although comprising Missionary and 
Activist Islamist organisations, is considered by many experts to be a major front 
organisation for JI and other Indonesian Jihadist organisation’s non-violent 
activities in Indonesia.
503
  
Ba’asyir’s endeavours throughout this period aimed to recruit and bring as 
many Islamist organisations and individuals throughout Southeast Asia into line 
and/or under the influence of JI’s Regional Jihadist ideology and, in turn, provide 
the Global Jihadist movement with a wider recruitment pool in the region: 
Malaysian and Indonesian operatives attempted to establish an official Southeast 
Asia branch of al-Qaeda in 2008.
504
 They sought also to infiltrate and operate out 
of southern Thailand exploiting the political and security conditions in that 
country.
505
  
Moreover, in the post-9/11 period, and particularly since 2005, al-Qaeda 
has sought to renew its operational ties with the both the MILF and the ASG in 
the southern Philippines following increased efforts by governments in the region, 
notably the Indonesian government in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombing, to 
resolve long-standing communal and inter-religious domestic conflicts which has 
affected al-Qaeda’s and JI’s operational theatre in the region and forced them to 
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disperse.
506
 Furthermore, unlike the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, ASEAN 
member states in the post-9/11 period have not engaged in any major inter-state 
conflicts, though tensions and mistrust remain a real problem, or facilitated or 
encouraged Jihadist attacks against other neighbouring states. This has further 
reduced incentives and limited the ‘operating space’ for Global Jihadists in 
Southeast Asia.
507
  
These developments have limited al-Qaeda’s and its regional affiliates, 
especially JI, abilities to exploit local grievances which they seek to harness in an 
effort to manufacture pro-Global Jihadist sentiment and, ultimately, new recruits.
 
508
 However, al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 activities in Southeast Asia and globally also 
confirms its ability to adapt and expand geographically which, in turn, has 
ultimately allowed al-Qaeda to regenerate and evolve its ideological and 
operational theatre in Southeast Asia and beyond.
509
 Intelligence gained by 
Indonesian and Thai authorities, and arrests in Malaysia, in 2008 confirmed that 
despite intense counter-terrorism operations in Southeast Asia, al-Qaeda 
(especially AQI) had began to restore its links with JI which had been disrupted in 
2003. Rohan Gunaratna noted that “Al-Qaeda’s’ re-linking with JI suggests an 
increase in the pace of transfer of ideology, finance and technology from the 
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Middle East to Asia.”510 Evidence of this can be seen in a second short lived 
attempt by al-Qaeda to establish an official Southeast Asia branch in Aceh, 
Sumatra but was quickly broken up and its members arrested by Indonesian 
authorities in February 2010. This attempt brought together a collection of some 
six Jihadist groups to form what was al-Qaeda for the Veranda of Mekkah.
511
     
Al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 evolution, as noted in the previous two chapters, has 
been further underpinned by the ascent of al-Qaeda’s ‘second generation’ Jihadist 
ideology that has spawned the phenomenon of ‘home-grown’ and ‘lone-wolf’ 
inspired Global Jihadists following the invasions of Afghanistan and, in particular, 
Iraq.
512
 In Indonesia alone, which is the epicentre of the Global Jihadist 
phenomenon in Southeast Asia, a July 2005 Pew Research Center survey 
identified that 62 percent of Muslims had an unfavourable view of the U.S. This 
directly increased the acceptance amongst Indonesian Muslims of the use of 
violence against the perceived ‘enemies’ of Islam, providing JI and al-Qaeda with 
a much wider recruitment pool.
513
 Support for al-Qaeda in Indonesia was 
highlighted in Pew Research Center surveys in 2010 and 2011 which indicated an 
average 21% of the Muslim population had a favourable view towards al-Qaeda in 
that country alone.
514
 Gunaratna identifies these two theatres of conflict as 
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ultimately a new Afghan-Jihad stating that: “The partnership [between AQI and JI] 
creates opportunities for fighting in Iraq, the most dangerous combat zone in the 
world, and transfer of expertise and skills to Asian conflict zones such as southern 
Thailand, eastern Indonesia and the southern Philippines.”515 Therefore, in the 
post-9/11 period al-Qaeda’s foothold in the region, like in all its other geographic 
theatres of operation, has dispersed to spawn new ‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ 
Global Jihadist organisations and individuals across Southeast Asia; since 2008 
this phenomenon has shown signs of a revival which endures to this day.
516
  
Therefore, as in its other theatres of operation throughout the world, al-
Qaeda’s post-9/11 evolution in Southeast Asia can be seen in two key areas. First, 
in the total number of organisations and individuals which have adopted the 
Global Jihadist doctrine as well as attacks carried out by them since 9/11. This 
increase can be compared with the 2002-2010 listings of Jihadist groups by the 
U.S. Department of State. Secondly, the geographic sphere in which Global 
Jihadists now operate.
517
 The increase, also identified in the previous two chapters, 
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is the direct result of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification strategy, 
implemented in response to the international community’s and, in the context of 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s commitment to the War on Terror.518  
Although this study presents evidence supporting the growing 
phenomenon of Global Jihadism in Southeast Asia it should be noted that, unlike 
the Middle East and some other regions of the Muslim world, it has been to a 
much lesser degree. Hence, al-Qaeda has not yet been able to infiltrate and/or 
exploit particular religious, social, economic, or political conditions in Southeast 
Asia to their full advantage. This was evident following the failure of al-Qaeda to 
establish an official regional branch of the organisation in southern Thailand in 
2008 and in Aceh, Indonesia in 2010 despite its post-9/11 decentralisation and 
diversification strategy.
519
 Moreover, Jihadist organisations in the region which 
have had direct operational and strategic links to al-Qaeda, and thus direct 
exposure to Global Jihadist ideology such as JAT, JI, MILF, and the ASG, have to 
date not evolved into comprehensive affiliates of either al-Qaeda or the Global 
Jihadist doctrine.
520
 Thus, the MILF remains a National Jihadist organisation: the 
ASG remains affectively a National and Regional hybrid Jihadist organisation: 
and JI and JAT remain essentially Regional Jihadist organisations with 
international operational and strategic links with al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda 
and its Southeast Asia operatives remain a primary threat to the region and are 
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actively seeking to infiltrate and expand the organisations operations and Global 
Jihadist doctrine throughout the region.   
Evidence of this can also be found in the types of counter-terrorism 
responses and cooperation by ASEAN member states in the post-9/11 period 
which include domestic, regional and global efforts to combat Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations in the region.
521
 These three geographic levels of counter-
terrorism response adopted by most Southeast Asia countries further reflect the 
three geopolitical and ideological phases and categories of the Jihadist 
phenomenon in Southeast Asia and hence the extent to which National, Regional 
and Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations are operating in the region.  
At the domestic level, most ASEAN member states affected by Islamist 
militant terrorism have in place a twofold counter-terrorism approach that 
includes a combination of military and police and/or law enforcement responses 
and counter-radicalisation initiatives.
522
 However, approaches vary significantly 
between ASEAN members according to a particular state’s domestic political and 
religious environment as well as the preserved security threat to the state.
523
 On 
the domestic front in Singapore, a key ally and supporter of the U.S.-led War on 
Terror, and Malaysia, for example, the governments there have implemented 
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counter-radicalisation programs which have had some success.
524
 In Indonesia and 
the Philippines (which has established an inter-agency counter-terrorism task 
force), to date counter-radicalisation efforts have had far less success even if they 
have been attempted.
525
 These two countries have, however, implemented military 
(especially the Philippines) and extensive law enforcement (particularly Indonesia) 
responses and initiatives which have had significant successes in combating the 
Jihadist threat in those two countries in the post 9/11 period.
526
 The choice to use 
military and heavy policing and/or law enforcement tactics and strategies to 
combat Jihadists provides further evidence of how significant the immediate 
threat is in those two countries. In addition, most countries in Southeast Asia have 
made considerable efforts to combat the fundraising efforts of Jihadists and have 
introduced significant changers to counter-terrorism laws and arrested many 
Jihadists and those aiding them in the post-9/11 period (especially in the wake of 
the first Bali bombing in 2002) signalling that most countries in Southeast Asia 
have a domestic Jihadist threat to some degree or another.
527
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At the regional level countries in Southeast Asia work together through 
different inter-state counter-terrorism initiatives. These include bilateral and 
multilateral efforts and/or strategic partnerships between particular countries in 
Southeast Asia as well as at an official ASEAN level. Malaysia, for example, 
established the South-East Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
(SEARCCT) in July 2003, an initiative that brings together counter-terrorism 
officials and those working in the field in the region for counter-terrorism training 
and capacity-building.
528
 The Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia have worked 
closely together to improve law enforcement and intelligence sharing efforts to 
counter Jihadists. These efforts have helped disrupt Jihadist organisations 
operating in and across these three countries borders and, for example, led to the 
detection of a Jihadist cell operating in Cambodia and the arrests of its three JI 
members and one al-Qaeda operative who were planning an attack in that country 
in 2003.
529
 Moreover, at the official regional level ASEAN has established more 
than a dozen institutional bodies to increase cooperation amongst its ten member 
states in an effort to combat Islamist militant terrorism throughout the region.
530
 A 
major intra-ASEAN counter-terrorism initiative emerged in October 2003 at the 
9
th
 ASEAN Summit in Bali where all ten member states signed the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II. The declaration states that the ASEAN Security Community 
will use ASEAN’s existing institutions and mechanisms to combat Jihadist 
organisations and transnational crime. The declaration further complemented 
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ASEAN’s commitment to counter-terrorism initiatives being implemented 
through other regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering.
 531
 Collectively these inter-state and ASEAN counter-
terrorism efforts provide additional insight into the imminent reality and threat 
posed by Jihadists to the wider region, especially Regional Islamist militant 
terrorist organisations.  
At the global level, ASEAN contributes via regional initiatives which 
make up an essential part of the wider international community’s counter-
terrorism efforts, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to this, 
individual countries in Southeast Asia have independently pursued bilateral 
initiatives in the post-9/11 period.
532
 These have included forging and renewing 
strategic and military ties with international powers such as the U.S. and its 
Western allies (especially Australia), and supporting the U.S.-led global War on 
Terror in an effort to fight Jihadists – as well as other forms of militant terrorism – 
worldwide: especially al-Qaeda and its global network of affiliates and their 
Global Jihadist doctrine. Examples of global bilateral counter-terrorism 
arrangements include the Philippines support of the U.S.-led global War on Terror, 
which has seen increased intelligence and military relations between those two 
countries, and its ratifying of all 12 UN counter-terrorism instruments.
533
 The 
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Philippine government also signed the Memorandum of Understanding on 
cooperation to combat international terrorism with Australia on the 4
th
 of March 
2004.
534
 On the 5
th
 of February 2004, Indonesia and Australia announced a joint 
counter-terrorism initiative to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation in the wake of the first Bali and J W Marriott Hotel bombings.
535
 In 
February that year Indonesia and Australia also hosted a Regional Ministerial 
Meeting on Counter-Terrorism which addressed critical areas of law enforcement, 
intelligence sharing and legal frameworks and was attended by Foreign Ministers 
and law enforcement officials from 25 countries.
536
 Moreover, Australia and the 
U.S. are key supporters of the SEARCCT counter-terrorism initiative set up by 
Malaysia.
537
 The Singapore government has increased security, intelligence and 
defence relations with the U.S. and is a key supporter of the U.S.-led War on 
Terror, explicitly asking for U.S. engagement to combat Jihadist forces in the 
region, and has enhanced intelligence sharing through its Joint Counter-Terrorism 
Centre and the U.S. Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Centre.
538
 It has also 
ensured that its ports are inline with U.S. cargo and transportation requirements. 
Singapore has also increased these areas of counter-terrorism with Australia.
539
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These global commitments to counter-terrorism by individual ASEAN 
member states, although varying from country to country and not foolproof as 
Jihadist groups operating in the region continue to readapt to counter-terrorism 
efforts, have, nevertheless, further strengthened the overall intelligence and 
readiness of both individual countries in Southeast Asia and the wider 
international community and the ability to detect, prevent or respond to Islamist 
militant terrorist threats or attacks. However, if states in the region provide the 
‘political space’ and hence operational conditions/environment, resulting from, in 
particular, political instability and inter-religious or inter-communal violence, al-
Qaeda would certainly capitalise and, in turn, increase the potential of that 
organisation and thus the Global Jihadist phenomenon becoming established in 
the Southeast Asia; regardless of the heightened counter-terrorism measures taken 
by ASEAN member states.    
 
 
 
 
 
180 
 
Chapter Eight  
Conclusion 
The study has examined key political, historical, economic, social, and 
religious phenomena and contexts directly associated with the phenomenon of 
Islamist militant terrorism, and hence Jhadism, in the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia. It has presented qualified support for the claim that there have been three 
key sequential phases in the ‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical 
transformation’ of the phenomenon in the Middle East and thus the National, 
Regional and Global phases of Jihadism. The study has presented qualified 
evidence that the Jihadist phenomenon in Southeast Asia has undergone the first 
two phases and thus the National and Regional ideological and geopolitical 
transformation of Islamist militant terrorism. However, unlike the Middle East, 
the Jihadist phenomenon in Southeast Asia has thus far not undergone an explicit 
shift towards Global Jihadism despite efforts to establish itself in the region.  
Therefore, the study concludes that the phenomenon of Global Islamist militant 
terrorism to date has not been able to successfully gain a foothold in Southeast 
Asia.       
The vast majority of the literature and data produced on Jihadism and 
examined in this study provide significant evidence that the phenomenon has 
undergone three sequential phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical 
transformation. The materials examined support the claim that the three phases of 
Jihadism emerged, and are manifested, in the context of National, Regional and 
181 
 
Global ideological and geopolitical frameworks. This, in turn, underpins support 
for the study’s claim that there exist three primary categories of organisations and 
individuals within the wide phenomenon of Jihadism. In the Middle East all three 
exist: National, Regional and Global. In Southeast Asia only the first two exist: 
National and Regional.  
The thesis has provided adequate evidence supporting the study’s 
hypothesis gained through its comparative, historical and phenomenological 
analysis of key data directly associated with the ideological and geopolitical 
contours of Jihadist organisations and individuals since the phenomenon’s 
inception in the early 20
th
 Century. The collected materials and data have been 
analysed against the spectrum which has set out the ideological and geopolitical 
contours of a number of key Jihadist organisations in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia. The spectrum explains the ideological and geopolitical trajectory 
of the Jihadist organisations and individuals examined in this study from their 
inspection to their current manifestations. Mapping their evolution and 
transformation which provides key insights into the ambitions and grievances of a 
particular Jihadist organisation or individual as well as evidence for the three 
phases and categories of Jihadism and the sequential shift that some Middle 
Eastern and Southeast Asia based Jihadist organisations and individuals have 
undergone. The spectrum presents analysis that provides significant evidence 
supporting the claim that the phenomenon of Jihadism is a sub-category of 
Islamism which emerged from, and is part of, the wider phenomenon of Political-
Islam. The findings highlight that the phenomenon is not monolithic but, rather, 
that it is threefold consisting of fundamentally different ideological contours and 
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geopolitical grievances and ambitions. These are identified in this study as 
National, Regional and Global manifestations of Jihadism and thus collectively 
represent the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East 
while the first two represent the phenomenon in Southeast Asia.   
While the evidence collected in this study supports the view that there are 
three primary categories of Jihadist organisations and individuals, not all have 
undergone any sequential shift in ideological evolution or geopolitical 
transformation since their inspection. Examples here include, among others, 
HAMAS in the Gaza strip and the MILF in the southern Philippines. However, 
the study has presented significant evidence that some organisations and 
individuals have undergone one or more of the phases of Jihadism. These include, 
among others, JI in Southeast Asia and the GSPC (also a core AQIM member) in 
the Middle East which have undergone at least two phases and, moreover, have 
emerged as al-Qaeda affiliates in their respected regions and therefore have 
further evolved into independent and semi-autonomous representatives 
respectively of the Global Jihadist doctrine. Others, such as the EIJ, Tanzim al-
jihad and the collection of Jihadist organisations that make up AQIM, AQI and 
AQAP have undergone all three phases of Jihadism. Moreover, operatives and 
organisations such as JI and JAT in Southeast Asia, while not explicit adherents of 
the Global Jihadist doctrine, nevertheless, collaborate with and represent al-Qaeda 
in the region. Collectively, these groups form the cornerstone underpinning the 
wider al-Qaeda network and Global Jihadist phenomenon in the two regions.  
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Although sometimes having strategic links, it is argued that the three 
forms of Jihadism are fundamentally separate entities driven by different 
ideological and geopolitical grievances and ambitions that, over time, have come 
to manifest National, Regional and Global phenomena and phases of Islamist 
militant terrorism. The evidence presented indicates that, in the context of the two 
geographic regions examined, this process began in the Middle East in the early 
20
th
 Century and thereafter emerged in Southeast Asia in the mid- to late- 1940s. 
Although the study identifies and confirms that all three phases and hence 
categories of Jihadist organisations and individuals exist and are active in the 
Middle East, evidence indicates that only the National and Regional phases and 
categories of the Jihadist phenomenon have successfully emerged in Southeast 
Asia.  
It has been found that Jihadist organisations or individuals that have 
undergone one or more of the phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical 
transformation primarily results from ongoing direct ‘contact’ and/or strategic 
collaboration rather than an exclusively ‘natural’ evolutionary processes. 
Identifying the ideological evolution of a particular organisation or individual is 
often preceded by, and transferred through, increased interactions or strategic 
forms of collaboration such as the transfer of tactics, technologies and finances 
between the different categories of Jihadists. The thesis has presented evidence 
that political instability, authoritarian regimes and failing and/or failed states have 
all exacerbated the Jihadist phenomenon since its inception in the early 20
th
 
Century.  
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The proliferation of Jihadism has been particularly energised by conflicts, 
especially anti-colonialist violence in the post-WWI period and during and after 
WWII in both regions; Muslim-Jewish violence in Palestine; the 1967 Six Day 
and 1973 Yom Yippur Wars; the Afghan-Soviet War; the 1991 Gulf War; 
Muslim-Christian violence in post-Suharto Indonesia; the long running separatist 
conflicts in both the southern Philippines and southern Thailand; the post-9/11 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; and post-Arab Spring Syria. Collectively, these 
conflicts can be seen as ‘melting-pots’ for Jihadist strategic collaboration. They 
have attracted and provided organisations and individuals from across the Jihadist 
spectrum theatres in which to strengthen their tactics, strategies and relations and 
thus have acted as Jihadists incubators which have significantly catalysed the 
proliferation of the wider Jihadist phenomenon in the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia and beyond.  
The analysis has also identified that ongoing direct contact and strategic 
collaboration between National and Regional Jihadist organisations and 
individuals with Global Jihadists has had major implications in the post-9/11 
period, especially in the context of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification. 
It is argued that during the post-9/11 period, al-Qaeda has successfully dispersed 
into a multidimensional organisation that has amalgamated and infiltrated both 
Regional and National Jihadist theatres of operation as well as organisations. This 
development is primarily the result of al-Qaeda’s ability to harness strategic 
collaboration as a tool to gain footholds into National and Regional Jihadist 
organisations and their theatres of operation in an effort to influence, recruit, 
regenerate, and thus endure.    
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Most literature and reports examined in this study provide evidence that 
Jihadist organisations have experienced significant setbacks following increased 
global counter-terrorism and security measures in the wake of 9/11. There is, 
however, a gulf between that evidence and that which supports a decline in the 
overall Global Jihadist phenomenon, especially in the context of al-Qaeda 
‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadists, or a decline in Regional and National 
Jihadist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and beyond. The 
study has considered, and acknowledges, evidence supporting that idea that there 
have been significant successes in combating Jihadist organisations in both of the 
considered regions and worldwide since 9/11. These have, however, primarily 
targeted al-Qaeda, especially the organisations central command structure and 
fighters that form AQC, and its network of Global Jihadist ‘affiliates’ operations, 
activities and, in particular, their ability to carryout large scale militant terrorist 
attacks. The argument here is that while the successes made have, on the one hand, 
significantly reduced both AQC and AQC-affiliated Jihadist organisations 
capabilities, on the other hand, they have not led to a stemming of the overall 
geographic expanse and number of Global Jihadist organisations or Regional or 
National Jihadist organisations in the two considered regions.  
The thesis has presented analysis supporting the claim that there has been 
an overall increase in the wider Jihadist phenomenon since its inception in the 
early 20
th
 Century and, especially, since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, 
followed by additional spikes in the phenomenon throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
particularly in the post-2003 period. Although armed Islamic groups pre-date the 
beginning of the 20
th
 Century in both of the considered regions, the phenomenon 
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and ascent of Jihadist organisations do not; they first emerged in the early 1900s 
during which there was only a small number of National Jihadist organisations. In 
the Middle East these included the al-Qassam group in Palestine, al-Husseini’s 
Nazi facilitated campaign of terror against Jews in Palestine and Eastern Europe 
during WWII, and the Muslim Brotherhood (although it nolonger employs 
militant terrorism). In the context of Southeast Asia, these included Darul Islam 
and TII in Indonesia. By the late 1970s, National Jihadist organisations in the 
Middle East increased to include, among others, the EIJ, the Islamic Group in 
Algeria, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In Southeast Asia, the MILF in the 
southern Philippines and Komando Jihad and JMA in Indonesia emerged as 
National Jihadist organisations during this period. National Jihadism has 
represented the primary manifestation within the wider phenomenon and has 
spawned many more organisations throughout the post-1970s in both regions and 
beyond.  
From the late 1970s onwards, and in particular throughout the 1980s, the 
phenomenon underwent the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation 
away from an exclusively National Jihadist phenomenon to a Regional one as well. 
The development spawned a new generation of organisations and, in the context 
of Iran, and to some extent, Saudi Arabia, state sponsors. The analysis identified 
that those Middle East based organisations that emerged, or underwent ideological 
evolution and geopolitical transformation from a National to Regional Jihadist 
organisation during this period included, among others, the EIJ, the Tanzim al-
Jihad network, MAK, and al-Qaeda. In Southeast Asia they primarily included 
Komando Jihad and Group 272. Regional Jihadist organisations increased 
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significantly throughout the post-1980s period and represent the second largest 
pool within the wider phenomenon of Jihadism in both of the regions and 
elsewhere.  
A third overall increase in the Jihadist phenomenon was identified as 
emerging in the late 1990s. During this period the Regional Jihadist organisation 
al-Qaeda spawned the ascent of Global Jihadism which it signalled with the 
formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad in 1998. Al-Qaeda can be seen as 
the first Global Jihadist organisation and thus it represents the third phase of 
ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of Jihadism in the Middle 
East and has been attempting to establish itself in Southeast Asia. Throughout the 
post-1998 period, and especially in the 2000s, al-Qaeda and its Global Jihadist 
doctrine experienced considerable growth in both regions and beyond. The 
analysis identified the following Jihadist organisations, among others, in the two 
regions as joining or being linked to the al-Qaeda network or adopting its 
ideology throughout the post-1990s: the EIJ, the Tanzim al-Jihad network, the 
Islamic Group, the GSPC, Ansar al-Islam, Tawhid wa al-Jihad, and Jaish Ansar 
al-Sunnah. In Southeast Asia these have included, among others, Group 272, JI, 
ASG, and JAT.  
Although representing a minority within the wider pool of Jihadism, and 
significantly weakened militarily, the al-Qaeda-led Global Jihadist movement and 
doctrine and their operations endure. They have evolved throughout the post-9/11 
period following the U.S.-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan and, in particular, 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. These two conflicts, along with increased global 
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counter-terrorism efforts, have forced the decentralisation and diversification of 
al-Qaeda resulting in a far more clandestine organisation and directly facilitating 
an increase in al-Qaeda ‘affiliated’ organisations in the two considered regions as 
well as the unprecedented ascent of al-Qaeda ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist 
organisations, cells and individuals in the Middle East and beyond. The 
conclusion can be drawn that the global post-9/11 political and security 
environment and, in particular, the military responses in Afghanistan and Iraq to 
the Global Jihadist threat have been, although far from counter-productive, 
‘double-edged’. They provided al-Qaeda with the opportunity to disperse, readapt 
and regenerate and hence the ability to infiltrate and work alongside what are 
otherwise essentially Regional or National Jihadist organisations and theatres. 
Ultimately, this has allowed al-Qaeda additional exposure to further expand its 
ideological influence, techniques and recruitment potential across a wider 
geographic sphere and thus has increased the overall number of al-Qaeda 
‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist organisations since 9/11.  
Whist al-Qaeda has been unsuccessful in surpassing or matching the scale 
of destruction and lethality of the 9/11 attacks the overall increases in al-Qaeda 
‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ organisations, cells and individuals have, in turn, 
converted to an overall increase in Global Jihadist militant terror attacks as well as 
in the overall Jihadist phenomenon in the Middle East and beyond. This 
development has had a significantly impact in Southeast Asia where al-Qaeda has 
been actively seeking to infiltrate and establish itself since the late-1990s, and 
especially throughout the 2000s. Al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 decentralisation and 
diversification into Southeast Asia has accelerated the transfer of militant terrorist 
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capabilities and technologies and the Global Jihadist doctrine to the region and 
intensified the overall phenomenon which has thus resulted in the proliferation of 
attacks carried out by Jihadist organisations in the region in the post-9/11 period.    
Collectively, the analysis presented provides qualified support for the idea 
that the three phases of sequential ideological evolution and geopolitical 
transformation have ultimately produced an overall increase in the wider 
phenomenon of Jihadism in both regions. Increases have been identified in the 
overall number of organisations and individuals which adhere to National, 
Regional or Global Jihadist doctrines, as well as increases in the overall 
geographic expanse of the phenomenon since its inception in the early 20
th
 
Century. The thesis reaches the conclusion that National Jihadists represent the 
largest group, followed by Regional Jihadists as the second largest group, and 
Global Jihadists as the third largest group within the wider Jihadist phenomenon. 
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